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Scholars have recognized the benefits to science of Bayesian inference about the relative plau-
sibility of competing hypotheses as opposed to, say, falsificationism in which one either rejects
or fails to reject hypotheses in isolation. Yet inference about causal effects — at least as they are
conceived in the potential outcomes framework (Neyman, 1923; Rubin, 1974; Holland, 1986) —
has been tethered to falsificationism (Fisher, 1935; Neyman and Pearson, 1933) and difficult to in-
tegrate with Bayesian inference. One reason for this difficulty is that potential outcomes are fixed
quantities that are not embedded in statistical models. Significance tests about causal hypotheses in
either of the traditions traceable to Fisher (1935) or Neyman and Pearson (1933) conceive potential
outcomes in this way; randomness in inferences about about causal effects stems entirely from a
physical act of randomization, like flips of a coin or draws from an urn. Bayesian inferences, by
contrast, typically depend on likelihood functions with model-based assumptions in which poten-
tial outcomes — to the extent that scholars invoke them — are conceived as outputs of a stochastic,
data-generating model. In this dissertation, I develop Bayesian statistical inference for causal ef-
fects that incorporates the benefits of Bayesian scientific reasoning, but does not require probability
models on potential outcomes that undermine the value of randomization as the “reasoned basis”
for inference (Fisher, 1935, p. 14).
In the first paper, I derive a randomization-based likelihood function in which Bayesian infer-
ence of causal effects is justified by the experimental design. I formally show that, under weak
conditions on a prior distribution, as the number of experimental subjects increases indefinitely,
the resulting sequence of posterior distributions converges in probability to the true causal effect.
This result, typically known as the Bernstein-von Mises theorem, has been derived in the context of
parametric models. Yet randomized experiments are especially credible precisely because they do
not require such assumptions. Proving this result in the context of randomized experiments enables
scholars to quantify how much they learn from experiments without sacrificing the design-based
properties that make inferences from experiments especially credible in the first place.
Having derived a randomization-based likelihood function in the first paper, the second paper
turns to the calibration of a prior distribution for a target experiment based on past experimental re-
sults. In this paper, I show that usual methods for analyzing randomized experiments are equivalent
to presuming that no prior knowledge exists, which inhibits knowledge accumulation from prior
to future experiments. I therefore develop a methodology by which scholars can (1) turn results
of past experiments into a prior distribution for a target experiment and (2) quantify the degree of
learning in the target experiment after updating prior beliefs via a randomization-based likelihood
function. I implement this methodology in an original audit experiment conducted in 2020 and
show the amount of Bayesian learning that results relative to information from past experiments.
Large Bayesian learning and statistical significance do not always coincide, and learning is greatest
among theoretically important subgroups of legislators for which relatively less prior information
exists. The accumulation of knowledge about these subgroups, specifically Black and Latino leg-
islators, carries implications about the extent to which descriptive representation operates not only
within, but also between minority groups.
In the third paper, I turn away from randomized experiments toward observational studies,
specifically the Difference-in-Differences (DID) design. I show that DID’s central assumption of
parallel trends poses a neglected problem for causal inference: Counterfactual uncertainty, due to
the inability to observe counterfactual outcomes, is hard to quantify since DID is based on parallel
trends, not an as-if-randomized assumption. Hence, standard errors and 𝑝-values are too small
since they reflect only sampling uncertainty due to the inability to observe all units in a population.
Recognizing this problem, scholars have recently attempted to develop inferential methods for DID
under an as-if-randomized assumption. In this paper, I show that this approach is ill-suited for the
most canonical DID designs and also requires conducting inference on an ill-defined estimand.
I instead develop an empirical Bayes’ procedure that is able to accommodate both sampling and
counterfactual uncertainty under the DIDs core identification assumption. The overall method is
straightforward to implement and I apply it to a study on the effect of terrorist attacks on electoral
outcomes.
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At first glance, design-based and Bayesian methods for causal inference might appear to stand
in tension: In the potential outcomes conception of causality (Neyman, 1923; Rubin, 1974; Hol-
land, 1986), potential outcomes are fixed quantities that are not generated by an underlying prob-
ability model (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009, p. 10). Randomness in inferences of causal effects
stems solely from the physical act of randomization (Neyman, 1923; Fisher, 1935). The ran-
domness in outcomes is inherited from the assignment process that randomly selects which of a
units’ multiple potential outcomes is observed. In studies without randomization, it still repre-
sents a methodological ideal whereby the quality of an observational study depends on the extent
to which it is analogous to an ideal experiment (Cochran, 1965). Bayesian methods, by contrast,
typically depend on likelihood functions that impose strong modeling assumptions on potential
outcomes. In Bayesian causal inference, as developed in Rubin (1978) and Imbens and Rubin
(2015), a stochastic, data-generating model for potential outcomes is used to stochastically pre-
dict unobserved potential outcomes. While the value of randomization in Bayesian inference has
been subject to perennial debate, randomization’s value in this framework stems from enabling re-
searchers to “ignore” the assignment mechanism when using a potential outcomes model to predict
counterfactual quantities (Rubin, 1976; Rubin, 1978). In light of these differing (but not incompat-
ible) statistic traditions, what good comes out of the development of new methods in design-based,
Bayesian causal inference? And how can they improve applied practice in political science and the
social sciences more broadly?
Bayesian inference, at its core, consists of two central pillars. The first pillar is the prior distri-
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bution. The prior distribution consists of a researcher’s subjective beliefs, represented as a proba-
bility measure, about the plausibility of competing hypotheses. The second pillar is the likelihood
function, which is a formal quantitative rule for updating subjective beliefs about competing hy-
potheses upon observing evidence. In developing Bayesian inference of causal effects, my aim is
pragmatic; it is not to ground Bayesian inference in a priori, rational principles (see Ramsey, 1929;
Ramsey, 1931; Savage, 1954, and related “Dutch book” arguments). Bayesian inference, I will
argue, has several benefits for social-scientists that improve upon existing design-based methods
of causal inference.
First, in contrast to null hypothesis significance testing (NHST), Bayesianism permits more
nuanced conclusions from data. NHST is a coarse form of inference wherein a researcher picks
hypotheses to test and then either rejects or fails to reject them. Among the hypotheses that a
researcher fails to reject, are all equally plausible? Or, when combined with estimation, is the point
estimate the most plausible value of the parameter with plausibility monotonically decreasing in
distance from this estimate? The paradigm of NHST does not offer definitive answers to these
questions. Bayesianism, by contrast, permits a continuous measure of the relative plausibility of
competing hypotheses, not simply a binary (reject or fail to reject) claim about each hypothesis.
Second, social scientists are increasingly interested in how knowledge cumulates. Bayesian
inference enables scholars to encode prior information about causal quantities in a target popu-
lation and, subject to certain constraints on the prior distribution, to change beliefs in light of
new evidence. In short, researchers can do more than evaluate whether a new finding, viewed in
isolation, is statistically significant or not. Incorporating prior information enables scholars to as-
sess how much a finding contributes to learning relative to what they already know going into the
experiment.
Third, existing design-based methods fail to explicitly quantify the plausibility of competing
identification assumptions. For example, the sensitivity analyses of Cornfield et al. (1959) played
a crucial role in convincing the research community that smoking causes lung cancer. These sen-
sitivity analyses showed that an extremely severe violation of a design’s identification assumption
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would have to be present in order to alter the substantive conclusion that smoking causes lung can-
cer. But absent the belief that such a severe violation is implausible, such a sensitivity analysis has
no bearing on the causal relationship between smoking and lung cancer. A sensitivity analysis tells
us how our conclusions would change if a violation of a key assumption were to exist, but cannot
tell us whether such a violation does exist. Hence, drawing inferences about causal effects from
sensitivity analyses, which scholars routinely (albeit informally) do, implicitly invokes Bayesian
reasoning. Bayesianism therefore gives us a quantitative apparatus that we can use to formalize
this reasoning.
In this dissertation, I show how design-based causal inference can be augmented by Bayesian
methods, but without sacrificing the valuable properties that have drawn political scientists to ex-
periments and design-based inference more broadly. In this introduction, I first seek to put ran-
domization — a foundation of design-based inference — on firm footing in the context of Bayesian
inference about causal effects. Doing so necessarily engages with arguments in philosophy of sci-
ence that claim randomization possesses no special status for Bayesian inference. After hopefully
demonstrating the valuable — if not essential — role randomization plays in Bayesian inference,
I then summarize the three chapters of this dissertation. The first two chapters provide a treatment
of the two pillars of Bayesian inference — the likelihood and the prior — in randomized experi-
ments. The third and final chapter turns to observational studies and develops empirical Bayesian
inference for the Difference-in-Differences design.
The role of randomization in design-based inference
The case for random assignment, a pillar of design-based methods, stands on shaky ground
in the context of Bayesian inference. Indeed, there exists, as Berry and Kadane (1997, p. 813)
state, “a standard result that Bayesians need not randomize.” This statement refers to the result
that, in the context of a single agent who wants to infer the value of a fixed, but unknown, causal
parameter, the deterministic selection of an optimal assignment dominates random assignment. For
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this reason, a range of scholars argues that a Bayesian agent ought to deterministically (rather than
randomly) select an optimal assignment (e.g., Kasy, 2016; Bertsimas, Johnson, and Kallus, 2015;
Kallus, 2018; Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence, 2002; Letham et al., 2019), which is an argument that
builds on a long research tradition on the value of optimum assignment (Kiefer, 1959; Fedorov,
1972; Harville, 1975), but is especially relevant today in light of advances in computing power and
the increasing use of machine-learning methods to tackle causal problems.
In light of this standard result that Bayesians do not need to randomize, Bayesian arguments
for or against randomization differentiate between “experiments to learn” and “experiments to
prove” (Kadane and Seidenfeld, 1990). The former pertains to a nonstrategic setting in which the
researcher alone is the only actor who seeks to learn (i.e., revise prior beliefs) about a fixed causal
parameter. The latter pertains to a setting with strategic interactions between a researcher, on the
one hand, and either “nature” (e.g., Wu, 1981) or an adversarial audience (e.g., Banerjee, Chassang,
and Snowberg, 2017; Banerjee et al., 2020), on the other. Bayesian arguments for randomization
state that it can be justified in “experiments to prove,” but not in “experiments to learn” (Savage,
1954; Savage, 1962a; Savage, 1962b; Stone, 1969; Basu, 1980; Lindley, 1982; Suppes, 1982).
In short, randomization can be justified within a Bayesian framework by changing the setting
from a nonstrategic one with a single agent who wants to infer a fixed causal target to a strate-
gic setting with a Bayesian agent pitted against either “nature” or an adversarial audience. Yet a
Bayesian argument for randomization need not be based on rational grounds. It can be based in-
stead on epistemic grounds. For some scholars, the rational basis for optimum assignment implies
for it an epistemic justification (Urbach, 1985; Urbach, 1993; Howson and Urbach, 2006; Lindley
and Novick, 1981). By contrast, I argue that a single Bayesian agent whose sole aim is to learn
about the true value of a fixed causal parameter ought to reasonably (albeit irrationally) choose to
randomize.
In this framework wherein Bayesian inference is justified due to its practical benefits, not ax-
ioms of rational decision theory, randomization is valuable because it severs the relationship be-
tween how the data are generated and a researcher’s subjective beliefs. That is, under random
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assignment, data are stochastically generated by a known, physical mechanism (e.g., independent
coin flips or draws from an urn), not by a researcher’s belief about which assignment is optimal.
Randomization’s severing of the relationship between the data generating process and subjective
beliefs, implies that a Bayesian agent revises one’s prior (subjective) beliefs toward the true value
of the causal parameter. The first chapter of this dissertation aims to formally establish this point.
Outline of dissertation
In the context of Bayesian inference, epistemic justifications for random assignment typically
refer to the Bernstein-von Mises theorem. A key condition for this theorem is Cromwell’s rule, so
named in Lindley (1971), which states that a prior probability of either 1 or 0 ought to be assigned
to hypotheses that are either logically true or false.1 Subjective probability distributions that satisfy
Cromwell’s rule ensure that one’s prior beliefs can indeed change upon observing new evidence.
Under this assumption, the Bernstein-von Mises theorem implies that a Bayesian agent’s posterior
distribution will converge in probability to the true value of the target parameter.
This theoretical result, however, has been derived in the context of parametric models and an
assumed sampling process from an infinite superpopulation (Vaart, 1998, Section 10.2). Yet ran-
domized experiments are especially credible precisely because they do not require such assump-
tions. Therefore, in the first chapter of this dissertation, I derive a randomization-based likelihood
function in which Bayesian inference of causal effects is justified by the experimental design. I
then show that, so long as the prior distribution obeys Cromwell’s rule (i.e., does not assign prior
probability 1 or 0 to a hypothesis that could logically be true or false), as the number of experi-
mental subjects increases indefinitely, the resulting sequence of posterior distributions converges
in probability to the true causal effect. In practical terms, if a researcher conducts a sufficiently
large experiment, the posterior distribution will concentrate closely around the true effect regard-
1In explaining the rationale for Cromwell’s rule, Lindley (1971, p. 110) writes, “if a decision-maker thinks some-
thing cannot be true and interprets this to mean it has zero probability, he will never be influenced by any data, which
is surely absurd. So leave a little probability for the moon being made of green cheese; it can be as small as 1 in a
million, but have it there since otherwise an army of astronauts returning with samples of the said cheese will leave
you unmoved.”
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less of of the idiosyncrasies of an individual’s prior distribution. Establishing this Bernstein-von
Mises result enables scholars to quantify how much they learn from experiments without sacrific-
ing the design-based properties that make inferences from experiments especially credible in the
first place.
Chapter 1 establishes the value of randomization for Bayesian inference by showing that, under
mild conditions on a prior distribution, belief revision will be driven by reliable data, not idiosyn-
cratic prior beliefs. But if one’s aim is to avoid undue influence of researchers’ prior distributions,
then why incorporate prior beliefs at all? Chapter 1 focuses on the likelihood function and its role
in ensuring that the revision of beliefs satisfies a specific epistemic property. Chapters 2 and 3
provide two answers to the question of why scholars ought to incorporate prior beliefs in both an
experimental and observational context.
In chapter 2, I turn my attention to the second pillar of Bayesian inference, the prior distri-
bution. I show that usual methods for the analysis of experiments are equivalent to assuming an
absence of any prior information. This implicit assumption inhibits knowledge accumulation from
prior to future experiments, as well as assessments of how much one has learned from a new ex-
periment relative to baseline knowledge. I therefore develop a methodology that enables scholars
to (1) turn results of past experiments into a prior distribution for a target experiment and (2) quan-
tify the degree of learning in the target experiment after updating prior beliefs via a design-based
likelihood, the properties of which are established in chapter 2. I implement this methodology
via an original audit experiment I conducted in 2020 on racial responsiveness among state leg-
islators. I draw on data from prior audit experiments by Butler and Broockman (2011), Butler
(2014), and Butler and Crabtree (2017) to construct a prior distribution for this experiment and
then show the extent of Bayesian learning that results. Bayesian learning is greatest among sub-
groups, specifically Black and Latino legislators, which in turn has implications about the extent
to which descriptive representation exists not only within, but also between minority groups.
The third and final chapter shifts attention to observational studies, specifically the Difference-
in-Differences (DID) design. In this chapter, I focus specifically on inference, not estimation. I
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show that standard errors in DID designs statistically account for only sampling uncertainty, due
to the inability to sample all units from a target population, not counterfactual uncertainty, due
to the inability to observe counterfactual potential outcomes among whichever units one samples.
Existing methods of uncertainty quantification therefore yield incorrect and potentially misleading
standard errors in DID applications.
Recent attempts to resolve this problem statistically represent counterfactual uncertainty via
an assumed random assignment mechanism. Yet a key feature of the DID design is that its causal
conclusions are based not on assumptions about an assignment mechanism, but rather about av-
erage changes in counterfactual outcomes over time (parallel trends). I show further that such
design-based methods predicated on an as-if-randomized assumption are (1) often unable to gen-
erate meaningful inferences in the most canonical DID applications and (2) require interest in
ill-defined causal estimands. In contrast to these methods, I decompose the causal estimand of
interest into two parameters, one of which is characterized by sampling uncertainty and the other
by counterfactual uncertainty. I then develop an empirical Bayes’ procedure that is able to statis-
tically represent both sampling and counterfactual uncertainty under the DID’s core identification
assumption of parallel trends.
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Chapter 1: Bernstein-von Mises Theorem for Design-based Causal Inference
1.1 Introduction
Causal inferences from randomized experiments are especially credible — and indeed have
spawned a so-called “credibility revolution” (Angrist and Pischke, 2010) — since their validity
depends on only the integrity of the data collection and the adherence of statistical analysis to
the stated design. Importantly, causal inferences from randomized experiments do not depend on
probability models for the response variable, an assumed sampling process from an often vaguely
defined superpopulation or other (often tenuous) assumptions (Berk and Freedman, 2003). These
properties of design-based estimators and tests, ensured by random assignment, make experiments
ideally suited to either estimate or test hypotheses about causal effects.
Methods of Bayesian causal inference, by contrast, appear to come at the expense of random-
ization as the “reasoned basis” for inference (Fisher, 1935, p. 14). Bayesian causal inference typi-
cally invokes probability models on potential outcomes and/or assumes random sampling from an
infinite superpopulation (Rubin, 1978; Imbens and Rubin, 1997; Imbens and Rubin, 2015; Zhang,
Rubin, and Mealli, 2009). Randomization serves as the basis for Bayesian causal inference only
for specific cases in which binary or ordinal outcomes lend additional structure to potential out-
comes (Ding and Miratrix, 2019; Chiba, 2018; Keele and Quinn, 2017; Humphreys and Jacobs,
2015).
The contribution of this paper is to develop Bayesian inference that is justified by the experi-
mental design. The development of such inference has been difficult because, absent a probability
model of potential outcomes, a likelihood function based on only the assignment mechanism will
be unidentified for causal effects of interest— i.e., flat over multiple hypothetical values of causal
effects. Hence, Bayesian belief revision about causal effects is not generally possible. To circum-
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vent this problem, I derive a randomization-based likelihood function that conditions not on the full
realized data, but a suitably defined function (test-statistic) of them. I then prove that, under weak
conditions on a prior distribution, as the number of experimental subjects increases indefinitely,
the resulting sequence of posterior distributions converges in probability to the true causal effect.
This result, typically known as the Bernstein-von Mises theorem, has been derived in the context
of parametric models and an assumed sampling process from an infinite superpopulation (see, e.g.,
Vaart, 1998, Section 10.2). Establishing this result in the context of randomized experiments opens
up new possibilities for scholars to formally quantify what they learn from experiments relative to
prior knowledge, but without sacrificing their desirable design-based features.
The remaining portions of the paper proceed as follows: The first section lays out the general
framework for design-based causal inference. The succeeding section introduces a prior distribu-
tion on causal targets of interest and then derives a design-based likelihood function. The following
section then presents the Bernstein-von Mises theorem for design-based causal inference before the
final section provides a discussion and conclusion.
1.2 Formal setup
Consider a randomized experiment on a finite study population that consists of 𝑁 ≥ 4 units and
let the index 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁 runs over these 𝑁 units. Of the 𝑁 ≥ 4 units in the finite study population,
𝑛𝑇 ≥ 2 are assigned to the treatment condition and the remaining 𝑁 − 𝑛𝑇 = 𝑛𝐶 ≥ 2 are assigned to
control. The binary indicator variable 𝑍𝑖 = 1 or 𝑍𝑖 = 0 denotes whether individual unit 𝑖 is assigned
to treatment (𝑍𝑖 = 1) or control (𝑍𝑖 = 0). Let Ω = {𝒛 :
∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑧𝑖 = 𝑛𝑇 } be the set of possible values
of 𝒁 =
[
𝑍1, . . . , 𝑍𝑁
]⊤ and let |Ω| denote the number of assignments in (i.e., the cardinality of)
Ω.1 In a uniform, randomized experiment Pr(𝑍𝑖 = 1) =
𝑛𝑇
𝑁
and Pr(𝒁 = 𝒛) = Pr(𝒁 = 𝒛) = |Ω|−1.2
1Under 𝑁 independent Bernoulli assignments, there are 2𝑁 possible assignments. However, even if 𝑛𝑇 is not fixed
by design, 𝑛𝑇 can be fixed by conditioning on its observed value. The randomization distribution conditional on the
realized 𝑛𝑇 yields the same randomization distribution one would obtain if 𝑛𝑇 had been fixed ex ante by design. Hence,
this general setup pertains to both simple and completely randomized assignments even though the argument by which
one can regard 𝑛𝑇 as fixed is slightly different for each type of assignment.




However, in general, one can consider arbitrary PDFs on Ω in which 0 < Pr(𝒁 = 𝒛) < 1 for all
𝒛 ∈ Ω.
Adopting the terminology of Freedman (2009) and later Gerber and Green (2012), define a
potential outcomes schedule as a vector-valued function, 𝒚 : Ω ↦→ R𝑁 , which maps the set of
assignments, Ω, to an 𝑁-dimensional vector of real numbers, R𝑁 . More intuitively, a potential
outcomes schedule is a listing of how each study participant would have responded to any 𝒛 ∈
Ω that a random assignment process could produce. The vectors of potential outcomes are the
elements in the image of the potential outcomes schedule, 𝒚 : Ω ↦→ R𝑁 , and the individual potential
outcomes for unit 𝑖 are the 𝑖th entries of each of the 𝑁-dimensional vectors of potential outcomes.
With |Ω| possible assignments, there are in principle |Ω| vectors of potential outcomes. However,
under the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) (Cox, 1958; Rubin, 1980; Rubin,
1986)3, let 𝑦𝑇𝑖 denote the common outcome value of unit 𝑖 for all 𝒛 ∈ Ω with 𝑧𝑖 = 1. Likewise,
let 𝑦𝐶𝑖 denote the common outcome value of unit 𝑖 for all 𝒛 ∈ Ω with 𝑧𝑖 = 0. The vectors 𝒚𝑪 and
𝒚𝑻 denote the collection of control and treatment potential outcomes, respectively, for all 𝑁 units.
The observed outcome for unit 𝑖 is 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑍𝑖𝑦𝑇𝑖 + (1 − 𝑍𝑖)𝑦𝐶𝑖, which is either 𝑦𝑇𝑖 or 𝑦𝐶𝑖 depending
on whether the randomly selected 𝒛 ∈ Ω is with 𝑧𝑖 = 1 or 𝑧𝑖 = 0. If baseline covariate data
exist, denote the 𝐾-dimensional row vector of baseline covariates for unit 𝑖 by 𝒙⊤𝑖 , where 𝐾 is the
number of covariates, and the 𝑁 × 𝐾 matrix of baseline covariates by 𝒙⊤. All inferences condition
on the potential outcomes and baseline covariates of all 𝑁 study units, as well as on the event that
the assignment vector is an element of Ω. To make the notation cleaner, I leave this conditioning
implicit.
Denote the individual treatment effect on the additive scale by 𝜏𝑖 ≡ 𝑦𝑇𝑖 − 𝑦𝐶𝑖 and the collection
of the 𝑁 individual treatment effects by 𝝉 =
[
𝜏1 𝜏2 . . . 𝜏𝑁
]⊤. At least since Neyman (1923),
one inferential target is the average treatment effect given by 𝜏 ≡ 𝑁−1 ∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝜏𝑖. Denote a hypotheti-
cal value of the true average causal effect by 𝜏ℎ and the parameter space of hypothetical values of 𝜏
3SUTVA implies that (1) units in the experiment respond to only the treatment condition to which each unit is
individually assigned and (2) the treatment condition is actually the same treatment for all units assigned to treatment
and the control condition is the same for all units assigned to control.
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by Θ𝜏ℎ . Alternatively, another target of inference, often associated with Fisher (1935), is the entire
𝑁-dimensional vector of individual causal effects, 𝝉. Denote a hypothetical vector of individual
causal effects by 𝝉ℎ. In principle, the space of 𝝉ℎ could be 𝑁-dimensional, reflecting hypothetical
values of 𝜏𝑖 for all 𝑁 units. However, I consider only the set of constant, additive causal hypotheses
denoted by Θ𝜏ℎ , the implications of which I discuss in Section 1.5.2. I refer to 𝜏ℎ as a weak causal
hypothesis and 𝜏ℎ as a sharp causal hypothesis, where 𝜏ℎ is no longer in bold to emphasize that it
is a 1-dimensional constant effect for all 𝑁 units.
1.3 Extant approaches to Bayesian causal inference
In the formal setup in Section 1.2, randomness stems solely from the PDF on the set of as-
signments, Ω. In a randomized experiment, this distribution is known by the researcher. Bayesian
inference typically proceeds by defining a likelihood function that conditions on the full realized
data, which are typically conceived as i.i.d draws from a random distribution of potential outcomes.
However, when potential outcomes are fixed quantities and inference is based on the assignment
mechanism (as described in Section 1.2 above), an identified likelihood function that conditions
on the full realized data cannnot generally be constructed.
To see this point, note that an assumed weak causal hypothesis does not imply a distribution
of potential outcomes. However, an assumed sharp causal hypothesis does. Therefore, we can
define an exact likelihood function that, when supplied a sharp causal hypothesis, assigns some
probability to the full realized data. Once we have postulated values for missing potential outcomes
according to a sharp causal hypothesis under one assignment, the vectors of outcomes we would
observe for all possible assignments are known. Under random assignment, the proportion of
these vectors that are equal to the vector of outcomes we actually did observe is the probability
that a sharp causal hypothesis assigns to the observed data. More generally, without imposing any
assumptions on potential outcomes, we can derive what Aronow and Miller (2019, p. 93) refer to
11




1{𝒚 = 𝒚𝒛ℎ} Pr(𝒁 = 𝒛) for 𝒚𝒛ℎ ∈ Y𝒛ℎ, (1.1)
where Y𝒛ℎ is the set of outcome vectors we would observe for each possible assignment in Ω if a
sharp causal hypothesis were true and 1{·} is the indicator function that returns the value of 1 if its
argument is true and 0 otherwise.
Such an exact likelihood function suffers from at least two pathological properties. First, under
the sharp causal hypothesis of 𝜏ℎ = 0, the vector of observed outcomes, 𝒚, is fixed over all assign-
ments. Hence, 1{𝒚 = 𝒚𝒛ℎ} in Equation (1.1) will return the value of 1 for all 𝒛 ∈ Ω, which implies
that the probability 𝜏ℎ = 0 assigns to the observed data will always be
∑
𝒛∈Ω Pr(𝒁 = 𝒛) = 1. For
other causal hypotheses, 𝜏ℎ : 𝜏ℎ ≠ 0, the likelihood function will typically be flat over different
values of 𝜏ℎ and, hence, will be equally consistent with a range of sharp causal hypotheses.
These pathologies can be somewhat resolved when outcomes are binary or ordinal. In partic-
ular, Copas (1973) shows that it is possible to derive a partially identified randomization-based
likelihood function when outcomes are binary. Ding and Miratrix (2019) then show how scholars
can conduct model-free Bayesian inference via such a randomization-based likelihood function
(see also Keele and Quinn, 2017; Humphreys and Jacobs, 2015). Chiba (2018) extends this logic
for the case of binary outcomes to that of ordinal outcomes. Yet the lack of binary or ordinal
outcomes in many applications makes such a randomization-based likelihood function untenable.
Given the difficulties of such model-free Bayesian inference, an alternative is to derive a like-
lihood function from a probability model of the joint distribution of potential outcomes. In this ap-
proach, as Imbens and Rubin (2015, p. 141) state, “potential outcomes themselves are also viewed
as random variables, even in the finite sample.” With stochastic potential outcomes, the essential
role of randomization is that it implies that one can “ignore the assignment mechanism when mak-
ing causal inferences” (Rubin, 1976, p. 233), hence the term “ignorability” (Rubin, 1976; Rubin,
1978).4 Random assignment ensures the independence between 𝒀𝑪 ,𝒀𝑻 and 𝒁. Therefore, we can
4Rubin (1976) and Rubin (1978) originally used the term “ignorability” in a Bayesian context to denote the situation
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ignore the assignment process and instead need to consider only (1) the prior distribution of the
potential outcome model’s parameters, 𝜽 , and (2) the likelihood of the potential outcomes condi-
tional on the model parameters. In practice, since no two potential outcomes are observable for the
same unit, Imbens and Rubin (2015) transform the potential outcomes into observed and missing
potential outcomes and derive the likelihood function of 𝑓 (𝒀 |𝜽), which is the marginal distribution
of observed potential outcomes after integrating out missing potential outcomes.
With a likelihood function derived from a model of the joint distribution of potential outcomes,
we can derive a posterior distribution of 𝜽 . Upon updating on 𝜽 , we can (1) draw from the posterior
distribution of 𝜽 , (2) input each draw as the parameters of the model of potential outcomes, (3) draw
from the model of potential outcomes, (4) impute these draws for the missing potential outcomes
and (5) directly calculate a function of the two vectors of (partially observed and partially imputed)
potential outcomes, e.g., the mean causal effect. Repeating this procedure many times yields a
simulation-based approximation to the posterior distribution of an estimand, such as the mean
causal effect.
Yet a central concern of this methodology is that inference now depends on a stochastic model
of potential outcomes, not only a known assignment process. Thus, one of the central appeals of
experiments — the ability to draw inferences based on only a known assignment process — no
longer obtains. Indeed, Imbens and Rubin (2015, p. 142) emphasize that “[o]ne of the practical
issues in the model-based approach is the choice of a credible model for imputing the missing
potential outcomes” and that “fundamentally the resulting inference may be more sensitive to the
modeling assumptions.” Thus, the ability to conduct Bayesian inference and quantify how much
we learn from an experiment appears to come at the expense of inference that depends on only a
known assignment process, not unverifiable probability models of potential outcomes.
As a solution to this impasse, I derive a likelihood function of causal effects that conditions not
on the full realized data, but rather a test-statistic of them. Conditioning on a suitable test-statistic
in which a correct posterior distribution will result from a likelihood function that ignores the stochastic assignment
process. Random assignment satisfies this ignorability condition. This original conception of ignorability differs
from later notions of “strong ignorability” (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) that pertain to Frequentist inference of
superpopulation parameters.
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yields a likelihood function that avoids the pathologies of a design-based likelihood function that
conditions on the full data. In particular, I show that the likelihood function I derive implies the
following property: Given weak conditions on a prior distribution — namely, that the true effect
is in the prior distribution’s support — scholars will revise their beliefs in a way that (so long as
the experimental population is sufficiently large) the posterior distribution concentrates around the
true causal effect. Such Bayesian inference therefore satisfies an important theoretical guarantee
regarding its ability to track the true causal effect. Section 1.4 to follow lays out the asymptotic
framework for this result and then Section 1.5 formally establishes this property, first for weak and
then for sharp causal hypotheses.
1.4 Asymptotic framework for design-based Bayesian causal inference
The theoretical property described above is an asymptotic one that pertains to limiting sta-
tistical properties over an infinite sequence of finite populations of increasing sizes. Thus, the
argument to follow embeds a finite experimental population in an imaginary sequence of finite
populations of increasing sizes. In actual practice, we only ever conduct a randomized experiment
on a finite number of 𝑁 units. Nevertheless, following the insight of Lehmann (1999, p. 255), the
purpose of embedding an experiment in this imaginary sequence of finite populations is “to obtain
a simple and accurate approximation. The embedding sequence is thus an artifice and has only this
purpose.” In other words, the asymptotic properties of design-based Bayesian inference to follow
offer a valuable approximation to the statistical properties of design-based Bayesian inference in
an actual experiment with a fixed, but large 𝑁 .
A common asymptotic regime in design-based causal inference (as in, e.g., Middleton and
Aronow, 2015; Bowers and Leavitt, 2020) is given by Brewer (1979). In this conception of asymp-
totic growth, each finite population in the infinite sequence of finite populations is a specified num-
ber of copies of the original finite population. Hence, all relevant quantities, namely, 𝑛𝑇/𝑁 , as
well as the means, variances and covariance of potential outcomes — denoted by ?̄?𝑇 , ?̄?𝐶 , 𝜎2𝑦𝑇 , 𝜎
2
𝑦𝐶
and 𝜎𝑦𝑇 ,𝑦𝐶 , respectively — are fixed constants for each 𝑁 over the entire sequence of finite popu-
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lations. This asymptotic regime implicitly embeds several regularity conditions that are standard
in the literature (see, e.g., Lin, 2013; Freedman, 2008; Cohen and Fogarty, 2020, among others).
In contrast to the asymptotic regime in Brewer (1979), I assume only these regularity conditions
whereby there is no other information whatsoever between any two populations in the sequence
of finite populations.5 The mild regularity conditions on the sequence of finite populations are as
follows:6










𝑦4𝑇𝑖 < 𝐿 < ∞.
2. Condition 2: As 𝑁 → ∞, the proportion of treated units, 𝑛𝑇
𝑁
, tends to a positive value
strictly greater than 0 and less than 1, i.e.,
𝑛𝑇
𝑁
→ 𝑝 ∈ (0, 1) as 𝑁 → ∞, which, since
𝑛𝑇 + 𝑛𝐶 = 𝑁 , also implies that
𝑛𝐶
𝑁
→ 1 − 𝑝 as 𝑁 →∞ .

























𝑦2𝐶𝑖 are Cesàro summable, i.e., tend to finite limits as 𝑁 → ∞, where, adopting the
angle bracket notation of Freedman (2008), these finite limits are denoted by ⟨𝑦𝑇 ⟩, ⟨𝑦𝐶⟩,
⟨𝑦𝐶 𝑦𝑇 ⟩, ⟨𝑦2𝑇 ⟩ and ⟨𝑦2𝐶⟩, respectively.
Regularity condition 1 ensures that the variance of an estimator of the Difference-in-Means’ vari-
ance tends to 0 as 𝑁 → ∞. The relevance of this property for Bayesian causal inference will be
explained shortly. The importance of Conditions 2 and 3 is to ensure that limits of 𝜏 and 𝑁 Var
[ ˆ̄𝜏]
exist over the sequence of finite populations of increasing sizes.
Under regularity conditions 1 — 3, Theorem 1 of Freedman (2008) shows that
√
𝑁 ( ˆ̄𝜏 − E[ ˆ̄𝜏]) 𝑑→ N(0, 𝜈), (1.2)
5For the value of such an asymptotic regime, see the brief but insightful discussion in Sävje, Aronow, and Hudgens
(2021, Section 5). Delevoye and Sävje (2020) also discuss the value of this asymptotic regime in passing.
6In writing these conditions and in laying out the general asymptotic argument moving forward, one ought to
index potential outcomes and other quantities in the infinite sequence of finite populations by 𝑁; however, for cleaner
notation and in accordance with standard practice, I leave this indexing implicit.
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where ˆ̄𝜏 is the Difference-in-Means of the observed data and 𝜈 is the asymptotic variance of the
centered Difference-in-Means scaled by
√




− (1 − 𝒁)
⊤𝒀















𝑁 ( ˆ̄𝜏 − 𝜏)] = lim
𝑁→∞




1 − 𝑝 ⟨𝑦
2
𝐶⟩ + 2⟨𝑦𝐶 𝑦𝑇 ⟩. (1.4)
Due to Slutsky’s theorem (Slutsky, 1925), Equation (1.2) can be equivalently expressed as
ˆ̄𝜏 − E[ ˆ̄𝜏]√
Var[ ˆ̄𝜏]
𝑑→ N(0, 1). (1.5)
In addition to the finite population CLT, the application of the Berry-Esseen theorem in Höglund
(1978) bounds the error of the Normal approximation to the distribution of the sample sum un-
der simple random sampling from a finite population. For this theorem to be relevant for the
Difference-in-Means, one needs only to note that, when the number of treated units is fixed, the
Difference-in-Means in Equation (1.3) can be expressed as a sample sum via scale and shift factors
















This representation of the Difference-in-Means as a sample sum calculated on a random sample
from a finite population assumes complete random assignment, which renders 𝑛𝑇 and 𝑛𝐶 fixed
constants. However, 𝑛𝑇 and 𝑛𝐶 would not be fixed under a random assignment process of, e.g., 𝑁
independent Bernoulli trials. Consequently, Höglund’s bound on the error of the Normal approxi-
mation to the Difference-in-Means would no longer be available. To alleviate this concern, we can
fix 𝑛𝑇 by conditioning on its observed value. The randomization distribution of the Difference-in-
Means conditional on the realized 𝑛𝑇 yields the same distribution one would obtain if 𝑛𝑇 had been
fixed ex ante by design. Thus, in sum, Höglund’s Berry-Esseen theorem implies that, so long as
an experiment is of at least moderate size and experimental units’ potential outcomes are not too
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skewed or characterized by extreme outliers,
ˆ̄𝜏 − E[ ˆ̄𝜏]√
Var[𝜏]
approx.∼ N(0, 1) or, equivalently, ˆ̄𝜏 approx∼ N(E[ ˆ̄𝜏],Var[ ˆ̄𝜏]). (1.7)
The equivalence in (1.7) holds due to the Normal distribution’s closure under location-scale trans-
formations; any errors in usingN(0, 1) to approximate the distribution of the standardized Difference-
in-Means estimator will be scaled by the standard error when using N(E[ ˆ̄𝜏],Var[ ˆ̄𝜏]) to approx-
imate the distribution of the unstandardized Difference-in-Means estimator. Taken together, the
finite population CLT and Höglund’s Berry-Esseen theorem justify the use of a Normal likelihood
function in which the probability density of the observed data, summarized by the Difference-in-
Means, is a function of two parameters, E[ ˆ̄𝜏] and Var[ ˆ̄𝜏].
Under random assignment and SUTVA, E[ ˆ̄𝜏] is equal to 𝜏, which is our target parameter of
interest. The parameter Var[ ˆ̄𝜏], however, is a nuisance parameter. The standard Bayesian ap-
proach to eliminating a nusiance parameter is by marginalizing over its distribution (Berger, Liseo,
and Wolpert, 1999; Liseo, 2005). Other common approaches include conditioning on a sufficient
statistic (Reid, 1995), plug-in estimation and worst case inference over all possible values of the
nuisance parameter or its confidence set (Berger and Boos, 1994). This issue of eliminating a
nuisance parameter arises only for a weak causal hypothesis, which implies a value of only the
expectation of the Difference-in-Means, not its variance. Sharp causal hypotheses, by contrast,
imply a values for both the expected value and variance parameters of the Difference-in-Means.
In the context of inference of average affects, applied scholars are unlikely to have well moti-
vated prior beliefs about the variance of the Difference-in-Means. Hence, eliminating the variance
parameter by marginalizing over its distribution is unattractive. Thus, for weak causal hypotheses,
the Bayesian procedure to follow eliminates the variance nuisance parameter not by integrating
over its distribution as is standard in Bayesian approaches, but instead via conservative plug-in
estimation. This approach effectively plugs in a conservative estimator for the variance and then
proceeds as if the variance parameter is known.
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With a uniform PDF on the set of possible assignments, Ω, Neyman (1923) showed that the
variance of the Difference-in-Means estimator is
Var















(𝑦𝑇𝑖 − ?̄?𝑇 )2





𝑆2𝜏 = (𝑁 − 1)−1
𝑁∑
𝑖=1
(𝜏𝑖 − 𝜏)2 .
A natural plug-in estimator for the variance parameter is the conservative variance estimator whose
expected value is always at least as great as Var[ ˆ̄𝜏] for any fixed 𝑁 (Neyman, 1923).7 Neyman’s








where 𝑠2𝑦𝑇 and 𝑠
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For inference of weak causal effects, this plug-in estimation approach obviates the need for scholars
to define priors over the variance parameter. Instead, scholars can simply define prior beliefs over
7The use of alternative, improved variance estimators is also possible, e.g., from Aronow, Green, Lee, et al. (2014)
in completely randomized experiments and Imai (2008), Fogarty (2018) and Pashley and Miratrix (2021) in finely
stratified experiments.
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the average causal effect and subsequently update those beliefs upon observing new experimental
data. Therefore, let 𝑝(𝜏ℎ) denote the prior PDF on the hypothetical values of the mean causal effect




which serves as the argument to the standard Normal likelihood function. The output of the stan-
dard Normal likelihood function is a probability density of the observed data, summarized by
ˆ̄𝜏, given a hypothesis about the average causal effect, 𝜏ℎ, and an estimate of the variance of the
Difference-in-Means, V̂ar[ ˆ̄𝜏]. With a prior distribution of 𝑝(𝜏ℎ), the standardized test-statistic in
Equation (1.10) and standard Normal likelihood function, inference proceeds via Bayes’ rule.
For sharp causal hypotheses, Section 1.5.2 derives an exact likelihood function. However, Nor-
mal approximations to the Difference-in-Means distribution implied by a sharp causal hypothesis
are possible. One needs only to substitute into Equation (1.10) the average effect and variance of
the Difference-in-Means implied by a sharp causal hypothesis. With such a likelihood function
— either exact or a Normal approximation — and a prior distribution, 𝑝(𝜏ℎ), inference of sharp
causal effects also proceeds via Bayes’ rule.
1.5 Bernstein-von Mises Theorem for Design-based Causal Inference
It is important not only to demonstrate that design-based Bayesian causal inference is possible,
but also to show that such inference reliably recovers the true causal effect. Therefore, I now prove
a version of the Bernstein-von Mises theorem for design-based Bayesian inference of the average
causal effect. I first consider weak causal hypotheses and show in Theorem 1 that, under mild
conditions on the prior distribution, 𝑝(𝜏ℎ), the posterior distribution of 𝜏ℎ converges in probability
(over a sequence of finite populations of increasing sizes) to the true mean causal effect. I then
establish an analogous result for sharp causal hypotheses in Theorem 2. In practical terms, both
results imply that, so long as one has not unduly excluded possible values of the causal effect
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from the prior distribution, then, in a sufficiently large experiment, the posterior distribution will
concentrate closely around the true causal effect.
1.5.1 Weak causal hypotheses
To prove a version of the Bernstein-von Mises theorem for weak causal hypotheses, I first es-
tablish Lemma 1, which states that the conservative variance estimator in Equation (1.9) converges
in probability to a constant at least as great as the true asymptotic variance, 𝜈, in Equation (1.2).
The proof of Lemma 1, as well as all other proofs, are in ??.
Lemma 1. Under regularity conditions 1 – 3, as 𝑁 → ∞, 𝑁V̂ar[
ˆ̄𝜏]
𝜈
𝑝→ 𝑐 ≥ 1, where 𝜈 =
lim
𝑁→∞




1 − 𝑝 ⟨𝑦
2
𝐶⟩ + 2⟨𝑦𝐶 𝑦𝑇 ⟩ is the asymptotic variance of the centered
Difference-in-Means test-statistic scaled by
√
𝑁 .
Under conditions 1 – 3, the variance estimator, V̂ar[
√
𝑁 ˆ̄𝜏], is not consistent for the asymptotic




𝑁 ˆ̄𝜏]. Yet an application of Slutsky’s theorem, an important step of the
theoretical result to follow, requires only that the variance estimator converge in probability to a
constant, not necessarily the target parameter. Lemma 1 shows that the random quantity V̂ar[
√
𝑁 ˆ̄𝜏]
converges to a constant that is always at least as great as the true asymptotic variance denoted by
𝜈.
Armed with Lemma 1, Theorem 1 below states that the limiting posterior probability of weak
causal hypotheses arbitrarily close to true average causal effect tends to 1 as 𝑁 →∞.
Theorem 1. Define Θ∗𝜏ℎ ≡ {𝜏ℎ : 𝜏 − 𝜀 < 𝜏ℎ < 𝜏 + 𝜀}, where 𝜀 is an arbitrarily small constant
greater than 0, 𝜀 > 0, and assume regularity conditions 1 – 3. If Θ∗𝜏ℎ is in the support of the prior
distribution, 𝑝(𝜏ℎ), then, as the size of the experiment increases indefinitely, 𝑁 →∞, the posterior





𝑓 ( ˆ̄𝜏 | 𝜏ℎ, V̂ar[ ˆ̄𝜏])𝑝(𝜏ℎ)𝑑 𝜏ℎ∫
𝜏ℎ∈Θ?̄?ℎ
𝑓 ( ˆ̄𝜏 | 𝜏ℎ, V̂ar[ ˆ̄𝜏])𝑝(𝜏ℎ)𝑑 𝜏ℎ
= 1.
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To provide more intuition for Theorem 1, note that we can equivalently write the test-statistic
in Equation (1.10) as √
𝑁 ( ˆ̄𝜏 − 𝜏) +
√






As Lemma 1 shows, the denominator converges in probability to a constant that is at least as great
as the true asymptotic variance of the test-statistic. When the weak causal hypothesis is true, 𝜏ℎ =
𝜏, Slutsky’s theorem and the continuous mapping theorem imply that Equation (1.11) converges
in distribution to 𝑍/𝑐, where 𝑍 is the standard Normal distribution and 𝑐 is a constant greater than
or equal to 1 (as defined in Lemma 1). By contrast, when 𝜏ℎ ≠ 𝜏, note that
√
𝑁 (𝜏 − 𝜏ℎ) will
increase or decrease without bound . Hence, Equation (1.11) will diverge in probability to either
−∞ or +∞. Finally, since the standard Normal likelihood function is monotonically decreasing
in distance from 0, the probability density that the standard Normal distribution assigns to the
observable test-statistic when 𝜏ℎ is false will tend to 0 as 𝑁 →∞. As the likelihood of any false 𝜏ℎ
tends to 0 as 𝑁 →∞, so does the posterior probability of false hypothetical values of the average.
Thus, by the law of total probability, the posterior distribution will concentrate increasingly around
the true average effect.
To illustrate this point, consider the results of the following simple simulation depicted in Fig-
ure 1.1. The experimental population consists of 20 units whose true control potential outcomes
are randomly drawn from the distribution N(50, 100) and then fixed at their realized values. Sub-
sequent references to convergence or divergence in probability refer to the probability distribution
over repeated randomizations (i.e., over Ω as described in Section 1.2). I define the treated poten-
tial outcomes as the control potential outcomes plus a constant, additive effect of 𝜏 = 10, which
implies that 𝜏 = 10. For expository purposes, I define a uniform prior on only two weak causal
hypotheses, 𝜏ℎ = 5 and 𝜏ℎ = 𝜏 = 10. Drawing on the asymptotic regime of Brewer (1979), which
satisfies regularity conditions 1 – 3, I then let the sequence of finite populations increase by simply
copying this initial finite population an increasing number of times.
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False weak causal hypothesis True weak causal hypothesis
Figure 1.1: Distributions of likelihoods and posterior probabilities over repeated randomizations
Since 𝜏ℎ = 5 is too small, the randomization distribution of the standardized Difference-in-
Means in Equation (1.11) diverges in probability to −∞. Thus, as Figure 1.1 shows, when 𝜏ℎ ≠ 𝜏,
the probability density that the standard Normal distribution assigns to a draw of the standardized
test-statistic in Equation (1.11) tends to 0 as 𝑁 → ∞. When 𝜏ℎ = 𝜏, the probability density
that the standard Normal distribution assigns to a draw of the standardized test-statistic takes on
values between 0 and 1/
√
2𝜋 ≈ 0.4, which is the maximum probability density of the standard
Normal distribution. Since the likelihood of the false weak causal hypothesis (𝜏ℎ = 5) tends to 0
asymptotically, so does the product of its prior and likelihood. Normalizing by the total probability
of the evidence thereby implies, by the law of total probability, that the posterior distribution
concentrates increasingly around the true weak causal hypothesis (𝜏ℎ = 10) as 𝑁 →∞
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1.5.2 Sharp causal hypotheses
The general spirit of Theorem 1 also applies to sharp causal hypotheses. Theorem 1 for weak
causal hypotheses invokes a Normal likelihood function that is justified by the finite population
CLT and Höglund’s Berry-Esseen theorem. It is possible, however, to derive a similar result with-
out invoking the asymptotic Normality of the Difference-in-Means so long as inferences pertain
to sharp rather than weak causal effects. I now derive a result analogous to Theorem 1 for sharp
causal hypotheses.
In the same way, that the likelihood function for weak causal hypotheses in Section 1.5.1 is
based on the centered Difference-in-Means, define the individual outcome for unit 𝑖 adjusted (or
centered) by its true individual causal effect as 𝑦𝑖 ≡ 𝑦𝑖 − 𝜏𝑧𝑖. Under SUTVA, ?̃?𝑖 = 𝑦𝐶𝑖 regardless
of whether 𝑧𝑖 = 0 or 𝑧𝑖 = 1 for all 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁 . Hence, regardless of whichever data are realized,
the collection of all 𝑁 adjusted outcomes, ?̃? =
[
?̃?1 . . . ?̃?𝑁
]⊤, is fixed over all 𝒛 ∈ Ω and thereby
satisfies the sharp causal hypothesis of no effect. (Recall that the sharp causal hypothesis of no
effect implies that an outcome vector is fixed over all possible assignments, just like ?̃?.)
We can therefore derive a likelihood function in which we adjust the observed data via a hy-
pothetical causal effect and then assess how consistent the adjusted data are with the sharp null
of no effects. That is, for a sharp causal hypothesis, 𝜏ℎ, given some realization of data, (𝒛, 𝒚), we
adjust each observed outcome as ?̃?𝑖ℎ = 𝑦𝑖 − 𝜏ℎ𝑧𝑖. If 𝜏ℎ is true, then ?̃?𝑖ℎ is equal to the true adjusted
outcome, ?̃?𝑖. Under the sharp null, treatment and control distributions are identical, so when the
𝜏ℎ used to adjust outcomes is true, treatment and control distributions in the adjusted data should
appear similar. Conversely, when 𝜏ℎ is false, treatment and control distributions in the adjusted
data should appear dissimilar.
Analogous to the result in Theorem 1, let the test-statistic be the Difference-in-Means given by






(1 − 𝑧𝑖)𝑣𝑖, where 𝒗 ∈ R𝑁 . (1.12)
Conditional on some realization of data, (𝒛, 𝒚), the Difference-in-Means test-statistic for a test of
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the sharp causal hypothesis of no effect on the adjusted outcome vector is 𝑡 (𝒁, ?̃?ℎ). The outcome
vector adjusted by a sharp causal hypothesis, ?̃?ℎ, is in lowercase because, conditional on a realiza-
tion of data, it is fixed over all 𝒛 ∈ Ω under the sharp causal hypothesis of no effect. When referring
to the test-statistic unconditional on a realization of data, the test-statistic is 𝑡 (𝒁, ?̃?ℎ), where ?̃?ℎ is
in uppercase because it can vary over different possible realizations of (𝒁,𝒀).8 Regardless of the
𝜏ℎ one uses to adjust the observed outcomes, E[𝑡 (𝒁, ?̃?ℎ)] = 0 and E[𝑡 (𝒁, ?̃?ℎ)] = 𝜏 − 𝜏ℎ.
An exact likelihood function for a test of 𝜏ℎ that conditions on the Difference-in-Means test-
statistic of the realized data is given by
𝑓 (𝑇 | 𝜏ℎ) = Pr(𝑡 (𝒁, ?̃?ℎ) = 𝑇) =
∑
𝒛∈Ω
1{𝑡 (𝒛, ?̃?ℎ) = 𝑇} Pr(𝒁 = 𝒛), (1.13)
where 𝑇 is the observed test-statistic calculated on the outcomes adjusted by a sharp causal hy-
pothesis. Intuitively, the likelihood function in Equation (1.13) returns the probability of observing
the test-statistic we did observe if the sharp causal hypothesis of 𝜏ℎ were true. This likelihood
function resembles the one in Equation (1.1) in Section 1.3. The key difference is that, instead of
conditioning on the realized outcomes, it conditions on the realized test-statistic.
Theorem 2 below shows that, under weak conditions on the prior, Bayesian inference will
recover the true causal effect asymptotically.
Theorem 2. Define Θ∗𝜏ℎ ≡ {𝜏ℎ : 𝜏 − 𝜑 < 𝜏ℎ < 𝜏 + 𝜑}, where 𝜑 is an arbitrarily small constant
greater than 0, 𝜑 > 0. Let the test-statistic be the Difference-in-Means and assume regularity
Conditions 2 – 3. If Θ∗𝜏ℎ is in the support of the prior distribution, 𝑝(𝜏ℎ), then, as the size of the





𝑓 (𝑇 | 𝜏ℎ)𝑝(𝜏ℎ)𝑑 𝜏ℎ∫
𝜏ℎ∈Θ𝜏ℎ
𝑓 (𝑇 | 𝜏ℎ)𝑝(𝜏ℎ)𝑑 𝜏ℎ
= 1.
8In particular, the test-statistic unconditional on a realization of data, 𝑡 (𝒁, ?̃?ℎ), will vary over assignments if and
only if 𝜏ℎ is false.
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To provide intuition for Theorem 2, consider the same simple simulation in Section 1.5.1,
except now let inference pertain to a sharp rather than weak causal effect. To reiterate, the experi-
mental population consists of 20 units whose true control potential outcomes are randomly drawn
from the distribution N(50, 100) and then fixed at their realized values. Treated potential out-
comes are equal to the control potential outcomes plus a constant shift of 𝜏 = 10. For simplicity, I
consider only two sharp causal hypotheses 𝜏ℎ = 5 and 𝜏ℎ = 𝜏 = 10 over the sequence of finite pop-
ulations that grow according to the aforementioned asymptotic regime from Brewer (1979). Since
the false hypothesis, 𝜏ℎ = 5, is too small, the distribution of the observable test-statistic, 𝑡 (𝒁, ?̃?ℎ),
is stochastically larger than any distribution of 𝑡 (𝒁, ?̃?ℎ) regardless of whichever data are realized.
Figure 1.2 below shows the distribution of the observable test-statistic alongside the distribution
of 𝑡 (𝒁, ?̃?ℎ) that has the largest variance over all possible assignments. For the true hypothesis,
𝜏ℎ = 10, the adjusted outcomes are fixed over all assignments, so the distribution of the observable
test-statistic and the distribution implied by 𝜏ℎ = 10 under any realization of data are all identical.
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Distribution of observable test statistic Distribution of test statistic implied by false causal hypothesis
Figure 1.2: Comparison of distribution of observable test-statistic and distribution implied by a
false causal hypothesis conditional on realization of data
In the first row of Figure 1.2, the solid line is the distribution of the observable test-statistic
and the dashed line is a distribution conditional on a realization of data — namely, the conditional
distribution of the test-statistic calculated on the adjusted outcomes implied by the false sharp
causal hypothesis of 𝜏ℎ = 5. The expected value of the distribution in the dashed line is equal
to 0 for every population in the sequence of finite populations. As Figure 1.2 shows, for a false
causal hypothesis, the distribution in the solid line is stochastically larger than the distribution in
the dashed line. Nevertheless, when an experiment is small, the probability that the distribution in
the dashed line assigns to a draw from a test-statistic from the solid line may still be high. Yet, as
the size of the experiment becomes larger, Figure 1.2 illustrates that both distributions converge
in probability to their limiting expected values. Since these limiting expected values differ, the
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probability that the distribution in the dashed line assigns to a draw from a test-statistic from the
solid line tends to 0 as 𝑁 →∞.
The implication of the property illustrated in Figure 1.2 is that the probability density that a
false causal hypothesis assigns to the observed data (summarized by a test-statistic) tends to 0 as
𝑁 → ∞. As the likelihood of a false causal hypothesis tends to 0, so does the product of the prior
and the likelihood. Then, just as with weak causal hypotheses, normalizing by the total probability
of the evidence implies, by the law of total probability, that the posterior distribution concentrates
increasingly around the true 𝜏 as 𝑁 →∞.
1.5.3 Incorporating covariate information
Just as in the case of standard estimation and hypothesis testing, incorporating covariate in-
formation can help increase the precision of the posterior distribution without sacrificing its con-
vergence in probability to the true average effect. In general, we can delineate two approaches to
incorporating covariates. One approach, blocking, increases precision by excluding assignments
that, on average, yield a Difference-in-Means (or test-statistic of choice) far from its expected
value. A second approach, e.g., linear regression, increases precision by linearly rescaling po-
tential outcomes in order to reduce their variances. Incorporating covariates via blocking requires
slightly different regularity conditions than those in Section 1.4, but implies the same general result
of Theorem 1. Inference on potential outcomes rescaled via covariates will also satisfy Theorem 1
so long as regularity conditions 1 and 3 also hold on the baseline covariates.
In a block (i.e., stratified) randomized experiment, each block (i.e., stratum) is a completely
randomized experiment. Hence, one needs only to apply Theorem 1 to each block and then aver-
age over all blocks to obtain a result analogous to Theorem 1 under blocked random assignment.
However, the appropriate asymptotic regime is slightly different under blocked random assign-
ment. The closest analogue to the asymptotic regime described by regularity conditions 1 – 3
imagines an infinite sequence of experiments that consists of experiments in which the total num-
ber of blocks, 𝐵, is bounded, but the number of units within blocks grows large, 𝑁𝑏 → ∞. Con-
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versely, an alternative asymptotic regime conceives of an infinite sequence of experiments with an
increasing number of total blocks 𝐵, while the block sizes, 𝑁𝑏, are bounded as 𝐵 → ∞. Aside
from these technical details, the logic of Theorem 1 carries over to block randomized designs.
An alternative approach to incorporating covariate information draws on linear regression (but
without the regression model’s usual assumptions), which, in the case of a single categorical co-
variate, can also be interpreted as a post-stratified Difference-in-Means (Miratrix, Sekhon, and Yu,
2013). Consider the regression-based test statistic proposed by Lin (2013), denoted by ˆ̄𝜏reg, which
consists of a fully saturated linear regression with all interactions between treatment and covariates
centered by their means. With the caveat that regularity conditions 1 and 3 for potential outcomes
also apply to baseline covariates, then the use of ˆ̄𝜏reg instead of the Difference-in-Means cannot
hurt (and will likely decrease) the asymptotic mean squared error of the posterior distribution.
Formally, we can add another assumption by substituting 𝑥𝑖𝑘 for each of the 𝑘 = 1, . . . , 𝐾
covariates into conditions 1 and 3. Then, under conditions 1 – 3, where conditions 1 and 3 also

















𝑒𝑇𝑖 = (𝑦𝑇𝑖 − ?̄?𝑇 ) − (𝒙𝑖 − ?̄?)⊤ ?̂?𝑇 ,
𝑒𝐶𝑖 = (𝑦𝐶𝑖 − ?̄?𝐶) − (𝒙𝑖 − ?̄?)⊤ ?̂?𝐶 ,
and ?̂?𝑇 and ?̂?𝐶 are the coefficient vectors that minimize the sum of squared residuals separately
among units with 𝑍𝑖 = 1 and among units with 𝑍𝑖 = 0. (See Cohen and Fogarty, 2020, Proposition
2.) In other words, when the regularity conditions apply to potential outcomes and covariates, then
these conditions also apply to residualized outcomes, 𝑒𝑇𝑖 and 𝑒𝐶𝑖. (See Cohen and Fogarty, 2020,
Lemma C for Proposition 2.) Importantly, the individual effects, centered by the limiting average
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effect, manifest entirely in the residuals of the regression:
𝑒𝑇𝑖 − 𝑒𝐶𝑖 = (𝑦𝑇𝑖 − ?̄?𝑇 ) − (𝒙𝑖 − ?̄?)⊤ ?̂?𝑇 −
(
(𝑦𝐶𝑖 − ?̄?𝐶) − (𝒙𝑖 − ?̄?)⊤ ?̂?𝐶
)
= (𝑦𝑇𝑖 − 𝑦𝐶𝑖) − ( ?̄?𝑇 − ?̄?𝐶).
(1.15)
The implication, then, is that scholars can incorporate covariate information in their Bayesian
inferences by substituting suitably transformed outcomes for the actual outcomes themselves.
1.5.4 Discussion and comparison of weak versus sharp causal hypotheses
Both Theorems 1 and 2 pertain to the Difference-in-Means test statistic. The Difference-in-
Means is a natural choice for inference of average effects. For sharp effects, the Difference-in-
Means is especially suitable for sharp hypotheses that postulate a 1-dimensional, constant effect
for all 𝑁 experimental units. Such a constant effect is perhaps implausible and, hence, the pos-
terior distribution will not converge in probability to the true causal effect, 𝝉. However, with
the Difference-in-Means test-statistic, the posterior distribution will converge in probability to the
value of 𝜏ℎ equal to the limiting value of 𝑁−1
∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝜏𝑖. Since the mean minimizes the sum of squared
Euclidean distances, the value of 𝜏ℎ to which the posterior distribution converges in probability has
an interpretation as the 1-dimensional causal effect that best approximates 𝝉. This general line of
reasoning offers a justification for inference of a 1-dimensional constant effect rather than the full
𝑁-dimensional vector of effects since inferences of the latter are often “so complex, so faithful to
the minute detail of reality, that they are unintelligible” (Rosenbaum, 2010, p. 45).
Nevertheless, such a justification for inference about the 1-dimensional effect that best approx-
imates the true 𝑁-dimensional effect, 𝝉, presumes that “best approximation” is based on a sum
of squared Euclidean distances metric. But this conception of “best approximation” may gloss
over different ways in which treatments exert effects. For example, if there are uncommon, but
dramatic responses to treatment (Rosenbaum, 2007), then inference about the 1-dimensional 𝜏
that minimizes the sum of squared Euclidean distances from 𝝉 may poorly summarize the causal
effect. Fortunately, inference about a 1-dimensional effect also warrants an interpretation as in-
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ference about the maximum individual effect (Caughey et al., 2020). Such an interpretation may
be of interest when researchers suspect uncommon but dramatic effects. If so, then a test-statistic
like the Stephenson rank statistic (Stephenson, 1981; Stephenson and Ghosh, 1985) may be prefer-
able even if, unlike the Difference-in-Means, the posterior distribution may not converge on the 1-
dimensional effect equal to the true average effect. Expanding the theory of design-based Bayesian
inference to other such test statistics is a potentially fruitful extension.
Insofar as our target of inference is the average effect, then we can conduct Bayesian inference
of it via either weak or sharp causal hypotheses. The key difference between the two approaches is
how each deals with the unknown variance of the Difference-in-Means. The first approach plugs
in a conservative estimator for the variance while the second tests a causal effect strong enough to
imply a value for the variance. Both approaches ensure that the posterior distribution converges
on the true average effect. Which approach is preferable, however, will depend in part on which
likelihood function contains more information. To assess the conditions under which either of
these two approaches is favorable, we can mount an asymptotic comparison. The aim is to assess
which approach is more likely to yield a posterior distribution with a lower mean squared error.
To facilitate a comparison, we can draw on a standard Normal asymptotic approximation to the
likelihood function of the respective standardized Difference-in-Means test-statistics given by
Weak causal hypothesis :
ˆ̄𝜏 − 𝜏ℎ√
V̂ar
[ ˆ̄𝜏] Sharp causal hypothesis : 𝑡 (𝒁,𝒀 − 𝒁𝜏ℎ) − 0√Var [𝑡 (𝒁,𝒀 − 𝒁𝜏ℎ)] .
Proposition 3 provides the exact differences in the first two moments of the respective distributions
of the Difference-in-Means under each approach for any 𝑁 .
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Proposition 3. Let 𝜏ℎ = 𝜏ℎ. For 𝑁 = 4, 5, . . .,
𝑡 (𝒁,𝒀 − 𝒁𝜏ℎ) − 0 −
( ˆ̄𝜏 − 𝜏ℎ) = 0 and (1.16)
Var[𝑡 (𝒁,𝒀 − 𝒁𝜏ℎ)] − V̂ar[ ˆ̄𝜏] = 𝑠2𝑦𝑇𝛼𝑇 + 𝑠
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𝐶 (𝑛𝐶 − 1) − 𝑛−1𝐶
)
.
For any 𝜏ℎ = 𝜏ℎ, the numerator of the two standardized test-statistics will be equal. If 𝜏ℎ =
𝜏ℎ ≠ 𝜏, then whichever test-statistic yields a lower variance will assign a lower likelihood (and,
hence, all else equal, lower posterior probability density) to false average effects. The expression
for the difference in variances in Equation (1.17) mirrors the Theorem 3 of Ding (2017), but differs
in that Equation (1.17) is an exact expression for any 𝑁 and pertains to any 𝜏ℎ and 𝜏ℎ, not only that
they are equal to 0. Analogous to Ding (2017, Theorem 3), we could also write the asymptotic
difference in the two variances as






+ 𝑁−1 (𝜏 − 𝜏ℎ)2 + 𝑜𝑝 (1/𝑁), where (1.18)
𝑜𝑝 (1/𝑁) is a quantity that converges in probability to 0 at rate 1/𝑁 . Equation (1.18) differs from
Equation (1.17) only in that the former, first, substitutes expectations of random quantities for the
random quantities themselves and, second, ignores the differences between 𝑁 and 𝑁 − 1, 𝑛𝑇 and
𝑛𝑇 − 1, and 𝑛𝐶 and 𝑛𝐶 − 1.
As Proposition 3 shows, whichever procedure yields a smaller variance depends on three key
factors: (1) the relative numbers of units in treatment and control conditions, (2) the variances
of treated and control potential outcomes and (3) the difference between the true average effect
and 1-dimensional sharp causal hypothesis. In the simulations below, I assess the implications of
this difference in variances by comparing the mean squared error of posterior distributions over
repeated random assignments. In particular, I begin with a standard Normal prior distribution and
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then draw 100 treated and control potential outcomes under four scenarios described in Figure 1.3
below. In both cases, I use a standard Normal approximation to the likelihood function in which
either a weak or sharp hypothesis assigns some probability density to the observed test-statistic.
After forming the posterior distribution, I then assess its mean squared error with respect to the true
average effect. I repeat this procedure over 1000 randomizations and calculate the mean squared
error of the posterior distribution in each case. Figure 1.3 below plots the results.
Proportion treated = 0.7; higher treated variance Proportion treated = 0.7; higher control variance
Proportion treated = 0.5; equal variance; small effect Proportion treated = 0.5; equal variance; large effect
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Figure 1.3: Mean Squared Errors (MSEs) of posterior distributions over repeated random assign-
ments
Table B.1 in Chapter B provides the expected MSE under each of the four scenarios. In gen-
eral, eliminating the variance nuisance parameter via plug-in estimation rather than via a sharp
hypothesis performs better on average. This greater performance is especially pronounced when
there is higher variance in treated potential outcomes (relative to control potential outcomes) and
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more than half of the units are in the treatment condition. On the other hand, when more than half
of the units are in the treatment condition, but the variance is higher among control potential out-
comes, then eliminating the variance nuisance parameter via a sharp hypothesis performs better. In
practice, scholars should be able to diagnose which scenario they are in by assessing the empirical
variance of observed potential outcomes in an experiment. For example, an experimenter might
erroneously expect higher variance in treated potential outcomes and thereby assign more units to
the treatment condition. Yet, after conducting the experiment, such a scenario can be diagnosed by
examining the variance of observed potential outcomes in each condition.
In addition, Figure 1.3, as well as the average MSEs in Table B.1, shows a lack of any substan-
tial difference in posterior MSEs between each panel in the first row. That is, a larger true average
effect does not, all else equal, appear to yield a worse posterior MSE. This result points to a key
difference between Bayesian inference and null hypothesis significance testing.
To lay out this difference, we can refer back to Equation (1.18), given again below






+ 𝑁−1 (𝜏 − 𝜏ℎ)2 + 𝑜𝑝 (1/𝑁),
and imagine that the true effect is constant for all units, which implies that 𝑆2𝑇 = 𝑆
2
𝐶 , and that
𝑛𝐶 = 𝑛𝑇 . To square our focus solely on the role of the true average effect size, also assume that
the size of the average effect grows proportional to 𝑁 such that, asymptotically, the difference in
variances for some 𝜏ℎ is driven solely by the size of the average effect: Var[𝑡 (𝒁, ?̃?ℎ)] − V̂ar[ ˆ̄𝜏] =
𝑁−1 (𝜏 − 𝜏ℎ)2. In the context of null hypothesis significance testing, plug-in variance estimation
will have greater relative performance in terms of rejecting the null hypothesis that 𝜏ℎ = 0 as the
true average effect, 𝜏, increases.
Yet this greater relative performance in terms of evidence against 𝜏ℎ = 0 does not necessarily
translate to a Bayesian framework. When the true average effect increases, the relative performance
of plug-in estimation increases for small causal hypotheses, like 𝜏ℎ = 0, but decreases for large
causal hypotheses closer to the true average effect. Thus, the performance of each variance method
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with respect to 𝜏ℎ = 0 may change in isolation, but not relative to other hypothetical causal effects.
A posterior distribution, in effect, lines up each hypothesis and assesses their relative plausibility,
while p-values pertain to each causal hypothesis in isolation. Factors, such as the size of the true
average effect, that affect relative performance in terms of the latter measure do not necessarily do
so in terms of the former.
Overall, eliminating the variance parameter via plug-in estimation performs better, on average,
than does eliminating the variance parameter via a sharp hypothesis. Despite this difference in
performance, Bayesian inference of sharp causal hypothesis might still be preferable. A prior
distribution on a sharp causal hypothesis implies a prior distribution on both the mean and variance
of the likelihood function. By contrast, a prior distribution on a weak causal hypothesis implies
a prior distribution on only the likelihood function’s mean, not its variance. In principle, one
could conduct fully Bayesian inference with a marginal prior distribution on the average effect and
another on the variance of the Difference-in-Means. But since the latter parameter is unlikely to be
of intrinsic interest, doing so would complicate inference with little valued added. Thus, Bayesian
inference of sharp as opposed to weak causal effects has the benefit of coherence in its treatment
of both the mean and variance parameters of the likelihood function.
1.6 Conclusion
In their critique of randomized experiments, Deaton and Cartwright (2018, p. 3) emphasized
the value of “understanding how the results from RCTs [randomized controlled trials] relate to the
knowledge that you already possess about the world.” The logic of null hypothesis significance
testing may not map neatly on to prior knowledge that scholars possess. In some cases, null ex-
perimental results may conflict with scholars’ prior expectations and contribute to learning about
causal effects in a given substantive domain. Conversely, significant results might merely confirm
what scholars already agree upon due to the results of prior studies. Hence, scholars may be inter-
ested not solely in whether results are statistically significant, but also in how much one actually
learns from a new experimental finding.
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This paper open up new possibilities for scholars to quantify the extent of Bayesian learning
from randomized experiments. A common concern with extant Bayesian methods (in experiments
or otherwise) is that they assume randomness in potential outcomes, which conflicts with what
scholars like about experiments — namely, that randomization alone constitutes the “reasoned
basis” for inference. In this paper, I have shown that, if the likelihood function conditions not on
the full data, but a suitable function of them, then Bayesian inference of either weak (average) or
sharp causal effects can be justified by the experimental design. Such Bayesian inference reliably
tracks the true causal effect of interest without any further assumptions than those made in classical
randomized experiments.
35
Chapter 2: Turning Past Experiments into Priors for Design-based Bayesian
Learning: Application to Audit Experiment on Racial Responsiveness
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I examine the degree of Bayesian learning that results from a new audit ex-
periment on the role of racial discrimination in the responsiveness of state legislators to putative
constituents. This experiment was conducted in 2020 on the email addresses of 5, 925 state repre-
sentatives in 49 US states (excluding Nebraska due to its unicameral and nonpartisan legislature).
The experiment randomly assigns these 5, 925 email addresses to a request for constituency ser-
vice from either a White, Black or Latino alias. The content of the constituency service email
was randomly chosen from three email types: an inquiry about internship opportunities, a request
for information about how to get more involved in politics, and a question about campaign work.
Within each email type, the email’s wording was randomly selected from three possible scripts.
All emails, regardless of the type or script, signal that the putative constituent belongs to the same
political party as that of the legislator. The outcome of interest is whether a legislator (or staff
member who is in charge of the legislator’s official email account) responds to the constituent
service request.
The question of Bayesian learning from randomized experiments is especially relevant for this
application. Ample evidence from past audit experiments shows that state legislators discrimi-
nate against putatively Black (Butler and Broockman, 2011; Butler, 2014) and Latino (Mendez
and Grose, 2018; Mendez, 2018; Wong, Nicholson, and Lajevardi, 2017) constituents relative to
putatively White constituents. This abundance of evidence has led some scholars to claim that
little additional knowledge can be generated from new audit experiments by themselves (Gaddis,
36
2019).1 A new randomized experiment — specifically another audit experiment — can certainly
uncover additional causal facts; however, its actual contribution to learning relative to scholars’
baseline knowledge may be minimal. This concern is especially salient given critiques of ran-
domized experiments to this effect (Cartwright and Hardie, 2012; Deaton, 2009; Deaton, 2010;
Deaton and Cartwright, 2018; Harrison, 2011; Harrison, 2014; Heckman, 1992; Heckman, 2020;
Ravallion, 2009; Ravallion, 2020), as well as scholars’ increasing emphasis on understanding both
randomized and nonrandomized studies within a framework of Bayesian learning (Pritchett and
Sandefur, 2015; Little and Pepinsky, 2021; Gerber, Green, and Kaplan, 2004; Vivalt, 2020; Im-
bens, 2021; Dunning et al., 2019).
In spite of — in fact because of — concerns about how much one learns from new experiments
(of which audit experiments are a particularly “tough case”), I develop a methodology for Bayesian
learning from randomized experiments. In particular, I develop methods through which scholars
can quantify (1) the state of prior knowledge based on past experimental results and (2) the extent
of Bayesian learning that occurs from before to after an experiment. While the prior distribution is
constructed through the tools (but not necessarily the assumptions) of model-based inference, the
likelihood function — explained in greater detail elsewhere in this dissertation — is design-based.
It invokes assumptions no stronger than usual methods for analyzing randomized experiments.
An answer to the question of what we learn from a new randomized experiment depends first
and foremost on prior knowledge going into the experiment. The informativeness of past experi-
ments about effects in a new experiment depends on the experiments’ distributional differences in
variables that explain effect heterogeneity (Coppock, Leeper, and Mullinix, 2018; Mullinix et al.,
2015). I therefore repurpose methods from the target validity literature (Westreich et al., 2019)
to generate a stochastic distribution of the average effect one would expect to see in a new exper-
iment given results of past experiments. Within the target validity literature, I draw specifically
on models of effect heterogeneity (Kern et al., 2016; Nguyen et al., 2017), which I complement
1Gaddis (2019, p. 443) writes that “as the use of the audit method to examine racial-ethnic discrimination has
increased over the last decade, the amount and diversity of knowledge that can be gained from new audits alone have
decreased.”
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with both full matching (Hansen, 2004; Rosenbaum, 1991; Sävje, Higgins, and Sekhon, 2021) and
weighting (Miratrix et al., 2018). Constructing a prior distribution is fundamentally different from
generalizing or transporting an estimated effect from one study to another. Hence, in drawing on
tools from target validity, I prioritize the transparent and intuitive representation of prior knowl-
edge, not, say, consistent or efficient estimation of causal effects in a target study. In short, the
procedures one uses to generate a prior distribution do not need to be “right,” so to speak; rather,
they ought to clearly, intuitively and (ideally) simply represent the state of prior knowledge based
on past experimental results.
Having developed a method for constructing a prior distribution, I then turn to quantifying
the extent of learning based on differences between the prior and posterior distributions of the
target experiment. Drawing on value of information theory, as explicated in foundational Bayesian
decision theory texts (Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961) (see also Howard, 1966), I propose two statistics
that quantify what I (and others, e.g., Little and Pepinsky, 2021) refer to as first- and second-
moment Bayesian learning. I then develop a standardized test statistic between 0 and 1 for the
extent of Bayesian learning from an experiment. This statistic’s benchmark for an experiment’s
degree of Bayesian learning is the amount of learning that would result in the absence of any prior
information whatsoever. Such an assumption of prior ignorance is conspicuously ill-suited for audit
experiments on legislative responsiveness. Nevertheless, I show that such an assumption is implicit
under a Bayesian interpretation of usual, non-Bayesian analyses of randomized experiments.
In the case of the 2020 audit experiment, I show that it contributes to substantial Bayesian
learning in the context of prior information from past experiments. In particular, the experiment
shows that, contrary to what one would expect from past experiments, legislators discriminate, on
average, against putatively Latino constituents in favor of putatively Black constituents. The most
likely percentage of legislators who would respond to a Black constituent, but not a Latino con-
stituent, changes from 0.46% before the experiment to 3% after. In addition, after this experiment,
the extent of legislators’ discrimination against Black in favor of White constituents is revised
downwards due to the lack of any experimental evidence for such discrimination. In an alternative
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analysis, such a result might be ignored since it does not pass the threshold of statistical signif-
icance; in a Bayesian context, however, insignificant results can nevertheless yield meaningful
degrees of learning. Overall, the greatest amount of Bayesian learning occurs among subgroups,
particularly those that are typically too small to draw inferences about from a single experiment
analyzed in isolation. The 2020 audit experiment yields greatest learning about discrimination
by Black and Latino legislators between putatively Black and Latino constituents. From this ex-
periment, we learn that Black legislators discriminate against Latino constituents (standardized
Bayesian learning statistic of 0.22), but Latino legislators don’t discriminate against Black con-
stituents (standardized Bayesian learning statistic of 0.17). Learning about these subgroup effects
carries implications for theories of descriptive representation — specifically, how it operates not
only within, but between minority groups.
Section 2.2 to follow motivates the ensuing methodological developments by, first, providing
a standard, non-Bayesian analysis of the 2020 audit experiment and, second, showing that this
analysis implicitly assumes an absence of prior information. Section 2.3 then focuses on how
to construct a prior distribution that represents information from past experiments. Section 2.4
subsequently turns to quantifying learning that occurs from before to after a target experiment.
Section 2.5 then provides a design-based Bayesian analysis of the 2020 audit experiment before
the succeeding section provides an overall discussion and conclusion.
2.2 Audit experiment
Audit experiments have become a staple method of studies that assess whether politicians
racially discriminate among their constituents. In one of the seminal audit experiments, conducted
among US state legislators in 2008, Butler and Broockman (2011) estimate that 5.1% of legisla-
tors would respond to a service request from a White constituent, but not a Black one. Subsequent
studies have found even more pronounced patterns of discrimination. In a meta-analysis of 41
published and unpublished audit experiments between 2011 and 2016, Costa (2017) estimates that,
compared to putatively White constituents, putatively Latino and Black constituents are 14.2% and
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7.3% less likely to receive responses to their inquiries from politicians.
Despite this extensive information from past audit experiments, methods for the analysis of
new experiments are unable to incorporate such information. For example, a standard analysis
of the 2020 audit experiment described in the introduction would unbiasedly estimate an average
effect and either reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis of no average effect. While such an
analysis has many valuable properties, it offers little insight into how much more information a new
experiment contributes to what scholars already know from past experiments. To further unpack
this point, consider the following preliminary analysis of the 2020 audit experiment described in
the introduction. I use this preliminary analysis as motivation for the subsequent methodological
argument.
In the 2020 audit experiment, there are six initial causal targets of interest, which pertain to
six different treatment contrasts. One causal target is the mean difference in state legislators’
responses if they were contacted by a putatively Black constituent compared to if they were con-
tacted by a putatively White constituent. Other targets of interest include the same average causal
effect for different treatment contrasts among the Black, White and Latino treatment conditions.
Table 2.1 below provides the Difference-in-Means and Neyman’s conservative standard error (Ney-
man, 1923) estimates for all six of these contrasts.
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Outcome: Reply from legislator’s email address
Treatment contrast Diff-in-Means (SE)
Black (1) vs White (0) 0.0212
(0.0154)
Latino (1) vs White (0) −0.0221
(0.0149)
Latino (1) vs Black (0) −0.0433∗∗∗
(0.0149)
Black or Latino (1) vs White (0) −0.0011
(0.0132)
Latino (1) vs Black or White (0) −0.0328∗∗∗
(0.0128)
Latino or White (1) vs Black (0) −0.0327∗∗∗
(0.0132)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2.1: Overall results of 2020 audit experiment
The usual point estimates and confidence sets implied by the results in Table 2.1 fail to incorporate
information from past audit experiments. In fact, the results in Table 2.1 are equivalent to the
Bayesian inferences one would draw with a uniform prior distribution (representing a lack of any
information whatsoever) on the average causal effect.
To see this point, note that, as Gerber, Green, and Kaplan (2004, p. 253) allude to, the finite
population CLT (see Li and Ding, 2017) justifies the use of a Normal likelihood function in which
possible realizations of the experimental data are summarized by the Difference-in-Means. The
Difference-in-Means is essentially a random draw from a Normal distribution with unknown mean
equal to the true average effect and variance that is unknown, but can be conservatively estimated
(Neyman, 1923). With this Normal likelihood function and a uniform prior on the average effect,
which is naturally bounded between −1 and 1, the resulting posterior distribution after observing
experimental data is a truncated Normal. This posterior distribution’s mean is equal to the realized
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Difference-in-Means and the distribution’s variance is equal to the realized conservative variance
estimate. Therefore, the mean causal effect with the greatest posterior density, the so-called max-
imum a posteriori (MAP) estimate, will be equal to the observed Difference-in-Means. Likewise,
the (1−𝛼)100% credible set with 𝛼 ∈ (0, 1) will be equal to the analogous (1−𝛼)100% confidence
set.
Figure 2.1 below shows the (1 − 𝛼)100% confidence sets with 𝛼 = 0.05 overlaid on top of the
posterior distributions that result from a uniform prior for each of the six treatment contrasts in
Table 2.1.
Latino (1) vs Black or White (0) Latino (1) vs White (0) Latino or White (1) vs Black (0)
Black (1) vs White (0) Black or Latino (1) vs White (0) Latino (1) vs Black (0)










Figure 2.1: Posterior distributions of treatment contrasts from Table 2.1
The blue lines in the panels of Figure 2.1 are the posterior distributions of the average causal effect
in the 2020 audit experiment. The dashed lines in each of the panels are the espective (1−𝛼)100%
confidence sets with 𝛼 = 0.05. We can see that these two-sided 95% confidence intervals are
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located exactly at the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of the posterior distribution. In addition, the MAP
estimates in each of the panels are identical to the respective Difference-in-Means estimates.
This preliminary analysis underscores that the usual methods for analyzing randomized experi-
ments assume that we have no prior information. At least for this particular audit experiment, such
an assumption is erroneous given the extensive number of past audit experiments about public offi-
cials’ responsiveness to constituents of different ethnoracial identities. Insofar as we possess prior
knowledge coming into an experiment, then the usual practice of estimating average causal effects
and Normal approximation-based confidence sets will not capture what we learn from random-
ized experiments. If we are to quantify what we learn from a new experiment relative to baseline
knowledge from past experiments, then we need a methodology that turns information from past
experiments into prior distributions for target experiments.
2.3 Constructing a prior distribution from past experimental results
2.3.1 Review of target validity methods
To construct a prior distribution from past experimental results, I draw on tools from the target
validity literature. Target validity, as described in Westreich et al. (2019), pertains to two types
of inference: One is generalizability, which refers to when a set of units under study is a proper
subset of a target population of interest; the other is transportability (Bareinboim and Pearl, 2013;
Pearl and Bareinboim, 2014), which refers to when units under study and the target population are
disjoint sets, i.e., study participants are not themselves members of the target population.
For both generalizability and transportability, scholars have drawn upon weighting (Cole and
Stuart, 2010; Stuart et al., 2011; Olsen et al., 2013), stratification (Tipton, 2013; Tipton et al., 2014;
O’Muircheartaigh and Hedges, 2014), outcome modeling (Kern et al., 2016; Nguyen et al., 2017)
or combinations of weighting and outcome modeling via “doubly robust” (Egami and Hartman,
2021b; Dahabreh, Robertson, and Hernán, 2019) or targeted maximum likelihood (Rudolph et al.,
2014; Rudolph and Laan, 2017) estimation. I briefly review weighting, stratification and outcome
modeling for target validity since the methodology I propose draws most heavily from these three
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approaches.
Broadly speaking, weighting estimators for target validity generalize or transport experimental
results via adjustment for units’ study participation probabilities. Cole and Stuart (2010) propose
an inverse probability weighted (IPW) estimator for generalizing effects from a study population
to a target population from which the study’s subjects were presumably sampled. Westreich et
al. (2017) show that this estimator extends to the context of transportability in which one need not
assume that the units in the study are a subset of the target population.2 Tipton (2013) and Tipton et
al. (2014) also estimate units’ study participation probabilities, but generalize to a target population
by constructing strata of study and target units that have similar estimated study participation
probabilities. Occupying a liminal space between weighting and outcome modeling approaches,
Josey et al. (2021) draw on entropy balancing (Hainmueller, 2012) and Lu et al. (2021) draw on
approximate balancing (Zubizarreta, 2015) to construct weights that balance covariates between
a study and target population. Such weights aim to minimize covariate imbalance and need not
reflect units’ study participation probabilities.
Outcome modeling approaches to target validity aim to directly model and adjust for variables
that explain effect heterogeneity (Kern et al., 2016; Nguyen et al., 2017). In principle, if one could
exactly stratify units in a study and target population on the values of all causal moderators, then it
would be straightforward to transport effects between units within the same stratum. Alternatively,
if one knew or could reliably predict how average potential outcomes vary across different values of
baseline covariates, then one could transport causal effects by predicting them in a target population
via a model of effect heterogeneity. Kern et al. (2016) employ this modeling approach using linear
regression, as well as Bayesian additive regression trees (BART) (Hill, 2011; Green and Kern,
2012). Other models are also possible, such as those from the machine learning literature that have
been used to estimate heterogeneous effects (Wager and Athey, 2018; Imai and Ratkovic, 2013;
Grimmer, Messing, and Westwood, 2017).
2The IPW estimator is an extension of the classic Horvitz-Thompson estimator from survey sampling (Horvitz and
Thompson, 1952). Other weighting estimators from the observational studies and survey sampling literatures are also
possible (and typically preferable), e.g., the Hájek (Hájek, 1960) and Des Raj (Raj, 1965) estimators among others.
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Assessments of the target validity methods thus described largely focus on the conditions un-
der which estimators are unbiased or consistent for causal quantities in a target population. If an
outcome model of average potential outcomes given baseline covariates is correctly specified, then
an outcome modeling estimator is consistent for the average causal effect in the target experiment.
Alternatively, if the model of study participation probabilities is correctly specified, then the IPW
estimator is consistent for the target average causal effect.3 By contrast, estimators that weight
for covariate balance typically depend on an assumption that the true, stochastic outcome model
lies in a particular class of models. Scholars then typically construct weights that minimize some
function of the chosen estimator’s error, such as the maximum squared error, under this assump-
tion. Such assumptions are sensible if one is to establish desirable properties (e.g., consistency) of
effect generalization estimators. However, the aim of constructing a prior distribution for a target
experiment based on past experimental results is fundamentally different.
Importantly, the assumptions of the methods I draw upon — i.e., weighting, stratification and
outcome modeling — need not be “right.” Going forward, potential outcomes are not assumed
to be embedded in an underlying probability model (or class of models). Outcome models in the
methodology to follow serve as predictive algorithms of fixed potential outcomes (rosenbaum2002;
see Sales, Hansen, and Rowan, 2018). The primary concern of these models is not whether their
assumptions are correct; instead, such models ought to transparently and intuitively predict the
average causal effect one would expect to see in a target experiment given the results of past exper-
iments. Such predictions, which, in turn, constitute a prior distribution for the target experiment’s
average effect, might be wrong. Yet such erroneous beliefs will be revised upon actually con-
ducting the target experiment. A comparison of posterior and prior beliefs in a target experiment
therefore reflects how much one learns from a new experimental result relative to what one would
expect the effect to be given past experiments.
3The doubly robust estimator (Robins, Rotnitzky, and Zhao, 1994; Kang and Schafer, 2007) will be consistent




To more rigorously lay out how one constructs such a prior distribution, consider a setting
with potentially multiple past experiments and one target experiment of interest. Concatenate the
prior and target experiments and let the index 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁 run over the 𝑁 total units. Denote the
collection of indices for prior experimental units by P and for target experimental units by T . Let
the sets P1 ⊂ P and P0 ⊂ P contain the indices for treated and control prior units, respectively,
where P1 ∪ P0 = P. The cardinality (i.e., the number of elements in) each respective set are
denoted by |P1 | = 𝑁P1 , |P0 | = 𝑁P0 , |P | = 𝑁P and |T | = 𝑁T .
Under the usual stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA), each of the 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁
units has one potential outcome, 𝑦𝑧𝑖, for each treatment condition, 𝑍𝑖 = 𝑧, to which the 𝑖th unit
could be assigned. The observed outcome is equal to the potential outcome corresponding to the
condition to which the 𝑖th unit is assigned: 𝑌𝑖 =
∑
𝑧 1 {𝑍𝑖 = 𝑧} 𝑦𝑧𝑖, where 1 {·} is the indicator
function that is equal to 1 when its argument is true and 0 otherwise. The treatment and outcome
variables are observed for units in prior experiments, but not for units in the target experiment.
The specific causal quantity of interest is the average treatment effect in the target experiment, i.e.,
the target average treatment effect (TATE). For a specific treatment contrast, e.g., 𝑧 versus 𝑧′, the




(𝑦𝑧𝑖 − 𝑦𝑧′𝑖) . (2.1)
Going forward, I refer to a binary treatment variable in which 𝑧 = 1 or 𝑧 = 0. In the 2020
audit experiment, there are 3 experimental conditions and 6 different binary contrasts of these 3
conditions. It should be clear from context the specific contrast to which the binary treatment
variable refers.
Denote the Difference-in-Means estimator of the TATE in the target experiment by 𝜏T . The
finite population CLT and associated theory imply that, in experiments of at least moderate size,
the Difference-in-Means is approximately Normal, i.e., 𝜏T
approx.∼ N (E [𝜏T ] ,Var [𝜏T ]). Under
random assignment, E [𝜏T ] = 𝜏T , which justifies the use of a Normal likelihood function in which
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a hypothetical value of 𝜏T (along with a conservative plug-in estimator of the variance) assigns
probability density to the observed experimental data summarized by the Difference-in-Means.
Also define a Normal prior distribution on the TATE, 𝜏T ∼ N(𝜇prior, 𝜎2prior), where 𝜇prior and 𝜎
2
prior
are the hyperparameters.4 With this Normal prior distribution on the TATE, as well as the Normal
likelihood function, inference can proceed via Bayes’ rule. Scholars are unlikely to have well
motivated prior beliefs about the nuisance parameter Var [𝜏T ]; hence, use of a Normal likelihood
function that substitutes for Var [𝜏T ] its conservative estimator enables scholars to define a prior
distribution and to conduct inference on only the TATE.
The aim in the immediately succeeding sections is to calibrate the parameters of the Normal
prior distribution. In particular, the prior distribution ought to encode information about the aver-
age effect in the target experiment based on results from past experiments. To do so, let 𝒙𝑖 denote
a 𝐾-dimensional vector of values for 𝐾 baseline variables measured in both prior and target exper-
iments. Each of the 𝐾 baseline variables are thought to predict effect heterogeneity; hence, I refer
to them as heterogeneity variables (see also Egami and Hartman, 2021a). To lay out what exactly it
means for a baseline variable to predict effect heterogeneity, let ?̂?𝑧 (·) denote an algorithmic model
that, when supplied with heterogeneity variables, 𝒙𝑖, generates predictions of the 𝑖th unit’s poten-
tial outcome, 𝑦𝑧𝑖. Then denote the conditional average treatment effect (CATE) predictive function
for the 𝑖th unit as
CATE predictive function : 𝜏T (𝒙𝑖) B ?̂?𝑧 (𝒙𝑖) − ?̂?𝑧′ (𝒙𝑖). (2.2)
The CATE function in Equation (2.2) returns a prediction of the causal effect for unit 𝑖 as a function
of the vector of variables thought to explain effect heterogeneity, 𝒙𝑖.
The predictive algorithm in Equation (2.2) can have high or low accuracy. Without embedding
potential outcomes in a stochastic model or class of models, the squared predictive accuracy of the
4This distributional choice is justified as a conservative one due to the Normal distribution’s property of maximum
entropy among distributions with finite variance (see Cover and Thomas, 1991). For a formal proof of this property,
see McElreath (2020, pp. 306–307), which is based on the treatment in Conrad (2005).
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CATE function for the TATE is given by
Predictive accuracy : 𝑁−1T
∑
𝑖∈T
[𝑦𝑧𝑖 − ?̂?𝑧 (𝒙𝑖) − (𝑦𝑧′𝑖 − ?̂?𝑧′ (𝒙𝑖))]2 , (2.3)
which is unknowable due to its dependence on unobservable potential outcomes in the target pop-
ulation. As Equation (2.3) shows, predictive accuracy depends not on a correct outcome model,
but rather boils down to the average squared distance between the true (but unobservable) potential
outcomes and their predictions.
The CATE predictive function as explained thus far generates only deterministic predictions
of potential outcomes given units’ fixed values of heterogeneity variables. To calibrate the prior
distribution of the TATE to results from past experiments, I use the following procedure:
1. Fit a CATE predictive model to prior experimental data and (assuming the model matrix is
of full rank) set the parameters of the model to the values that minimize the prediction error
of observed potential outcomes in the prior experimental data.
2. Having fit the model to prior experimental data, feed baseline data from the target experiment
to the fitted model in order to generate a prediction of the individual effect for each unit in
the target experiment.
3. Set the hyperparameters of the Normal prior distribution of the TATE as follows:




𝜏T (𝒙𝑖) and (2.4)
(b) Set 𝜎2prior to the variance of the average predictive effect implied by the estimated











𝜈𝑖 𝑗 , (2.5)
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where 𝜈𝑖 and 𝜈𝑖 𝑗 are the diagonal and off-diagonal entries of the the variance-covariance
matrix for the predicted values, where variance-covariance matrix estimated on prior
data with robust (heteroskedasticity consistent) standard errors (Eicker, 1963; Eicker,
1967; White, 1980).
Note that in this procedure, both prior and target experimental data are fixed. The randomness
stems from the Normal prior distribution on the parameter vector of the CATE in which the hy-
perparameters of the prior distribution are set to the empirical means and the empirical variance-
covariance matrix. The result of this procedure is a Normal prior distribution of the TATE in which
prior uncertainty is based on how well heterogeneity variables predict observed potential outcomes
in past experiments. Intuitively, this empirical Bayes’ procedure is sensible because it sets the most
likely predicted average effect to that which best fits the prior data. Nevertheless, uncertainty in
this predicated average effect remains. Overall uncertainty in predictions of the TATE depends on
the accuracy of predictions from the CATE model, on average, in the prior data. The most plausible
predicted TATE will be based on which parameter values of the CATE model best fit the prior data
and the next most plausible values of the TATE will be based on the CATE model’s parameters that
do not minimize the sum of squared residuals, but yield the next best fit. Therefore, this procedure
intuitively calibrates uncertainty about the TATE based on predictive accuracy of the CATE model
in prior experiments.
Implementing this procedure in practice requires researchers to make specific choices about
the functional form of the CATE predictive algorithm. In general, researchers ought to have flex-
ibility in the specific algorithm they choose, which will likely depend on domain knowledge of
the application at hand. Nevertheless, several common principles related to model dependence
and the reliability of each prior observation are important regardless of the predictive algorithm
one chooses. I now turn to how scholars can satisfy these principles by both stratification (via
matching) and weighting in the context of a baseline linear projection model.
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2.3.3 Complementing the CATE model with matching and weighting
Given that the CATE function is a predictive algorithm, not a specification of a true, underlying
probability model, one would want to avoid an overdependence on the (often arbitrary) functional
form assumptions of the CATE predictive algorithm (Ho et al., 2007; King and Zeng, 2006; King
and Zeng, 2007). In other words, one would want to avoid generating predictions that depend
upon either interpolation or extrapolation of the CATE algorithm’s functional form to covariate
regions in which the data are sparse. To alleviate this concern, I propose, first, matching prior and
target units based on their similarity in heterogeneity variables before fitting a weighted model that
minimizes the sum of within stratum squared prediction errors.
Matching for common support
The CATE model is fit to only prior data; hence, the first desirable feature is internal common
support within the prior data, which refers to covariate regions of the prior data that have a suf-
ficiently large number of observations and variation in the treatment variable. With high internal
common support, the parameters of the CATE function based on the model fit to prior data will
be more credible. Nevertheless, predictions of the TATE based on the CATE model fit to prior
data inevitably involve extrapolation to the target data. Therefore, a second desirable feature is
external common support between the prior and target experiments, which refers to covariate re-
gions across both prior and target experiments with a large number of observations and variation
in whether they belong to the prior or target experiments. Matching units to optimize balance be-
tween treatment conditions in prior experiments and between prior and target units addresses both
concerns of internal and external common support.
Following Sävje, Higgins, and Sekhon (2021), let a matched set, 𝒎, be a nonempty set of unit
indices and let a matching, 𝑴, be a set of disjoint matched sets, 𝑴 = {𝒎1,𝒎2, . . .}. Sävje, Hig-
gins, and Sekhon (2021) and Higgins, Sävje, and Sekhon (2016) provide a near-optimal algorithm
for constructing a matching that, subject to user specified constraints, minimizes the maximum
value of a distance metric between any two units in the same matched set. Although driven in
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part by computational tractability, this choice of objective function (minimizing the maximum
within-set distance) has intuitive appeal. It allows a user to specify a maximum distance whereby
any greater distance between any two units would render them incomparable due to lack of com-
mon support and related concerns of model dependence. Subject to this user-specified constraint,
the algorithm of Sävje, Higgins, and Sekhon (2021) and Higgins, Sävje, and Sekhon (2016) can
then find the matching that minimizes the maximum distance between any two units in the same
matched set. To make this algorithm relevant for turning past experiments into a prior distribution,
we need to define a relevant distance metric and a set of constraints that a matching, 𝑴, ought to
satisfy.
For the former task, denote the heterogeneity score of unit 𝑖 by ℎ𝑖 = 𝜑(𝒙𝑖), where 𝜑(·) is a
function that predicts membership in the prior or target experiments as a function of heterogene-
ity variables. A natural choice for 𝜑(·) is a logistic regression of an indicator of membership in
the prior or target experiments on the set of heterogeneity variables. Other link functions — e.g.,
probit, cauchy and complementary log-log among others — are also possible. Importantly, the
heterogeneity score is not meant to reflect the predicted probabilities of participation in either the
prior or target experiments. Instead, 𝜑(·) serves primarily to collapse the 𝐾-dimensional vector of
baseline covariates of each unit into a single scalar value, 𝜑 : R𝐾 ↦→ R. Once we’ve constructed
heterogeneity scores for all 𝑁 units, we can then calculate a unidimensional distance metric be-
tween any two units given by 𝑑𝑖 𝑗 =
√
(ℎ𝑖 − ℎ 𝑗 )2, which is the absolute distance in heterogeneity
scores between units 𝑖 and 𝑗 .
The set of constraints that a matching, 𝑴, out to satisfy in this context are as follows. First, in
order to be as transparent as possible, each unit can belong to at most one matched set. Second,
each matched set ought to contain at least one unit from the treatment and control conditions in
the prior experiments and at least one unit from the target experiment. Third, since the effect of
interest is the TATE, the matching should not exclude any target units. Finally, as mentioned above,
two units in the same matched set ought not to exceed a user-specified distance in heterogeneity
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For all 𝒎,𝒎′ ∈ 𝑴, if 𝒎 ≠ 𝒎′, then 𝒎 ∩ 𝒎′ = ∅, (2.6b)
For all 𝒎 ∈ 𝑴 and 𝑧 ∈ {0, 1} , |𝒎 ∩ P𝑧 | ≥ 1, (2.6c)
For all 𝒎 ∈ 𝑴, |𝒎 ∩ T | ≥ 1, (2.6d)∑
𝒎∈𝑴





𝑑𝑖 𝑗 : 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝒎
}
≤ 𝑐, (2.6f)
0 ≤ 𝑐 < ∞. (2.6g)
Rosenbaum (1991) and Hansen (2004) show that in the context of bipartite matching, the optimal
solution that reduces the sum of all treatment-control, within-stratum distances will consist of
one treated unit matched to potentially multiple control units, or vice versa. The near-optimal
algorithm for the different objective function in Equation (2.6a) from Sävje, Higgins, and Sekhon
(2021) and Higgins, Sävje, and Sekhon (2016) will not necessarily result in a matching with this
structure. However, in more complex setups beyond a single binary treatment variable and with a
large number of units, this near-optimal algorithm is preferable. Upon constructing matched sets
of units with similar in heterogeneity variables, it is then straightforward to fit the CATE model
within these matched sets before aggregating over all of them, e.g., by including fixed effects for
matched strata in the CATE model.
5If calipers on other distance measures, such as the Euclidean distance on a single important heterogeneity variable,
are crucial in substantive applications, such additional constraints can be incorporated.
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Weighting for the reliability and importance of prior observations
Even after matching, differences within matched sets on the heterogeneity score are likely
to remain. Prior units that are more similar to target units presumably generate more reliable
predictions of target units’ effects. To reflect this greater reliability, we can upweight prior units
that exhibit greater similarity to target units in the same stratum. Furthermore, in addition to the
reliability of prior observations, the importance of each prior observation depends on the number
of target units to which each prior unit can be compared. That is, if one prior unit is similar to
one target unit, but another prior unit is similar to five target units, then the latter prior unit is
more important than the former. In what follows, I propose weights for the CATE model that
aims to intuitively and transparently account for the twin aims of representing the reliability and
importance of prior observations.
To lay out this weighting scheme, first let the index 𝑚 = 1, . . . , 𝑀 run over the 𝑀 matched sets
and let 𝑠𝑖 = 𝑚 indicate the matched set to which unit 𝑖 belongs. Then write the number of prior












1 {𝑠𝑖 = 𝑚} ,
and let 𝜔𝑖 for all 𝑖 ∈ P be
𝜔𝑖 = 1 {𝑖 ∈ P0} 1 {𝑠𝑖 = 𝑚}
𝑛𝑚T
𝑁𝑚0




If prior unit 𝑖 is treated, then 𝜔𝑖 is simply the ratio of the number of target units to prior treated
units in 𝑖’s matched stratum. If prior unit 𝑖 is in the control condition, then 𝜔𝑖 is the ratio of the
number of target units to prior control units in 𝑖’s matched stratum. This quantity 𝜔𝑖 is relative to a
53
baseline of 1 in which 𝜔𝑖 = 1 implies that one treated or control prior unit stands for the treated or
control potential outcome of one target unit. When 𝜔𝑖 is greater than 1, then one prior unit stands
for a greater number of target units; hence, this prior unit is especially important since it counts for
a greater number of target units. Conversely, when 𝜔𝑖 is less than 1, then this prior unit is one of
multiple prior units that stand for 1 target unit; hence, the importance of this one prior unit by itself
is downweighted. In general, if unit 𝑖 belongs to a set in which there are more target units than
units in the condition to which unit 𝑖 was assigned, then 𝜔𝑖 will be less than 1. Otherwise, 𝜔𝑖 will
be greater than or equal to 1. The quantity 𝜔𝑖 represents the importance of each prior observation.
I now turn to each prior observation’s reliability.
Optimally matching on the heterogeneity score constructs sets such that prior treated, prior con-
trol and target units are similar on the heterogeneity score, which is interpreted as a 1-dimensional
summary of the 𝐾-dimensional vector of heterogeneity variables. Yet, as mentioned above, im-
balances on the heterogeneity score (and the heterogeneity variables themselves) may remain after
matching. Prior units with heterogeneity scores closer to the average heterogeneity score among
within-stratum target units yield more trustworthy predictions of these target units’ counterfactual
outcomes. To assign greater weight to such prior observations, define the distance between a prior
unit’s heterogeneity score and the average heterogeneity score of target units in 𝑖’s stratum as
For all 𝑖 ∈ P, 𝛿𝑖 =











This quantity 𝛿𝑖 provides a measure of the imbalances on the heterogeneity score that remain after
matching. Note that all units’ heterogeneity scores take on values between 0 and 1, which implies
that 𝛿𝑖 is also bounded between 0 and 1. Values of 𝛿𝑖 closer to 1 indicate higher imbalance on
heterogeneity variables and values closer to 0 indicate lower imbalance.
Within a matched set, the degree of balance on heterogeneity scores gives us a sense of the
reliability of predictions based on these prior units. That is, a prior unit’s heterogeneity score may
be equal to the average of within-stratum target units’ heterogeneity scores; if so, that prior unit
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ought to be assigned its full weight implied by 𝜔𝑖 in Equation (2.7). If a prior unit is dissimilar
from the average within-stratum target unit, then that prior unit ought to count for fewer target
units compared to more similar within-stratum prior units.
To quantify this overall intuition, we can bring together Equations 2.7 and 2.8 to define the
normalized weight of prior unit 𝑖 as









The weight in Equation (2.9) can be incorporated into the CATE algorithm such that prior units
with higher weights exert greater leverage in the fitting of the CATE model. Prior units with lesser
weights exert less influence in the fitting of the CATE model. The weight in Equation (2.9) implies
that prior units comparable to a greater number of target units (i.e., greater ratio of target to prior
treated or control units in the same matched set) and more similar in heterogeneity scores will have
the greatest weights. Conversely, prior units’ weights are decreasing in the within-stratum ratio of
target to prior treated or control units and in the distance between within-stratum prior and target
units’ heterogeneity scores.
Armed with both a matching and weighting scheme, Section 2.3.4 now provides a linear projec-
tion model for the CATE. The model is fit only to prior units, accounting for their weights, stratum
memberships and heterogeneity variables. The fitted model is then used to generate predictions
of potential outcomes for target units, which, in turn, are used to calibrate the target experiment’s
prior distribution as described in Section 2.3.2.
2.3.4 Model of conditional average treatment effect (CATE)
Having described the matching procedure and the weights reflecting the reliability and impor-
tance of prior observations, we can now state the CATE model. As a baseline model, I propose
a linear, multiplicative interaction model (as in Kern et al., 2016) with fixed effects for matched
strata and weights given in Equation (2.9). Formally, we can write the CATE predictive model for
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target experimental units as






?̂?𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑚𝑧𝑖𝑚 for all 𝑖 ∈ T . (2.10)
Importantly, the coefficients in Equation (2.10) are solutions to the least squares problem in the
prior data:
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The actual relationship between heterogeneity variables and potential outcomes is not assumed
to be linear. The linear model in Equation (2.10) serves only as a linear approximation that
represents how potential outcomes change, on average, across different values of heterogeneity
variables. In the context of representing baseline knowledge from past experiments, not, e.g.,
consistent estimation, such a linear approximation is sensible, particularly as a baseline model.
Other models, specifically those from the machine-learning literature on estimating heterogeneous
effects (Wager and Athey, 2018; Hill, 2011; Green and Kern, 2012; Imai and Ratkovic, 2013;
Grimmer, Messing, and Westwood, 2017), are also potentially fruitful choices. However, in the
closely related context of target validity, simple linear regression often performs nearly as well as
machine-learning models in a range of simulations with different data generating processes (see
e.g., Kern et al., 2016).6
Referring back to Equation (2.4), we can set the mean of the target experiment’s prior dis-
tribution to the difference in means of predicted potential outcomes in Equation (2.10). Like-
wise, as in Equation (2.5), we can set the variance of the target experiment’s prior distribu-
tion to the uncertainty of these predictions implied by the estimated variance-covariance matrix.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent (robust) standard errors (Eicker, 1963; Eicker, 1967; White, 1980)
6Kern et al. (2016, p. 124) write “[o]ne surprising result from our simulations is that, overall, linear regression
performed better than expected; this leads one to wonder if it is worthwhile for researchers to adopt more sophisticated
methodological strategies.”
56
are an intuitive choice in that the diagonal entries of the variance-covariance matrix are the error
variances of each prior observation; hence, the prior variance is intuitively calibrated to the predic-
tive accuracy of the CATE model in past experiments. I use HC3 standard errors (MacKinnon and
White, 1985; Andrews, 1991) since they are conservative (i.e., larger) compared to alternative HC
variance-covariance matrix estimators (see Hansen, 2021, p. 112).7
2.4 Quantifying Bayesian learning from target experiment
Thus far, I have focused on how scholars can construct a target experiment’s prior distribution
based on results from past experiments. I now turn to how scholars can characterize how much
they have learned, relative to this prior distribution, after carrying out the target experiment. As
mentioned in the introduction (Section 2.1), I draw on value of information theory, as explicated
in Bayesian decision theory (Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961; Howard, 1966), in order to quantify how
much one has learned from a randomized experiment
Prior to observing experimental data, the best guess for the TATE, 𝜏T , is whichever value
maximizes its prior probability density. In addition to this best guess, we can also define a loss
function that characterizes the penalty for making an incorrect guess about the value of 𝜏T . This
loss function depends on both the best guess of 𝜏T and its true value over which one has prior or
posterior beliefs.
To formalize this framework, first let 𝜏𝑑T denote the best guess (decision) about the value of 𝜏T .








. The optimal guess
is that which minimizes expected loss. Hence, the Bayes’ solution to the decision problem before
7The notion of conservativeness may take on a different meaning in the context of Bayesian inference compared to
other modes of inference. For example, it might be anti-conservative to use larger standard errors for the CATE model
since the subsequent prior distribution will be more diffuse and, consequently, learning from the target experiment will
be greater than it otherwise would be. Alternatively, one could conceive of larger standard errors for the CATE model
as conservative since it aims to mitigate the power of the prior distribution to shape posterior inferences. Under trade-
offs such as these two, I err on the side of letting target experimental data speak for themselves, which is conservative
in terms of how one quantifies the amount of prior information.
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𝜏T | 𝜏T , V̂ar[𝜏T ]
)
𝑑 𝜏T , (2.13)
where, as mentioned above, 𝑝 (𝜏T ) is the prior distribution of 𝜏T and 𝑝
(
𝜏T | 𝜏T , V̂ar[𝜏T ]
)
is the
posterior distribution after observing experimental evidence summarized by 𝜏T and plugging in
Neyman’s conservative variance estimator for the variance nuisance parameter. With a squared
error loss function, the optimal decision rules given in Equations (2.12) and (2.13) are equal to the
expectations of the prior and posterior distributions, respectively (see Jaynes, 2003, pp. 172–175).
Since the optimal decision is the expected value of either the prior or posterior distribution, the
expected loss of this decision with a squared error loss function is the variance of the respective
prior or posterior distribution.
Proposition 4 below formally characterizes the change in the optimal guess about the TATE
and the change in expected loss from the prior to posterior distribution.









𝜏T | 𝜏T , V̂ar [𝜏T ]
)
. The change in the optimal decision from the prior to the
posterior distribution is
𝜇post − 𝜇prior =
𝜎2prior(
𝜎2prior + V̂ar [𝜏T ]
) (𝜏T − 𝜇prior) (2.14)
and the change in the expected loss from the prior to the posterior distribution is
𝜎2post − 𝜎2prior = −
𝜎4prior
𝜎2prior + V̂ar [𝜏T ]
. (2.15)
As one might expect, the smaller is the variance in the target experiment, the greater is the decrease
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in expected loss upon observing data from a new experiment. Moreover, since V̂ar [𝜏T ] < ∞, it
follows that an additional randomized experiment always yields at least some degree of second-
moment learning (decrease in expected loss). The change in the optimal decision about the value of
𝜏T (first-moment learning) depends on the relative information that the experimental data and the
prior distribution provide. In particular, the greater is prior uncertainty, then the more the optimal
decision shifts in the direction of the estimated average treatment effect. Relatedly, the smaller is
the estimated variance, then the less weight is assigned to the prior mean.
Both expressions in Proposition 4 provide two useful statistics that represent how much one
has learned from a new randomized experiment. I refer to Equation (2.14) as the first-moment
Bayesian learning statistic and to Equation (2.15) as the second-moment Bayesian learning statis-
tic. But in addition to these first- and second-moment Bayesian learning statistics, it is helpful to
have a single standardized statistic taking on values between 0 and 1. As mentioned in the mo-
tivating example in Section 2.2, when potential outcomes are naturally bounded, the usual point
and standard error estimates are equivalent to a uniform prior distribution on the possible values of
the TATE. This situation corresponds to the maximal amount of learning. Hence, a useful statis-
tic compares the actual amount of learning to the maximal amount of learning without any prior
information. Formally, we can write this standardized Bayesian learning statistic as











)2 with 𝑈𝜏T and 𝐿𝜏T representing the lower and upper bounds of the
TATE. In the case of the legislative audit experiment on state legislators, the TATE is naturally
bounded between −1 and 1. When the TATE is unbounded, the implicit prior distribution can no
longer be uniform and the maximal amount of learning is difficult to characterize. Although an
improper Jeffreys (Jeffreys, 1939; Jeffreys, 1946) or reference (Bernardo, 1979) prior can yield a
proper posterior, they do not facilitate comparisons of the change in expected loss of the best guess
from the prior to posterior distributions. Thus, when potential outcomes are unbounded, I propose
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to compare the change in expected loss from prior to posterior distributions to what the change









(1 − 𝑧𝑖)𝑦𝑖 . (2.17)
Equation (2.17) sets the upper bound to the maximum observed treated potential outcome minus
the minimum observed control potential outcome. The lower bound is the minimum observed
treated potential outcome minus the maximum observed control potential outcome. Note that the
minimum and maximum outcomes under treated and control are taken over all prior experiments
and the target experiment.
Finally, before turning to an empirical analysis of the 2020 audit experiment in Section 2.5,
I briefly offer two other insights that can be gleaned from Proposition 4. First, it shows that
some degree of learning always results from a single replication study. As a thought exercise, if a
replication study were conducted on the exact same units as a prior study and the estimated effect
were identical, a decrease in expected loss (second-moment learning) would nonetheless result.
As Equation (2.15) shows, the posterior minus the prior variance is always negative, so second
moment learning results. Continuing the thought experiment of an exact replication, imagine that
𝜎2prior and the estimated variance in the replication experiment, V̂ar [𝜏T ], are identical. The extent
of learning will depend on the value of 𝜎2prior. In this case of an exact replication, the amount
of learning can be represented simply as −𝜎2prior/2. Hence, we always learn from a single, exact
replication, but how much we learn depends on the state of prior knowledge. With a very precise
state of prior knowledge, learning is minimal, but increases with greater prior uncertainty.
Second, Proposition 4 offers insight more broadly on a form of Bayesian power analysis
whereby scholars can assess how large an experiment would need to be to achieve a certain degree
of learning in expectation. For example, consider the difference in variances between prior and
posterior distributions in Equation (2.15). Under assumptions about the means and variances of
treated and control potential outcomes, as well as the total number of units and proportion of treated
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units in the target experiment, it is straightforward to assess the expected amount of learning. The
key insight is that V̂ar[𝜏T ], whose expectation and probability limit can be analytically derived,
is the only random quantity in Equation (2.15). The prior variance is fixed over possible random
assignments. Hence, it would be straightforward to assess how large the 𝑁 of a target experiment
would need to be to achieve some expected level of Bayesian learning. Given budget constraints
that researchers invariably face, they can assess how much learning would result relative to prior
knowledge from a small experiment (even if that experiment were unlikely to reach the threshold
of statistical significance).
2.5 Empirical analysis
I now apply the overall methodology to the 2020 audit experiment described in Section 2.2. I
construct the prior distribution for this target experiment based on data from three published papers
(Butler and Broockman, 2011; Butler, 2014; Butler and Crabtree, 2017) and one unpublished paper
(Janusz and Lajevardi, 2016). Given the private nature of the data from audit experiments on public
officials, I was able to obtain data with sufficient background information from only these four
papers under the condition that I not share the data.
The first step in implementing the methods thus described is to define the set of heterogeneity
variables. I define this set as
X = {Gender, Race, Party,Level of government, District percent Black,
Professionalism index, Southern state}.
(2.18)
I then construct heterogeneity scores, as described in Section 2.3.2 via logistic regression. The













Figure 2.2: Heterogeneity score distributions (logit scale) between prior and target experiments
The heterogeneity score distributions suggest a poor degree of overlap on variables that plau-
sibly explain effect heterogeneity. Hence, a large proportion of prior observations will be poorly
suited to predict potential outcomes in the target experiment. To construct sets of prior control,
prior treated and target units similar on the heterogeneity score, I implement generalized full
matching via R’s quickmatch package (Sävje, Higgins, and Sekhon, 2021). I construct a match-
ing for each treatment contrast separately. The matching for all contrasts satisfies the constraints
given in Equations 2.6b – 2.6f with a caliper on the heterogeneity score set to 0.2.8 Figure 2.3
below presents the differences in heterogeneity score distributions between prior and target exper-
iments after matching.
8This caliper on the heterogeneity score also happens to be the recommended caliper on the propensity score in the
closely related context of matched observational studies with a binary treatment variable (Cochran and Rubin, 1973;
Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984).
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Black or Latino (1) vs White (0) Latino (1) vs Black or White (0) Latino or White (1) vs Black (0)
Black (1) vs White (0) Latino (1) vs Black (0) Latino (1) vs White (0)














Figure 2.3: Heterogeneity score distributions (logit scale) after matching for all treatment contrasts
Overlap in heterogeneity scores is substantially improved after matching, but at the expense of
fewer prior units. Moreover, discrepancies in heterogeneity scores (and the heterogeneity variables
themselves) between prior control, prior treated and target units may still exist (and can be as large
as 0.2 or approximately −1.39 on the logit scale). Table 2.2 below provides the maximum absolute
distance in heterogeneity scores within a matched set for all treatment contrasts, along with the
average within-stratum ratio of target to either treated or control prior units.
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Treatment contrast Max heterogeneity distance Avg target-prior ratio
Black (1) vs White (0) 0.0201 0.0002
Latino (1) vs White (0) 0.0445 0.0003
Latino (1) vs Black (0) 0.0416 0.0003
Black or Latino (1) vs White (0) 0.0251 0.0002
Latino (1) vs Black or White (0) 0.0448 0.0002
Latino or White (1) vs Black (0) 0.0251 0.0002
Table 2.2: Maximum within-stratum absolute distance on heterogeneity score between prior and
target units and maximum within-stratum ratio of target units to either treated or control prior units
In many cases, as is shown in Table 2.2, the within-stratum ratio of target to prior units will be
small. When multiple prior experiments exist, there will likely be many more prior units than
target units, thereby deflating the within-stratum ratios of target to prior treated or control units.
With the weights in Equation (2.9) and fixed effects for matched strata, I fit the linear interaction
model in Equation (2.11) with the heterogeneity variables in Equation (2.18) to the prior data. I
then use the fitted coefficients from this model to construct the mean and variance parameters of
the truncated Normal prior distribution as described in Equations (2.4) and (2.5). I subsequently
update the respective prior distributions via a Normal likelihood function in which a hypothetical
value of the average effect, along with a conservative plug-in estimator of the variance, assigns
probability density to the target experiment’s post-treatment data summarized by the Difference-
in-Means. Figure 2.4 and Table 2.3 below provide both the prior and posterior distributions for all
six treatment contrasts.
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Black (1) vs White (0) Black or Latino (1) vs White (0) Latino (1) vs Black (0)














Figure 2.4: Prior and posterior distributions on the average effect in the target experiment for all
treatment contrasts
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Outcome: Reply from legislator’s email address
Treatment contrast Prior mean (SD) Posterior mean (SD) Bayes’ learning
Black (1) vs White (0) −0.034 −0.0191 0.0084
(0.0094) (0.008)
Latino (1) vs White (0) −0.0419 −0.0284 0.0312
(0.0218) (0.0123)
Latino (1) vs Black (0) −0.0046 −0.0318 0.0334
(0.023) (0.0125)
Black or Latino (1) vs White (0) −0.0355 −0.0252 0.0082
(0.0086) (0.0072)
Latino (1) vs Black or White (0) −0.0205 −0.0293 0.03
(0.0204) (0.0108)
Latino or White (1) vs Black (0) 0.0283 0.0083 0.0091
(0.0092) (0.0076)
Table 2.3: Means and standard deviations of prior and posterior distributions of the average effect
in the target experiment for each of the six contrasts. The Bayes’ learning statistic is the standard-
ized statistic given in Equation (2.16).
As Figure 2.4 and Table 2.3 show, this audit experiment results in substantively meaningful
first-moment learning, but leads to relatively little changes in expected loss. Based on results of
prior audit experiments, one would expect 3.4% of state legislators to respond to a White con-
stituent, but not a Black constituent. Yet in this experiment, referring back to Table 2.1, the av-
erage difference in legislators’ response rates to putatively White and Black constituents is low.
Therefore, the posterior mean suggests a substantially smaller level of discrimination, 1.91%, that
legislators exhibit, on average, against Black constituents in favor of White constituents.
Unsurprisingly, the standardized Bayesian learning statistics are all relatively small. With a
prior distribution informed by several past audit experiments, the change in expected loss from the
prior to posterior distribution will be much smaller than what that change would have been with
a uniform prior. That is what is reflected in Table 2.3, even though we do see meaningful levels
of first-moment learning. Learning is likely to be greater among subgroups for which less prior
66
information exists. I now turn to an analysis of learning from theoretically important subgroups.
2.5.1 Subgroup analysis
One of the primary benefits of Bayesian analysis of experiments is that it enables assessments
of how much information from an experiment one gains about theoretically important subgroups.
I focus on subgroups defined by both party and ethnorace. Before assessing Bayesian learning in
these subgroups, I present the Difference-in-Means and conservatively estimated standard errors
in each subgroup.
Outcome: Reply from legislator’s email address
Treatment contrast Diff-in-Means (SE)
GOP legs Dem legs Black legs Latino legs
Black (1) vs White (0) 0.0128 0.0304 0.0452 0.1343∗∗
(0.0216) (0.0218) (0.0429) (0.0667)
Latino (1) vs White (0) −0.0454∗∗ 0.0032 −0.0054 0.1018
(0.0206) (0.0216) (0.0414) (0.0663)
Latino (1) vs Black (0) −0.0582∗∗∗ −0.0272 −0.0505 −0.0325
(0.0206) (0.0217) (0.0412) (0.0686)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2.4: Subgroup results of audit experiment
Table 2.4 suggests that Latino legislators strongly favor putatively Black to White constituents,
but still favor Latino constituents over Black constituents. These results suggest that the benefits
of descriptive representation, at least among Latino legislators, accrue to both in- and out-minority
groups. By contrast, among Black legislators, the benefits of descriptive representation appear
to apply only to putatively Black constituents. These estimated effects among Black legislators
are not statistically significant, although at least one of the results among Latino legislators is
significant. Regardless of their significance, we can still assess how much we learn from these
results.
Examining Table 2.5 below, we can see that this experiment yields a very different understand-
ing of both Black and Latino legislatorsrelative to what one would have predicted going into the
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experiment. Figure 2.5 below illustrates the changes from prior to posterior distributions.


















Figure 2.5: Prior and posterior distributions of treatment contrasts by race of legislators
Of particular interest is Black legislators’ responsiveness to Latino vs Black constituents. The
first-moment change from the prior to posterior distribution is large, 0.04 to −0.043. But more
importantly, the prior to posterior standard deviation decreases from 0.133 to .039. Among Latino
legislators, there is relatively large amount of learning overall about the extent to which they favor
Black over White constituents. Yet the posterior distribution itself is still relatively imprecise. An
even greater amount of learning among Latino legislators obtains for the Latino vs Black contrast.
Note again, however, that this large amount of learning still results in a relatively imprecise pos-
terior standard deviation. The high learning is driven by an extremely diffuse prior distribution
due to the scarcity of Latino legislators in prior experiments. We can see this pattern in Table 2.5
below.
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Outcome: Reply from legislator’s email address
Treatment contrast Prior mean (SD) Posterior mean (SD) Bayes learning
Subgroup: Black legislators
Black (1) vs White (0) 0.057 0.0521 0.0404
(0.0361) (0.0276)
Latino (1) vs White (0) 0.106 0.0046 0.2187
(0.132) (0.0395)
Latino (1) vs Black (0) 0.0404 −0.0426 0.2204
(0.1329) (0.0393)
Subgroup: Latino legislators
Black (1) vs White (0) 0.0527 0.0985 0.0986
(0.0755) (0.05)
Latino (1) vs White (0) 0.0664 0.0774 0.0435
(0.0447) (0.0371)
Latino (1) vs Black (0) −0.0385 −0.0341 0.1745
(0.1162) (0.0591)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2.5: Bayesian learning among Black and Latino legislators
Now turning to subgroup effects by party, recall from Table 2.4 suggests that GOP legislators,
on average, discriminate quite strongly against putatively Latino constituents in favor of not only
White, but also putatively Black constituents. Table 2.4 also shows that GOP and Democratic
legislators exhibit little discrimination between putatively Black and White constituents. Figure 2.6
and Table 2.6 show the changes from prior to posterior distributions upon observing the results in
Table 2.4.
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Figure 2.6: Prior and posterior distributions of treatment contrasts by party of legislators
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Outcome: Reply from legislator’s email address
Treatment contrast Prior mean (SD) Posterior mean (SD) Bayes learning
Subgroup: GOP legislators
Black (1) vs White (0) −0.0711 −0.0454 0.0137
(0.0143) (0.0119)
Latino (1) vs White (0) −0.0602 −0.0522 0.0283
(0.0223) (0.0151)
Latino (1) vs Black (0) −0.0063 −0.0328 0.0261
(0.021) (0.0147)
Subgroup: Dem legislators
Black (1) vs White (0) 0.0004 0.0113 0.0171
(0.0164) (0.0131)
Latino (1) vs White (0) −0.016 −0.0017 0.0547
(0.0366) (0.0186)
Latino (1) vs Black (0) 0.0053 −0.0203 0.0646
(0.042) (0.0193)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2.6: Bayesian learning among GOP and Democrat legislators
Figure 2.6 and Table 2.6 show that meaningful first-moment learning obtains within party sub-
groups. The standardized Bayesian learning statistics, however, are all relatively small. However,
the Bayesian learning for the Latino vs White and Latino vs Black contrasts among Democratic
legislators is twice as large as all measures of overall learning in Table 2.3.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have demonstrated how scholars can generate a prior distribution, empirically
justified from past experiments, for a new target experiment. I have also shown how scholars can
provide meaningful quantitative summaries of how much one has learned from a target experiment
relative to the prior. Both the prior distribution and likelihood function are the two central pillars
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of Bayesian inference. This chapter has focused on the prior distribution and how it changes
when updated by new experimental data. Chapter 2 focused on the likelihood function, which
showed that Bayesians do not simply revise their beliefs, but do so in a way that tracks the true
causal target of interest. This likelihood function and the prior distribution, taken together, enables
scholars to quantify what they learn from randomized experiments and to assess how knowledge
cumulates from one experiment to the next. Having laid out these properties in the context of
an ideal randomized experiment, the next chapter shifts focus to observational studies and the
Difference-in-Differences design in particular.
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Chapter 3: Identification and Inference for Difference-in-Differences under
Uncertainty in Parallel Trends
3.1 Introduction
At least since the seminal studies of Ashenfelter and Card (1985), Card (1990) and Card and
Krueger (1994),1 Difference-in-Differences (DID)2 has emerged as one of the most popular non-
parametric (model-free) methods for inference of causal effects in studies with outcomes measured
over time. Scholars use the canonical DID design in contexts where one (treated) subpopulation
is subject to an intervention but another (control) subpopulation is not. In such contexts, the av-
erage treatment effect in the treated subpopulation (the ATT) is difficult to infer. First, baseline
factors often differ between treated and control groups. Hence, a treated-vs-control comparison of
post-treatment outcomes may reflect not a causal effect, but only this baseline difference between
groups. Second, factors other than treatment often vary over time in the treated population. Hence,
a comparison of pre- and post-treatment outcomes in the treated group may reflect these factors,
not a causal effect. The DID design offers a solution to both problems. So long as there would
have been no difference between treated and control populations’ average changes in outcomes
over time had the treatment not occurred,3 the DID design identifies the ATT.4 This identification
1The actual genesis of the DID design can be traced at least as far back as Snow (1854) and Obenauer and Nienburg
(1915). For more on the role that DID reasoning played in John Snow’s analysis of London’s 1854 Broad Street cholera
outbreak, see Coleman (2019).
2For some of the core literature on DID designs (albeit sometimes under different names), see Abadie (2005), An-
grist and Pischke (2008, chapter 5), Athey and Imbens (2006), Lechner (2011), Rosenbaum (1989b) and Rosenbaum
(2001), Sofer et al. (2016) and Tchetgen Tchetgen (2014) among others.
3In other words, as Abadie (2005, pp. 1–2) states, “the conventional DID estimator requires that in absence of
the treatment, the average outcomes for treated and controls would have followed parallel paths over time.” One
could equivalently state that the DID design adjusts for time-invariant confounders, but not time-varying confounders.
Hence, the crucial identification assumption of the DID design is that of no time-varying confounders.
4Following Koopmans and Reiersøl (1950) (see also Hurwicz, 1950; Koopmans, 1949; Koopmans, Rubin, and
Leipnik, 1950), I refer to an unobservable causal parameter as identified when, given perfect knowledge of the prob-
ability distributions of observable variables, that parameter is consistent with only one value, not (perhaps infinitely)
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assumption, known as parallel trends, provides a design-based justification for common estimators,
like two-way fixed effects. However, despite its benefits for estimation, the tethering of the DID
design to the identification assumption of parallel trends poses problems for inference.
Drawing upon the typology of Abadie et al. (2020), uncertainty is typically conceived in two
ways. One is sampling uncertainty that arises from the inability to sample all units from a target
population. Another is counterfactual uncertainty that arises from the inability to observe counter-
factual potential outcomes among whichever units one samples. When making a statistical infer-
ence from observed data in a sample to a counterfactual parameter in a population, the statistical
distributions on which our conclusions about this parameter are based ought to reflect both types
of uncertainty. Consider, for example, a randomized experiment conducted on a random sample
of units from a target population. Statistical uncertainty in conclusions about the average causal
effect in this target population reflect variation in (1) the average causal effect across possible
samples and (2) causal estimates across possible assignments conditional on each possible sample
(Neyman, 1923; Aronow, Green, Lee, et al., 2014; Freedman, 2008; Imbens and Rubin, 2015).
By contrast, statistical uncertainty in the canonical DID design reflects only sampling uncertainty
that arises from the inability to sample all units from a target population. The quantification of
uncertainty in inferences from observed to counterfactual outcomes is difficult in the DID design
since its causal conclusions are based on assumptions about the fixed target parameter itself, not
assumptions about a random assignment mechanism (see, e.g., Manski and Pepper, 2018). Hence,
counterfactual uncertainty is absent from the standard errors, 𝑝-values and confidence intervals of
the canonical DID design.
This failure to account for counterfactual uncertainty in the DID design has two immediate
consequences for empirical practice: First, in cases where both sampling and counterfactual un-
certainty exist, scholars often produce uncertainty intervals that are too narrow and hypothesis tests
that too frequently detect an average causal effect when none exists. Second, in many cases, units
cannot be naturally conceived as a sample from a target population, e.g., when units consist of all
many values.
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50 states in the United States. When units can indeed be conceived as a sample from a population,
the standard assumption of independent and identically distributed (IID) sampling may be difficult
to justify (Abadie et al., 2020; Manski and Pepper, 2018). Thus, existing methods that assume
an IID random sampling process yield incorrect and potentially misleading standard errors in DID
applications.
One solution to these two problems is to statistically capture counterfactual uncertainty due to
a random treatment assignment mechanism with unknown and potentially heterogeneous assign-
ment probabilities (Rambachan and Roth, 2020) or the potentially random timing of treatment in
the DID design (Athey and Imbens, 2021). Yet a key feature of the DID design is that, unlike other
observational designs, its causal conclusions are not based on an analogy with randomized experi-
ments (see Keele, 2020). Therefore, statistical uncertainty predicated on an alternative assumption
about the assignment mechanism does not represent uncertainty in ones causal conclusions from
the DID design.5
In this paper, I offer a resolution to the problem of inference via the following methodological
contribution. I first generalize the DID design to the full set of counterfactual trend assumptions,
which includes not only parallel trends, but also each possible way in which parallel trends could
be violated. I use this framework to decompose the DID design’s overall uncertainty into sam-
pling and counterfactual uncertainty. To statistically capture counterfactual uncertainty, I derive an
empirical Bayes’ procedure that calibrates a prior distribution on the set of counterfactual trend as-
sumptions to (a) pre-treatment outcome trends and (b) the control group’s post-treatment deviation
from pre-treatment trends. This empirical Bayes’ procedure can be easily integrated with the usual
nonparametric bootstrap in DID designs (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004) when sampling
uncertainty is also present. I show that this empirical Bayes’ procedure resolves the pathological
inferential properties of the DID design and also show the conditions under which this procedure’s
5This difficulty of quantifying uncertainty leads some scholars in some DID designs to eschew standard errors
altogether. For example, in their DID design to assess the effect of Right-to-Carry laws on crime in US states, Manski
and Pepper (2018) make clear that their DID design’s identification assumption is based on deterministic constraints
on the mean of counterfactual potential outcomes. Therefore, Manski and Pepper (2018, p. 234) write that they “do not
provide measures of statistical precision” because the US states in the study are not realizations of a random sampling
process nor are the design’s causal conclusions based on an assumed random assignment mechanism.
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uncertainty intervals have correct coverage.
This paper’s contribution pertains to inference, not estimation. Standard approaches to esti-
mation in the DID design typically proceed by choosing one from a set of possible identification
assumptions and then estimating the ATT conditional on this assumption. The use of model-based
estimators are often justified based on their equivalence with DID estimators defined in terms of
potential outcomes rather than structural parameters of a model (Egami and Yamauchi, 2019; Lee,
2016; Mora and Reggio, 2012; Mora and Reggio, 2019). In this paper, I happen to draw on the
machinery (but not the assumptions) of linear regression only as a way to calibrate the prior dis-
tribution on counterfactual trends. The empirical Bayes’ procedure for inference is not wedded to
linear regression for effecting such calibration. Thus, as an extension to empirical Bayes’ infer-
ential procedure, I show how scholars can assess the sensitivity of their inferences to alternative
choices for calibrating the prior distribution of counterfactual trends.
In the rest of the paper, I proceed by introducing, first, a running example of a canonical DID
design from Montalvo (2011), which seeks to infer the effect of the 2004 Madrid train bombings
on subsequent outcomes in Spain’s 2004 general election. I choose this application because the
empirical Bayes’ (maximum a posteriori) point estimate that results from the procedure I propose
is roughly identical to that which would result from the canonical DID estimator, but with very
different levels of associated uncertainty. Hence, the Montalvo (2011) study helps square the fo-
cus of this paper on inference rather than estimation. The succeeding sections provide relevant
notation and lay out the pathological properties for inference that follow from the canonical DID
design. The succeeding sections derive the generalized DID design and the empirical Bayes’ infer-
ential framework. Given the extensive literature on sampling-based inference (see, e.g., Bertrand,
Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004; Beck and Katz, 1995; Conley and Taber, 2011; Donald and Lang,
2007; Driscoll and Kraay, 1998; Ferman and Pinto, 2019; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009; Rokicki
et al., 2018; Wooldridge, 2003), these sections focus primarily on counterfactual inference in a
finite sample, but nevertheless show how one can easily draw upon the nonparametric bootstrap
to incorporate sampling uncertainty when it is also present. The final section offers concluding
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remarks and reflects on potentially fruitful extensions of the general method.
3.2 Running Example and Formal Setup
On March 11, 2004, only three days before Spain’s general election, several coordinated bomb-
ings of Madrid’s commuter trains left nearly 200 people dead and thousands more injured. Many
commentators perceived the Madrid train bombings to be in response to Spain’s support of US mil-
itary involvement in Iraq. José-Maria Aznar of the ruling Partido Popular (PP) (People’s Party)
staunchly supported US military involvement in Iraq despite widespread opposition from the Span-
ish public. Polls predicted a victory by the PP prior to the bombings on March 11. However, the
opposition Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party), which
opposed Spanish military involvement in Iraq, ended up winning the general elections three days
after the Madrid bombings. Some scholars argue that the Madrid bombings caused the unexpected
PSOE victory (Bali, 2007), while others argue that the electoral outcome would have remained the
same in the absence of the bombings (Torcal and Rico, 2004; Lago and Montero, 2005).
Montalvo (2011) intervenes in this debate by seeking to infer the effect of the Madrid bombings
on electoral support for the PP relative to the PSOE via the DID design. As Montalvo (2011)
explains, the Madrid bombings occurred three days before resident Spanish voters cast their votes.
But nonresident Spanish voters (i.e., Spanish nationals living outside of Spain) voted either in
person at the relevant Spanish consulate or by mail between March 2 and March 7, four days before
the bombings. Resident voters therefore make up a treated group whose members did know about
the attacks at the time of voting and nonresident voters make up a control group whose members did
not know about the attacks at the time of voting. Technically, the votes of nonresidents are realized
before treatment onset, but one can nevertheless regard them as post-treatment under the mild
assumption that nonresidents’ votes would have been the same had nonresidents voted roughly
one week later in the absence of the bombings.
In the dataset from Montalvo (2011), each election — in 1989, 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2004 —
consists of 104 observations, which reflect the two groups of resident and nonresident voters in
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each of Spain’s 52 provinces. The primary outcome of interest is the PP vote share at the province-
group level, which is naturally bounded between 0 and 1. The central identification problem is
that, in the absence of the bombings, resident voters’ PP vote share in 2004 is unobserved.
A standard resolution to this identification problem is to assume that, as Montalvo (2011,
p. 1149) states, “in the absence of treatment, the average outcome for the treated and untreated
would have followed parallel trends.” This assumption states that the counterfactual mean of res-
ident groups’ PP vote shares in 2004 is equal to an observable quantity — the mean of resident
groups’ PP vote shares in 2000 plus the change in means of nonresident groups’ PP vote shares
from 2000 to 2004. Although, the parallel trends assumption is fundamentally untestable without
further assumptions, Montalvo (2011) draws on additional elections in 1989, 1993, 1996 and 2000
as placebos to assess the plausibility of parallel trends. As Figure 3.1 shows, the means of PP vote
shares for the provinces’ resident and nonresident groups follow roughly parallel trends prior to
the 2004 bombings, but then come closer together in 2004 after the bombings.6
6Focusing specifically on the outcome of the mean ratio of PP to PSOE votes, Montalvo (2011, p. 1149) states,
“[b]efore 2004, the lines are basically parallel; in 2004, they converge.” This application using the data from Montalvo
(2011) uses PP vote share as the outcome since the ratio of PP to PSOE vote share is not defined for all possible values
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Figure 3.1: Trends in mean Partido Popular (PP) vote shares in Spain’s 52 provinces (data from
Montalvo, 2011)
Figure 3.1 suggests that the assumption of parallel trends is indeed plausible — i.e., that res-
ident and nonresident groups’ changes in average PP vote share from 2000 to 2004 would have
been equal had the bombings not occurred. However, given that resident groups’ counterfactual
PP vote shares are fundamentally unobservable, a range of violations of parallel trends are also
plausible. In the canonical DID design, the parallel trends assumption permits identification of the
average effect of the bombings on resident groups’ vote shares for the PP in 2004.
More formally, the canonical DID setup consists of two groups and only one post-treatment
period.7 Let P𝑁 be a population of 𝑁 units that belong to one of two groups: a control group,
7Recent literature on DID considers deviations from this canonical setup (see, e.g., Strezhnev, 2018; Chaisemartin
and D’Haultfœuille, 2021; Goodman-Bacon, 2018; Callaway and Sant’Anna, 2018; Hudson, Hull, and Liebersohn,
2017; Yamauchi, 2020).
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𝑍 = 0, and a treated group, 𝑍 = 1, which are of sizes 𝑁0 and 𝑁1, respectively. From the population,
P𝑁 , let S𝑛 be a random sample of size 𝑛, which is stratified by 𝑍 , where 𝑛0 and 𝑛1 are the fixed
numbers of sampled units from 𝑍 = 0 and 𝑍 = 1, respectively, and 𝑛 = 𝑛0 + 𝑛1. Without loss of
generality, assume that the first 1, . . . , 𝑛0 units are sampled from group 𝑍 = 0 and the 𝑛0 + 1, . . . , 𝑛
units are sampled from group 𝑍 = 1. All units in the population, P𝑁 , bear measurements over
𝑇 + 1 time periods, where the index 𝑡 ∈ {0, . . . , 𝑇} runs over the 𝑇 + 1 periods. The baseline period
is 𝑡 = 0 and 𝑇 is the only post-treatment period. Throughout this paper, I write individual sample
quantities with the 𝑖 subscript, where the index 𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛} runs over the 𝑛 individual units in S𝑛,
and in either uppercase or lowercase depending on whether the sample quantity is random (upper)
or not (lower). Distributions defined on all units in the population, P𝑁 , are written in uppercase
without the 𝑖 subscript.
All units in the population, P𝑁 , are unexposed to treatment in time periods 𝑡 ∈ {0, . . . , 𝑇 − 1}.
However, in time period 𝑇 , the group 𝑍 = 1 is treated, while the group 𝑍 = 0 is not. Under the
stratified sampling process described above, the groups 𝑍 = 0 and 𝑍 = 1 can be treated as two
subpopulations from which units are sampled, which in turn implies that 𝑧𝑖 is constant over all time
periods conditional on the value of 𝑖.8 The time period subscript, 𝑡, is omitted for 𝑍 and 𝑧𝑖 since
both quantities are fixed across all time periods.
In contrast to 𝑧𝑖, sample units’ outcomes in all periods are random. Denote the individual sam-
ple outcomes as 𝑌𝑖𝑡 . For units in which 𝑧𝑖 = 1, assume that each unit has two potential outcomes
in period 𝑇 denoted by 𝑌𝑖𝑇 (1) and 𝑌𝑖𝑇 (0), which reflect if all treated units had been treated or
untreated.9 Only the treated potential outcome, 𝑌𝑖𝑇 (1), is observed in period 𝑇 . Crucially, this rep-
resentation of potential outcomes in only time 𝑇 , not in any prior periods, implies no anticipation
of treatment for all units in which 𝑧𝑖 = 1, which is distinct from the assumption of parallel trends
(Malani and Reif, 2015). Potential outcomes in period 𝑇 are defined only among treated units since
8That is, the value of 𝑧𝑖 for a sampled unit could not have been different had some other unit from P𝑁 been sampled
instead.
9By defining exposure to treatment such that all treated units are either treated or untreated as a group, this as-
sumption does not preclude interference among treated units. This assumption does, however, stipulate that there are
no hidden levels of the treatment variable, which implies that all treated units are comparable to each other (Rubin,
1986).
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the estimand of interest (the ATT) pertains only to them and the DID design need not invoke the
assumption that control units had some treatment assignment probability greater than 0 and less
than 1.10 For control units, one can simply denote the observed outcomes in period 𝑇 as 𝑌𝑖𝑇 .
We can denote the population ATT as
ATT = E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 (1) − 𝑌𝑖𝑇 (0) | 𝑧𝑖 = 1] (3.1)
and the population parallel trends assumption, defined on periods 𝑇 − 1 and 𝑇 , as
Parallel trends B E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 (0) − 𝑌𝑖𝑇−1(0) | 𝑧𝑖 = 1] = E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 − 𝑌𝑖𝑇−1 | 𝑧𝑖 = 0] , (3.2)
where the expected value operator, E [·], is taken over the set of possible samples from P𝑁 via the
stratified, simple random sampling process described above.
The DID estimator is defined on only periods 𝑇 and 𝑇 − 1, but all pre-treatment periods can
be harnessed for placebo studies under additional assumptions (see, e.g., Egami and Yamauchi,










𝑖=1 (𝑌𝑖𝑇 − 𝑌𝑖𝑇−1)














(𝑌𝑖𝑇 − 𝑌𝑖𝑇−1) , (3.3)
is unbiased for the descriptive difference of E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 (1) − 𝑌𝑖𝑇−1 | 𝑧𝑖 = 1] − E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 − 𝑌𝑖𝑇−1 | 𝑧𝑖 = 0].11
The population parallel trends assumption in Equation (3.2) is the key identification assump-
tion for the DID design. Equation (3.2) implies that the descriptive difference between treated and
10Rosenbaum (2017, chapter 8) prefers the term “counterparts” instead of “controls” for this reason.
11This DID estimator in Equation (3.3) is equivalent to the two-way fixed effects (FE) estimator (i.e., linear regres-
sion with unit and time fixed effects) (Imai and Kim, 2019; Sobel, 2012; Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Wooldridge,
2005; Kropko and Kubinec, 2018; Egami and Yamauchi, 2019), although this equivalence does not necessarily hold
when the DID estimator is defined on more than two groups or time periods (Imai and Kim, 2021; Chaisemartin and
D’Haultfœuille, 2021; Goodman-Bacon, 2021).
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control populations is equal to a causal difference in the treated population — namely, the ATT in




is equal to not only the descriptive quantity of E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 (1) − 𝑌𝑖𝑇−1 | 𝑧𝑖 = 1]−
E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 − 𝑌𝑖𝑇−1 | 𝑧𝑖 = 0], but also for the causal quantity of ATT when the assumption of parallel
trends holds. However, as I will argue, this causal identification assumption leads to a pathological
property of inference in the DID design.
3.3 Pathology of Causal Identification in DID
To illustrate the pathology of the parallel trends assumption in DID, it is helpful to contrast it
with the archetypal model of an observational study (Cochran, 1965). In a randomized experiment,
units’ individual assignment probabilities are known by design. In an observational study, units’
realized assignments are usually assumed to be the result of independent, individual assignment
mechanisms with unknown and potentially heterogeneous probabilities. A standard observational
design like optimal matching (Rosenbaum, 1989a; Rosenbaum, 1991; Hansen, 2004) aims to re-
solve this problem by constructing matched strata that can (at least provisionally) justify the claim
that individual assignment probabilities are uniform within strata. Under this assumption, con-
ditioning on the observed number of treated units in each matched stratum implies a uniform
probability distribution on the set of assignment vectors within each stratum (Rosenbaum, 1984;
Rosenbaum, 2002, Sections 3.2 and 3.4), which thereby renders methods for the analysis of com-
plete, block randomized experiments appropriate. A sensitivity analysis can then assess whether
any found impact persists over different values of a sensitivity parameter that represent increas-
ingly severe violations of the complete random assignment within matched strata assumption (see
Rosenbaum and Krieger, 1990; Gastwirth, Krieger, and Rosenbaum, 2000; Fogarty, 2020).
In this archetypal model of an observational study, identification assumptions are about the
assignment mechanism. For example, consider a test of the null hypothesis of no average effect
relative to the alternative of a positive average effect: Different assumptions about the assignment
mechanism imply different probability distributions of the test statistic, which, in turn, determine
whether or not we reject the null hypothesis (see Fogarty, 2020). Since our causal conclusions
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(e.g., rejection or not of null in favor of alternative) are based on the statistical distribution of our
test statistic, our causal claims are characterized by statistical uncertainty, e.g., type I and type II
error probabilities. In DID, by contrast, the key identification assumption of parallel trends is about
the causal parameter itself. But because the causal parameter is a fixed quantity of which there is
no statistical distribution, assumptions about it do not imply measures of statistical uncertainty.
To see more clearly the problem that parallel trends poses for inference, imagine that one
samples the entire population of interest (S𝑛 = P𝑁 ) such that the DID estimator is without sampling
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𝑖=𝑛0+1 𝑦𝑖𝑇 (0), is unobserved in a finite sample. Thus, parallel
trends boils down to an assumption about the mean of treated units’ post-treatment outcomes in





𝑖=𝑛0+1 𝑦𝑖𝑇 (0). Since the mean of treated units’ treated potential
outcomes is observed, parallel trends logically implies a value of the ATT in a finite sample. Hence,
the parallel trends assumption is about a fixed causal parameter, not the distribution of a random
quantity on which our inferences of this fixed parameter are based. Parallel trends therefore implies
an absence of statistical uncertainty in our causal conclusions.
This problem cannot be solved by a sensitivity analysis to violations of parallel trends. In a
sensitivity analysis to violations of assumptions about the assignment mechanism (Rosenbaum and
Krieger, 1990; Gastwirth, Krieger, and Rosenbaum, 2000; Fogarty, 2020), scholars can assess how
their conclusions about a fixed causal parameter would change over different values of a sensitivity
parameter that characterizes the assignment mechanism. Yet each assumption about the assign-
ment mechanism, which justifies one’s subsequent causal conclusions, implies some measure of
statistical uncertainty in one’s causal conclusions. By contrast, in the DID design, an assessment
of sensitivity to some violation of parallel trends boils down to another assumption about the mean
83
of treated units’ counterfactual outcomes, a component of the fixed causal parameter itself. Hence,
assessments of sensitivity to violations of parallel trends fail to statistically capture counterfactual
uncertainty.
One solution to this pathology of the parallel trends identification assumption is to invoke an
alternative identification assumption altogether. Athey and Imbens (2021), for example, invoke an
assumption about the random timing of treatment adoption for all units in a finite sample. Simi-
larly, Rambachan and Roth (2020) consider a finite sample DID setting in which the assignment
mechanism is stochastic, but treatment assignment probabilities potentially vary across units. In
this setting, the key identification assumption is that the covariance of assignment probabilities and
the after-minus-before change in control potential outcomes is equal to 0. I propose an alternative,
empirical Bayes’ approach that statistically captures uncertainty over the possible violations of
parallel trends. Like the canonical DID design, this approach conditions on the observed assign-
ments and does not invoke assumptions about units’ assignment probabilities or their covariance
with potential outcomes. There are at least three reasons why scholars might prefer such an empir-
ical Bayes’ approach as opposed to an approach based on assumptions about a random assignment
mechanism:
(1) A key feature of the DID design is that its core assumption is not based on analogy with
a randomized experiment (Keele, 2020). Indeed, the parallel trends assumption in Equation (3.2)
makes no reference to an assignment mechanism. Moreover, such an assumption about the changes
in potential outcomes conditional on units’ realized assignments might, in many applications, be
more convincing than one about units’ assignment probabilities.
(2) Even with complete knowledge of either assignment probabilities or the random timing
of treatment adoption, inference on such bases is often unfeasible. For example, consider the
canonical Card and Krueger (1994) DID study, which draws on employment outcomes measured
over time in New Jersey (NJ) and Pennsylvania (PA) to assess the effects of NJ’s minimum wage
increase on employment in NJ’s fast-food restaurants. Exposure of restaurants to treatment (mini-
mum wage increase) occurs at the state level, which would imply a clustered random assignment
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process for restaurants in NJ and PA. With only two possible assignments (conditioning on the
event that restaurants in only one of the two states are treated), inference on the basis of an assign-
ment mechanism is impractical even if the probability distribution on this set of two assignments
were known with certainty. The same problem obtains under inferences based on the random
timing of treatment when, as is the case in many applications, there are few time periods.
(3) In a setting with a stochastic assignment mechanism, but potentially heterogeneous as-
signment probabilities, the ATT estimand will vary over possible assignments depending on which
units happen to be treated (Sekhon and Shem-Tov, 2021). The variance of the DID estimator would
capture statistical uncertainty surrounding not a fixed ATT, but rather the expected value of a ran-
dom ATT. With unknown and potentially heterogeneous assignment probabilities, the expected
ATT is a weighted sum of individual treatment effects, with weights equal to the inverse of units’
treatment assignment probabilities, divided by the number of treated units (see Rambachan and
Roth, 2020). With unknown weights, which might be unintuitive even if they were known, such an
estimand is difficult to interpret and relate to scientific quantities of interest in DID applications.
In the sections to follow, I derive an empirical Bayes’ procedure that captures uncertainty over
the possible violations of parallel trends. To do so, I first generalize the DID design beyond the
parallel trends assumption to the full space of possible trend assumptions. I then decompose the
population ATT into two parameters, one of which is characterized by only sampling uncertainty
and the other by counterfactual uncertainty. I then show how scholars can calibrate a prior dis-
tribution on the causal parameter based on pre-treatment outcome trends and the control groups
post-treatment deviation from pre-treatment trends, both of which inform the plausibility of differ-
ent possible trend assumptions. Finally, I derive the conditions under which the empirical Bayes’
uncertainty intervals I propose have correct coverage.
3.4 Generalized Nonparametric DID framework
To generalize the canonical DID design, I introduce the parameter Δ, which quantifies the dif-
ference in (1) the pre- to post-treatment change in treated units’ mean outcomes had the treatment
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not occurred and (2) the pre- to post-treatment change in control units’ mean outcomes. Parallel
trends is a special case of this general representation in which Δ = 0; however, the space of Δ also
captures all possible ways in which parallel trends could be false. Under stratified, simple random
sampling from a target population, the parameter Δ is defined as
Δ = E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 (0) | 𝑧𝑖 = 1]︸                ︷︷                ︸
Inestimable
−E [𝑌𝑖𝑇−1 | 𝑧𝑖 = 1]︸               ︷︷               ︸
Estimable
−
E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 | 𝑧𝑖 = 0]︸            ︷︷            ︸Estimable −E [𝑌𝑖𝑇−1 | 𝑧𝑖 = 0]︸               ︷︷               ︸Estimable
 , (3.5)
where only the first term, E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 (0) | 𝑧𝑖 = 1], cannot be estimated from sample data. This general
representation of the difference in counterfactual trends between treated and control units leads
to Proposition 5 below. The proof of this proposition and all others are in the supplementary
materials.
Proposition 5. Under stratified, simple random sampling from a target population, P𝑁 , the differ-
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When the parallel trends assumption holds, i.e., Δ = 0, then the DID estimator’s expected value
is equal to the average treatment effect in the treated population. However, if the parallel trends
assumption does not hold, i.e., Δ ≠ 0, then the expected value of the DID estimator differs from





enables identification of ATT under any assumption about the value of Δ, whether Δ = 0 (parallel
trends) or otherwise.
In addition, the decomposition of ATT in Proposition 5 clarifies that ATT is a function of
two quantities, inferences of which are subject to two different types of uncertainty under random




, is subject to only sampling
uncertainty due to the inability to observe all units in a population. Inference of the other quantity,
Δ, is subject to counterfactual uncertainty due to the inability to observe counterfactual outcomes
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The standard parallel trends assumption asserts not only that Δ = 0, but also that there is no
uncertainty in the value of Δ. Hence, in the canonical DID design, overall uncertainty in one’s





is equal to a descriptive difference between treated and control populations.
In the argument to follow, the statistical representation of counterfactual uncertainty in the
value of Δ is induced not by a classical mechanism, such as random sampling or random assign-
ment. Instead, randomness reflects a subjective, prior distribution due to uncertainty about treated
units’ unobserved counterfactual outcomes in the post-treatment period.
3.5 Empirical Bayes’ Identification and Inference under Uncertainty in Parallel Trends
The decomposition of the ATT into the expected value of the DID estimator, subject to only
sampling uncertainty, and Δ, subject to counterfactual uncertainty, results in one linear equation
with one known (or estimable) parameter — E [DID] — and two unknown parameters — ATT
and Δ. (See Equation 3.6.) Hence, without imposing a restriction on the value of the nuisance
parameter Δ, the ATT is unidentified (and, indeed, has infinitely many solutions). We can achieve
identification by imposing an assumption on the value of Δ such that only one value of ATT is




— which is known in a finite sample and unknown, but
estimable, under random sampling from a superpopulation. Yet referring back to Equation (3.5), an
assumption about Δ boils down to an assumption about a component of the target parameter itself
— namely, the mean of treated units’ counterfactual outcomes. Thus, a restriction on the value of
Δ elides any statistical representation of the fundamental uncertainty that arises from the inability
to observe treated units’ counterfactual outcomes. In this section, I draw on the Bayesian notion
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of identification in probability (Drèze, 1972; Drèze, 1975; Drèze, 1976)12 to derive an empirical
Bayes’ procedure that does not require exact restrictions on Δ to identify the ATT and is able to
statistically capture counterfactual uncertainty.
Let 𝑝 (Δ) denote a prior probability distribution function (PDF) on Δ, which, when individual
outcomes are unbounded, can take on any real number. However, some values of Δ will typically be
more plausible than others, which is reflected by their differing prior probability densities. In this
context, we can refer to identification in probability (Drèze, 1972; Drèze, 1975; Drèze, 1976) of
the ATT as follows: Instead of an exact, deterministic restriction on the value of Δ, we can instead
impose such a restriction on the value of E [Δ] such that only one value is consistent with E [ATT]




.13 By imposing a distribution on Δ and a concomitant assumption on
E [Δ] rather than Δ itself, we statistically account for counterfactual uncertainty that arises from
the inability to observe treated units’ counterfactual outcomes. Such counterfactual uncertainty
implies that even if the expected difference in trends were equal to 0 (analogous to the canonical
parallel trends assumption), other values of Δ are plausible and induce uncertainty in our inferences
of ATT.
One concern, however, is that an idiosyncratic prior distribution will overly drive our inferences
of ATT. Therefore, to maximize the quality of information that drives our inferences of ATT, I
propose an empirical Bayes’ approach (so named in Robbins, 1956; Robbins, 1964) wherein the
prior distribution is not fixed before the realization of data, but is informed by pre-treatment data
instead. In the developments to follow, I propose a procedure that uses the machinery of regression
to calibrate the parameters of a Normal prior distribution on Δ to information contained in pre-
treatment data and the control group’s change in outcomes from the pre- to post-treatment period.
As alluded to above, this approach is conservative, especially in contrast to the canonical DID
12For valuable discussions on this topic, see Aldrich (2002, especially pp. 87–96) Berger (1985), Dawid (1979),
Gustafson (2005) and Gustafson (2009), Hsiao (1983), Kadane (1975), Leamer (1978, especially Chapter 7), Neath
and Samaniego (1997), Poirier (1998), Richard (1973), Rothenberg (1971) and Zellner (1971, especially pp. 253–258).
13In this framework, I avoid the debate about whether identification of a parameter ought to be conceived as a
property of a likelihood function Kadane (1975) or a prior distribution (lindley1972). Since identification of E [ATT]
is defined with reference to its posterior distribution, given a value or estimate of E [DID], identification can be
satisfied by conditions on either the likelihood function or prior distribution.
88
design, which is characterized by a degenerate prior probability distribution concentrated on the
assumption of parallel trends.
Before laying out this procedure, first consider (for simplicity) finite sample inference. Then
define a Normal prior distribution on the nuisance parameter Δ, which is a conservative choice due
to the Normal distribution’s property of maximum entropy among distributions with finite variance
(Cover and Thomas, 1991; Harte, 2011).14 Based on the definition of Δ in a finite sample, a
























Because of the closure of the Normal distributions under linear combinations and the fact that





𝑦𝑖𝑇 (0) ∼ N
(













𝑖=1 (𝑦𝑖𝑇 − 𝑦𝑖𝑇−1). Thus, to calibrate the
prior distribution on Δ, we need to calibrate only the mean (which we can then shift by the observed
values of ?̄?1𝑇−1 and ?̄?0𝑇− ?̄?0𝑇−1) and variance of the mean of treated units’ counterfactual outcomes.
To do this calibration, first denote a predictive (machine-learning) model by ?̂?𝑧 (·), where 𝑧 ∈
{0, 1} indicates whether the model is fit in the control (𝑧 = 0) or treated (𝑧 = 1) group. Once
?̂?𝑧 (·) has generated predictions for all control units and for all treated units, we can stochastically
14For a formal proof of this property, see McElreath (2020, pp. 306–307), which is based on the treatment in Conrad
(2005).
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impute the mean of treated units’ counterfactual outcomes in a way that accounts for pre-treatment
outcome trends and the control groups post-treatment deviation from pre-treatment trends:














where ˆ̄𝑌𝑇 (0) is the imputed mean of treated units’ control potential outcomes and the prediction of
a treated unit’s counterfactual outcome, 𝑌𝑖𝑇 (0), is written in uppercase, which indicates that it is a
random quantity.
In principle, any machine-learning model can be used to generate the predictive distribution of
ˆ̄𝑌𝑇 (0). In the Montalvo (2011) example and the algorithm below, I use a linear time trend regression
with individual fixed effects, although the inferential procedure to follow is by no means wedded to
this particular choice. Inference of the ATT may of course be sensitive to the choice of specifically
how to calibrate the prior distribution on Δ. To lay out the regression procedure for predicting ˆ̄𝑌𝑇 (0)
(and thus implying a distribution on Δ), consider, first, how to generate the predictive distribution
of the mean of treated units’ counterfactual outcomes and, second, how to adjust this distribution
by the expected prediction error in the control group.
First, let 𝒙1,pre be the model matrix of explanatory variables for the treated group in the
pre-treatment period. Denote the treated group’s pre-treatment outcomes as 𝒚1,pre. Then let
?̂?1,pre = 𝒙1,pre ?̂?1 be the linear projection of 𝒚1,pre onto the space of 𝒙1,pre, where ?̂?1 is under-
stood not as an estimator for the parameter of a probability model, but instead simply as ?̂?1 =
arg min
𝜷1∈R𝐾
𝒚1,pre − 𝒙1,pre𝜷12. With the vector ?̂?1, it is straightforward to generate predictions of
treated units’ post-treatment outcomes had pre-treatment trends continued uninterrupted: ?̂?1𝑇 (0) =
𝒙1,𝑇 ?̂?1. The vector ?̂?1𝑇 (0) contains the post-treatment projections that are most consistent with
pre-treatment trends (i.e., based on the 𝜷1 that minimizes the sum of squared residuals in the pre-
treatment period). Yet even if a particular projection is the most plausible, there are still other
projections that remain plausible, albeit slightly less so. Such other projections are captured by the
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other values of 𝜷1 that fit the pre-treatment data, although not as well as the vector ?̂?1 that mini-
mizes the sum of squared residuals. To capture this uncertainty over the set of plausible projections









𝑛1−𝐾 and 𝝐1 = 𝒚1,pre − 𝒙1,pre ?̂?1. This
expression for 𝑆21,pre implies that, all else equal, the more accurate one’s projections are in the
pre-treatment period and the more pre-treatment data one has, then the more certain will be one’s
extrapolations to the post-treatment period.
Second, beyond the existence of pre-treatment data in the treated group, we can also directly
assess the prediction error of the same linear projection in the control group, 𝒚0𝑇 − ?̂?0𝑇 , where
?̂?0𝑇 = ?̂?0𝒙0,𝑇 , and ?̂?0, 𝒙0,𝑇 , 𝒚0,pre and 𝒙0,pre are defined analogously to how they were in the treated
group. The control group’s post-treatment deviation from its pre-treatment trend can inform what
the same deviation from trend would have been in the treated group in the absence of treatment.
Hence, in addition to information from pre-treatment data, we can also draw upon a measure of
exactly how informative pre-treatment data are for post-treatment outcomes.
Thus, to calibrate the Normal prior distribution on the mean of treated units’ counterfactual
outcomes, which implies a Normal prior distribution on Δ after shifting the distribution by the





























𝑠𝑖 𝑗 , (3.12)







The reliability of this procedure in terms of finite sample coverage depends on how much the
true mean of treated units’ counterfactual outcomes differs from the most plausible value of that













𝑌𝑖𝑇 (0) as given in Equation (3.10). Consider finite sample
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inference with a fixed level of 𝛼 ∈ (0, 1) and a Normal prior distribution on Δ. A two-sided
(1 − 𝛼) 100% uncertainty interval brackets ATT with probability at least as great as 1 − 𝛼 for any





























By contrast, when Equation (3.13) is false, a two-sided (1 − 𝛼) 100% uncertainty interval brackets











( ?̂?𝑖𝑇 − 𝑦𝑖𝑇 )
 ≤ Φ−11−𝛼/2 Var [Δ]1/2, (3.14)
where Φ−11−𝛼/2 is the quantile function of the standard Normal distribution evaluated at 1 − 𝛼/2.
The coverage properties of the empirical Bayes’ inferential procedure depend fundamentally
on the prior distribution of Δ. If the predictions in treated and control groups have equal expected
deviations from their true values, then the left-hand side of the inequality in (3.14) is equal to
0 and the (1 − 𝛼) 100% uncertainty interval will always possess proper coverage no matter the
variance of Δ. By contrast, in the (likely) event that Equation (3.13) does not hold exactly, correct
coverage depends on the magnitude of the expected difference in prediction errors relative to the
level of uncertainty in Δ. For example, a violation of equal expected deviation from trends in
Equation (3.13) would have to be roughly twice the standard deviation of Δ in order for the 95%
uncertainty interval to have coverage probability less than 0.95. Therefore, even if counterfactual
patterns like Ashenfelter’s dip (Ashenfelter, 1978) — common in, e.g., job training programs —
and regression to the mean more broadly (Daw and Hatfield, 2018) exist, the proposed uncertainty
intervals will maintain proper coverage so long as such patterns do not deviate too extremely from
the data used to calibrate the variance of Δ.
To implement this empirical Bayes’ procedure in practice, we can draw on what Gelman and
Hill (2006, chapter 7) term an “informal Bayesian approach.” In this procedure, given in Algorithm
1, we set the hyperparameters of a multivariate Normal prior distribution,N𝐾 (𝝁,𝚺), on the treated
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group model’s 𝐾 dimensional vector, 𝜷1, to 𝝁 = ?̂?1 and 𝚺 = ?̂?1. We then repeatedly draw from
this multivariate Normal prior distribution and generate plausible predictions of the counterfactual
mean outcome of treated units, which imply plausible values of Δ. With this simulation-based
approximation to the distribution of Δ, we can then generate a simulation-based approximation to
the posterior distribution of ATT by taking D̂ID − Δ.
When sampling uncertainty exists in addition to counterfactual uncertainty, pre-treatment out-
come data and the control group’s change in outcomes from the pre- to post-treatment period can-
not be directly observed. Nevertheless, the procedure for calibrating the distribution of Δ remains
informative about Δ under the assumption that the realized sample approximates the population.
This assumption is equivalent to the standard assumption in the nonparametric bootstrap (Efron
and Tibshirani, 1994) and, hence, it can be used to combine both counterfactual and sampling un-
certainty. As Algorithm 1 shows, each treated unit has a random distribution of imputations for its
missing potential outcome, 𝑌𝑖𝑇 (0) for all 𝑖 ∈ {𝑛0 + 1, . . . , 𝑛}, and all control units have an expected
individual prediction for their post-treatment outcomes, ?̂?𝑖𝑇 for all 𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛0}. These quantities
imply not only a distribution on Δ in the superpopulation (based on the realized sample as an ap-
proximating distribution), but also a distribution on the finite sample Δ for whichever units happen
to have been sampled (with replacement) via the bootstrap. With treated units’ random imputations
of their missing potential outcomes and control units’ individual predictions of post-treatment out-
comes, it is straightforward to generate the distributions on ATT for a given bootstrapped sample
and the overall distribution of ATT over all samples.
When the analogous population version of Equation (3.13) is true, the (1 − 𝛼) 100% uncer-
tainty intervals will always have correct coverage regardless of the prior variance of Δ. How-
ever, when Equation (3.13) is false, coverage depends on the magnitude of the violation of Equa-
tion (3.13) vis-á-vis the overall variance of D̂ID−Δ, which consists of the variances of D̂ID and Δ,
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. The inner expectations and variances, defined
conditional on a realized sample, reflect counterfactual uncertainty due to the inability to observe
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sampled units’ counterfactual outcomes. The outer expectations and variances, defined over the
set of bootstrapped samples, reflect how causal quantities vary across samples.
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Algorithm 1: Inference of ATT
Data: Long-format dataframe with variables measured over all time periods















2 Set ?̂?𝑧 ← arg min
𝜷𝑧 ∈R𝐾
𝒚𝑧,pre − 𝒙z,pre𝜷𝑧2 for 𝑧 ∈ {0, 1} and 𝚺1 ← 𝝐 ′1𝝐1𝑛1−𝐾 (𝒙′1,pre𝒙1,pre)−1
3 Generate predictions for control units’ post-treatment outcomes, ?̂?0,𝑇 ← 𝒙0,𝑇 ?̂?0
4 Set hyperparameters of multivariate Normal prior distribution,N𝐾 (𝝁,𝚺), on treated group model’s
𝐾 dimensional parameter vector, 𝜷1, to 𝝁← ?̂?1 and 𝚺← ?̂?1
5 for 𝑠 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑆}, where 𝑆 is the total number of draws, do
6 Randomly draw coefficient vector from N𝐾 (𝝁,𝚺) and call this vector ?̃?𝑠
7 Generate predictions for treated units’ counterfactual post-treatment outcomes
?̂?𝑠1,𝑇 (0) ← 𝒙1,𝑇 ?̃?
𝑠
8 end
9 if target is ATTS𝑛 then
10 for 𝑠 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑆}, do
















12 Set difference in counterfactual trends




















13 Estimate effect ÂTT






, . . . , ÂTT
𝑆
}
16 else if target is ATTP𝑁 then
17 for 𝑟 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑅}, where 𝑅 is the total number of draws, do
18 Randomly draw with replacement samples of size 𝑛0 and 𝑛1 from {𝑦𝑖0, . . . , 𝑦𝑖𝑇 , ?̂?𝑖𝑇 }𝑛0𝑖=1
and
{


















20 for 𝑠 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑆} do




































23 Estimate effect ÂTT
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The output of Algorithm 1 consists of a simulation-based approximation to the posterior distri-
bution of the ATT, which captures both sampling (if it exists) and counterfactual uncertainty. Since
the posterior distribution is Normal, the most probable value of the ATT will be the mean of this
distribution (see Jaynes, 2003, pp. 172–175). Hence, the maximum a posteriori (MAP) point esti-
mate is the mean of the output returned by Algorithm 1. Scholars can combine this point estimate
with (1 − 𝛼)100% uncertainty intervals for 𝛼 ∈ (0, 1) by evaluating the lower (𝛼/2) and upper
(1 − 𝛼/2) quantiles of the simulation-based approximation to the posterior distribution of ATT.
To demonstrate this algorithm, consider again the example from Montalvo (2011). In this
study, a reasonable choice for calibrating the distribution of Δ is a linear time trend with individual
fixed effects:
?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 for 𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛0} and 𝑡 ∈ {0, . . . , 𝑇 − 1} (3.15)
?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 for 𝑖 ∈ {𝑛0 + 1, . . . , 𝑛} and 𝑡 ∈ {0, . . . , 𝑇 − 1} , (3.16)
where ?̂?𝑖𝑡 is the predicted value of the outcome for unit 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝛽0 is an intercept term, 𝛽1 is the
coefficient of 𝑡, which is a counter that is equal to 0 in the first baseline period and increases by 1
for each succeeding period up to the last pre-treatment period, and 𝛼𝑖 is the individual fixed effect
for the 𝑖th unit. Separately fitting the two trends to control and treated groups in Equations 3.15
and 3.16 is equivalent to
?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑧𝑖 + 𝜃𝑧𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 for 𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛} and 𝑡 ∈ {0, . . . , 𝑇 − 1} , (3.17)
where 𝛽2 is the coefficient of the treatment variable, 𝑧𝑖, and 𝜃 is the coefficient of the interaction
between treatment and the time index. The inclusion of the interaction term enables differential
pre-treatment trends between treated and control groups.
For inference in a finite sample, the data — 𝑦𝑖𝑡 , 𝑧𝑖 and 𝑡 — are fixed for all units, while the vec-
tor of coefficients is random. (See Steps 4–6 in Algorithm 1.) Since the distribution on the vector
of coefficients 𝜷1 is multivariate Normal, the distribution on 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is univariate Normal. The expected
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value of 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is E [𝜖𝑖𝑡] = 0 since the predictive models are fit with individual intercept terms for each
unit. The variance of 𝜖𝑖𝑡 , which is derived from the expression for the variance of a linear combina-
tion of correlated random variables, is Var [𝜖𝑖𝑡] =
𝐾∑
𝑘=1





𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑘𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑙 Cov (𝛽𝑘 , 𝛽𝑙),
where 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑘 and 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑙 are the respective values (including the intercepts) for the 𝑘 𝑡ℎ and 𝑙th independent
variables of the 𝑖th unit in the 𝑡th period. The distribution on 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is derived not from a probability
model on the outcome, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 , but from a random distribution on 𝜷1 that is calibrated to pre-treatment
data.
The predictions in Equations (3.15) and (3.16) can then be used to generate the expected pre-
dictions and corresponding uncertainty intervals of the mean post-treatment outcome in treated and
control groups, respectively. Step 4 in ?? above implies that the expected coefficient vector in the
treated group is E [𝜷1] = ?̂?1. Hence, in the treated and control groups, the expected predictions
can be written as 𝒙1,𝑇 ?̂?1. Figure 3.2 illustrates the trends fit separately to pre-treatment data in
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Figure 3.2: Linear time trends separately fit to pre-treatment data in treated and control groups
(data from Montalvo, 2011)
Once we have generated predictions of the the post-treatment mean outcomes in treated and
control groups based on pre-treatment trends, we can then impute the mean of treated units’ post-
treatment outcomes in the absence of treatment according to the imputation scheme given in Step
11. Following this imputation, we can then estimate ATTS𝑛 according to Steps 12 – 13 in ??.
The output of Algorithm 1 is an entire simulation-based approximation to the posterior distribu-
tion of ATT. From this entire distribution, we can calculate a MAP point estimate, a (1 − 𝛼) 100 un-
certainty interval, or various other features of the distribution. Given the use of regression tools to
calibrate the prior distribution on Δ, which in turn informs the MAP point estimate and (1 − 𝛼) 100
uncertainty interval, the procedure thus far might seem only to be proposing a new parametric
model for DID designs (much like recent literature that incorporates group-specific time trends
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into regression specifications, e.g., Dobkin et al., 2018; Goodman-Bacon, 2021; Bhuller et al.,
2013). Yet, as mentioned at the outset, this paper’s focus is on inference, not estimation. Hence,
Corollary 1 below shows that it is possible to represent the MAP point estimator of the posterior
distribution returned by Algorithm 1 as a standard model-based estimator. Yet despite this equiv-
alence in terms of estimation, the empirical Bayes’ procedure above has different implications for
inference.






, is numerically equivalent to the model-












( ?̂?𝑖𝑇 − 𝑦𝑖𝑇 ) . (3.18)
In terms of inference, the procedure in Algorithm 1 implies that Equation (3.18) has at least
two key differences from a model-based estimator: First, according to Algorithm 1, the expression
in Equation (3.18) represents a random distribution on the parameter ATT conditional on a real-
ized sample. Hence, in contrast to a model-based estimator, Equation (3.18) does not represent a
single point estimate that varies across possible samples from a population. Second, model-based
estimators, such as two-way fixed effects regression, are often justified based on their equivalence
with a model-free estimator that recovers the ATT under an identification assumption about poten-
tial outcomes. Equation (3.18), by contrast, represents a random distribution on the ATT that is
induced by a prior distribution over the space of possible identification assumption (i.e., the space
of possible values of the mean of treated units’ counterfactual outcomes) in a fully generalized
DID design.
Insofar as this model extracts information from pre-treatment data to inform the Normal prior
distribution on Δ, the resulting inferences of ATT will be sensitive to the choice of prior distribu-
tion. Fortunately, this approach permits straightforward assessments of how one’s inferences of
ATT would change under different prior distributions on Δ. In general, there are many ways to
calibrate the distribution on Δ, such as by incorporating various weights for each time period and
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autoregressive structures, such as those in Bloom, Riccio, and Verma (2005), Miratrix (2019) and
others. Section 3.6 assesses the robustness of results to alternative model choices to calibrate the
prior distribution. Despite the sensitivity of this approach, it will be less than that of the canon-
ical DID design wherein the identifying restriction that Δ = 0 is equivalent to a degenerate prior
probability distribution on Δ that is concentrated on the assumption of parallel trends (Δ = 0).
3.6 Comparing and combining sampling versus counterfactual uncertainty
Thus far, I have proceeded by decomposing the ATT into the expected value of the DID esti-
mator, which is equal to the difference in after-minus-before means between treated and control
populations, and the difference in counterfactual trends. When one samples the entire population
of interest, there is no sampling uncertainty for inference of the first quantity, but counterfactual
uncertainty exists for the second. This section now compares the practical stakes in the Montalvo
(2011) study of (1) erroneously using sampling-based standard errors for inference of the ATT in
a finite sample versus (2) statistically representing counterfactual uncertainty in a finite sample as
laid out in this paper or (3) capturing both sampling and counterfactual uncertainty when each of
which exists. I then show how scholars can assess the sensitivity of their inferences to the choice
for calibrating the Normal prior distribution on Δ.
Perfunctory variance calculations in the DID design are based on elementary theory of survey
sampling (e.g., Cochran, 1977; Lohr, 2010; Kish, 1965). This theory from survey sampling yields
analytic expressions for the variance of the DID estimator when the assumed treated and control
superpopulations are finite, 𝑁0, 𝑁1 < ∞, and when they are infinite, 𝑁0, 𝑁1 = ∞. In the latter case,















Var [(𝑌𝑇 (1) − 𝑌𝑇−1) | 𝑍𝑇 = 1] . (3.19)
The two unknown superpopulation variances in Equation (3.19) can be unbiasedly and consistently
estimated by
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(𝑌𝑇 (1) − 𝑌𝑇−1)
))2
, (3.21)
assuming that 𝑛0, 𝑛1 > 1. Interval estimation and hypothesis tests can then proceed via Normal
approximations that appeal to central limit theorems or the nonparametric bootstrap (as proposed
for the DID design by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004).
The perfunctory use of such survey sampling-based standard errors when the target is a causal
quantity in a finite sample often leaves information on the table. In the context of the Montalvo
(2011) study, Table 3.1 below shows the differences between point estimates and standard errors
calculated via the standard sampling-based approach to inference, the method described in this
paper and the combination of both types of uncertainty.
Type of uncertainty:
Sampling Counterfactual Both
Point estimate of ATT -8.56∗ -8.76∗ -8.76∗
(0.88) (0.62) (1.14)
Note: ∗p<0.05
Table 3.1: Point estimates and standard errors under different inferential procedures in the Mon-
talvo (2011) study
The point estimate in the first column of ≈ −8.56 is the estimate from the usual DID estimator
of ATT under the assumption of parallel trends. The MAP estimate of ≈ −8.76 in the second
column is the expected value of the posterior distribution of ATT in which the prior distribution on
Δ is calibrated via the FE linear time trends in Equations (3.15) and (3.16). This point estimate of
≈ −8.76 differs slightly from the estimate of ≈ −8.56 calculated under the assumption of parallel
trends. This slight difference is because the most probable difference in counterfactual trends,
i.e., E [Δ], is set to that which is most consistent with the pre-treatment data given the trends in
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Equations (3.15) and (3.16). The most probable difference in counterfactual trends is ≈ 0.2, which
in turn yields the MAP estimate for the ATT of ≈ −8.76. The point estimate of ≈ −8.56 under
the parallel trends assumption assumes a difference in counterfactual trends slightly less consistent
with pre-treatment trends.
As Table 3.1 also shows, the standard errors under counterfactual uncertainty are roughly 30%
smaller than the standard errors under sampling uncertainty. Note that, for finite sample inference,
the nonparametric bootstrap implicitly encodes a prior distribution on Δ in which E [Δ] = 0 and
Var [Δ] is equal to the sum of Equations (3.20) and (3.21). This approach clearly leaves informa-
tion on the table given the strong trends in the pre-treatment period that continue (in the control
group) into the post-treatment period. However, the standard error under the combination of coun-
terfactual and sampling uncertainty via the nonparametric bootstrap is roughly 0.94. Hence, the
corresponding 95% interval is wider than either of the intervals under only one source of uncer-
tainty. All of the 𝑝-values are significant — i.e., have uncertainty intervals that exclude 0 — at the
𝛼 = 0.05 level. Nevertheless, the substantial differences in uncertainty point to the practical impli-
cations of clarifying exactly what the target estimand is and which forms of statistical uncertainty
can be interpreted as counterfactual uncertainty surrounding that estimand.
Given that inference of the ATT will be driven by the choice of how to calibrate the prior dis-
tribution on Δ, it is important as a matter of practice to assess the sensitivity of inferences to this
choice. The burgeoning literature on more flexible DID estimators that directly impute counter-
factual potential outcomes can be helpful in this regard. For example, two-way linear fixed effects
(Imai and Kim, 2019; Imai and Kim, 2021), interactive fixed-effects, (Gobillon and Magnac, 2016;
Bai, 2009) synthetic control (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller,
2010; Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller, 2012), as well as recent generalizations of it (Amjad,
Shah, and Shen, 2018; Xu, 2017), and matrix completion (Athey et al., 2020) methods can all
be helpful for calibrating the prior distribution on Δ, even though these methods were originally
developed in a different context focused on direct estimation of the ATT.
One issue is that the synthetic control and matrix completion methods require a large number
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of pre-treatment periods and control observations. For example, Xu (2017, p. 73) recommends
at least 10 pre-treatment periods and 40 control units. With only 4 pre-treatment periods, the
gsynth and MCPanel packages in R are unable to fit a model to the Montalvo (2011) data and
return error messages due to the insufficient number of pre-treatment periods. Instead, I assess the
sensitivity of the FE linear time trends in Equations (3.15) and (3.16) to a linear lagged dependent
variable (DV) and time trend with unit fixed effects (as in Doudchenko and Imbens, 2017) given
in Equations (3.22a) and (3.22b) below:
?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑡 for 𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛0} and 𝑡 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑇 − 1} (3.22a)
?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑡 for 𝑖 ∈ {𝑛0 + 1, . . . , 𝑛} and 𝑡 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑇 − 1} , (3.22b)
where the baseline time period, 𝑡 = 0, is excluded since the lagged mean PP vote share percentage
does not exist for the first time period.
The posterior distributions of the ATT under when calibrating the distribution of Δ to either
Equations (3.15) and (3.16) or Equations (3.22a) and (3.22b) are given in Figure 3.3 below.
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Figure 3.3: Posterior distributions of ATT given different choices for calibrating distribution of Δ
(data from Montalvo, 2011)
Under both distributions on Δ, the ATT is negative. However, the effect under the FE linear
time trend calibration suggests an expected ATT with slightly greater magnitude. Like any sensi-
tivity analysis, the results in Figure 3.3 cannot tell us which among the differing approaches for
calibrating Δ is most plausible. Therefore, interpreting the sensitivity analysis requires careful
assessment of which approach is indeed most plausible. Nevertheless, inferences are relatively
robust under these two choices and it is straightforward to assess robustness to other choices as
well.
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3.7 Discussion and Conclusion
I have argued that uncertainty in the ATT can be decomposed into sampling uncertainty of the
DID estimator and counterfactual uncertainty of the difference in counterfactual trends. In contrast
to the canonical DID design, statistical uncertainty depends on the difference in counterfactual
trends distribution, which is calibrated to pre-treatment data via a predictive model fit separately to
treated and control groups. Uncertainty in such inferences will accurately represent the inference
from observed to counterfactual outcomes, which is the causal inference scholars are often most
interested in. Standard design-based methods in the DID design reflect only sampling uncertainty,
not counterfactual uncertainty.
The method I propose in the paper is just one way to express counterfactual uncertainty in
the DID and other related designs. Inference under uncertainty in the difference in counterfactual
trends is also possible via tools developed for the synthetic control design. Inference in this context
proceeds by generating a distribution of either “in-time placebos” or “in-space placebos” (Abadie,
Diamond, and Hainmueller, 2012, pp. 499–500) and then assessing the proportion of placebos
that are at least as extreme as the estimated effect.15 Recently, Hasegawa, Webster, and Small
(2019) and Keele, Hasegawa, and Small (2019) have applied such placebo-based inference to the
DID design. However, this inferential procedure will be uninformative for a given null hypothesis
about the ATT when there are few pre-treatment periods, which is why Abadie, Diamond, and
Hainmueller (2012, p. 500) “do not recommend using this method when . . . the number of
pretreatment periods is small.” Many DID designs do indeed have too few pre-treatment periods for
placebo-based inference to be informative, which makes inference proposed in this paper attractive
in such cases. In the Montalvo (2011) study, for example, there are 4 pre-treatment periods and,
if one were to calculate placebo DID estimates on each pair of adjacent pre-treatment periods, the
15This form of placebo-based inference has been used in many applied studies on a range of topics. Examples in-
clude studies on the effect of direct democracy on naturalization decisions for immigrants (Hainmueller and Hangart-
ner, 2019), the personal connections of former U.S. Treasury Secretary (2009 – 2013) Timothy Geithner on stock
market prices (Acemoğlu et al., 2016), minimum wage laws on subsequent employment and wages (Dube and Zip-
perer, 2015), immigration employment laws on the size of immigrant populations (Bohn, Lofstrom, and Raphael,
2014), and employer health insurance laws on health insurance coverage and labor demand (Buchmueller, DiNardo,
and Valletta, 2011) among others.
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minimum possible placebo-based p-value would be 0.25. As I have attempted to illustrate, more
informative inferences of ATTS𝑛 are possible despite the existence of only 4 pre-treatment periods.
Hence, the method in this paper offers a valuable complement to other methods of causal inference
when identification is not based on claims about the assignment mechanism.
The arguments and methods proposed in this paper also relate to some of the foundational lit-
erature on causal inference in observational studies (Cochran, 1965; Cochran, 1983), which states
that the quality of an observational design can be evaluated based on the extent to which it is anal-
ogous with an ideal randomized experiment (see also Bind and Rubin, 2019; Hansen and Bowers,
2008; Rubin, 2007; Rubin, 2008). However, the DID design’s core identification assumption is
akin to the “scientific” as opposed to the “statistical solution” to causal inference (Holland, 1986,
p. 947).16 The nature of uncertainty under the “scientific solution” is clearly explicated by Abadie,
Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010, pp. 496–497) who write that statistical uncertainty represents
“ignorance about the ability of the control group to reproduce the counterfactual of how the treated
units would have evolved in the absence of treatment.” One potentially fruitful extension would
be to compare the inferential properties via the method proposed in this paper with others, such as
placebo-based 𝑝-values, in a range of contexts.
Other possible extensions include applying the inferential method in this paper to closely re-
lated designs. Examples of relevant designs include the aforementioned synthetic control, as well
as others that draw upon measurements of the same units over time as a source of causal lever-
age (Blackwell and Glynn, 2018; De Boef and Keele, 2008; Wooldridge, 2010). More broadly,
inference in this paper can potentially be extended to designs that solve the “fundamental problem
of causal inference” (Holland, 1986, p. 947) via invariance assumptions on potential outcomes
instead of assumptions about a stochastic assignment mechanism. For example, another common
invariance assumption is continuity of potential outcomes, as in the regression discontinuity de-
sign (Hahn, Todd, and Klaauw, 2001) and, more specifically, the regression discontinuity in time
16By the “scientific solution” to causal inference, as opposed to the “statistical solution,” Holland (1986) refers to
designs based on “invariance” (also known as “homogeneity”) assumptions. These assumptions stipulate, in some
form or another, that an observed quantity is a proxy for an unobservable counterfactual quantity.
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design (Hausman and Rapson, 2018).17 Overall, designs that invoke some form of an invariance
assumption for causal identification are ubiquitous in a range of applications. This paper offers
one way in which expressions of statistical uncertainty can be made to reflect uncertainty in these
designs’ causal conclusions.
17For an approach to inference in the regression discontinuity design based on continuity arguments instead of local
randomization, see Eckles et al. (2020).
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A.0.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. First note that ( ˆ̄𝜏− 𝜏) is equivalent to ˆ̄𝜏 when potential outcomes are centered to have mean
0. Thus, without loss of generality (and without amending notation), assume that the potential










𝑦𝐶𝑖 = 0 and consider the variance of
√
𝑁 ˆ̄𝜏.
From the rules of variance and the derivation of the Difference-in-Means estimator’s variance
in Neyman (1923), it follows that for any 𝑁 = 4, 5, . . .,








𝜎2𝑦𝐶 + 2𝜎𝑦𝑇 ,𝑦𝐶
)
. (A.1)



















Hence, we can write the variance in Equation (A.1) as






























Then, from Conditions 2 and 3, it follows that
lim
𝑁→∞




1 − 𝑝 ⟨𝑦
2
𝐶⟩ + 2⟨𝑦𝐶 𝑦𝑇 ⟩ = 𝜈 (A.2)
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as in Theorem 1 of Freedman (2008) described in Equation (1.2) in the main text.
Now note that with centered potential outcomes we can write 𝑁V̂ar[ ˆ̄𝜏], where V̂ar[ ˆ̄𝜏] is Ney-
man’s conservative variance estimator in Equation (1.9), as follows:






























(1 − 𝑍𝑖)𝑦2𝐶𝑖 .










𝑦2𝑖𝐶 , it follows from conditions 2 and 3 that
lim
𝑁→∞




1 − 𝑝 ⟨𝑦
2
𝐶⟩ + ⟨𝑦2𝑇 ⟩ + ⟨𝑦2𝐶⟩, (A.4)
which, by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, is greater than or equal to 𝜈 in Equation (A.2).
Finally, to establish that 𝑁V̂ar[ ˆ̄𝜏] converges in probability to this constant in Equation (A.4)
that is greater than or equal to 𝜈, we need only to demonstrate that both Var[?̂?𝑦2𝑇 ] and Var[?̂?𝑦2𝐶 ] tend
to 0 as 𝑁 →∞. From elementary theory of survey sampling, it follows that, for any 𝑁 = 4, 5, . . .
Var[?̂?𝑦2𝑇 ] =
















































































(𝑁 − 𝑛𝑇 )
𝑁 − 1 → 1 − 𝑝 and
𝑛𝑇
























𝑦4𝑇𝑖 < 𝐿 < ∞ for each 𝑁 = 4, 5, . . .. Therefore, Var[?̂?𝑦2𝑇 ] → 0 and
Var[?̂?𝑦2
𝐶
] → 0 as 𝑁 →∞, which completes the proof.
□
A.0.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Let Θ𝜏ℎ be the set of hypothetical mean causal effects in the support of the prior distribution.
Also define Θ∗𝜏ℎ ≡ {𝜏ℎ : 𝜏 − 𝜀 < 𝜏ℎ < 𝜏 + 𝜀}, Θ
−
𝜏ℎ
≡ {𝜏ℎ : 𝜏 − 𝜏ℎ ≥ 𝜀} and Θ+𝜏ℎ ≡ {𝜏ℎ : 𝜏ℎ − 𝜏 ≥
𝜀}, where 𝜀 is an arbitrarily small constant in which 𝜀 > 0. The sets Θ−𝜏 and Θ+𝜏 contain the
hypothetical average causal effects that are either too small or too large to be within a distance of
𝜀 from the true average causal effect, 𝜏.
The test-statistic in Equation (1.10) is
√














We can equivalently write this test-statistic as(√
























Then, by the finite population CLT, Slutsky’s theorem, the continuous mapping theorem and
Lemma 1, the first term (√













𝑝→ √𝑐. When 𝜏ℎ ∈ Θ−𝜏ℎ or 𝜏ℎ ∈ Θ
+
𝜏ℎ
, the numerator of the second term,
√
𝑁 (𝜏 − 𝜏ℎ), diverges to either +∞ or −∞. Therefore, the test-statistic diverges in probability,
i.e., the probability that the absolute value of the test-statistic in Equation (1.11) is greater than
𝑚 tends to 1 as 𝑁 → ∞, where 𝑚 is any positive, real number. Given that the standard Normal
distribution is strictly monotonically decreasing in distance from its mean, the probability density
of the standard Normal likelihood tends to 0 as 𝑁 →∞.






𝑓 ( ˆ̄𝜏 | 𝜏ℎ, V̂ar[ ˆ̄𝜏])𝑝(𝜏ℎ)𝑑 𝜏ℎ +
∫
𝜏ℎ∈Θ+?̄?ℎ
𝑓 ( ˆ̄𝜏 | 𝜏ℎ, V̂ar[ ˆ̄𝜏])𝑝(𝜏ℎ)𝑑 𝜏ℎ∫
𝜏ℎ∈Θ?̄?ℎ





=0︷                         ︸︸                         ︷
( lim
𝑁→∞
𝑓 ( ˆ̄𝜏 | 𝜏ℎ, V̂ar[ ˆ̄𝜏])) 𝑝(𝜏ℎ)𝑑 𝜏ℎ +
∫
𝜏ℎ∈Θ+?̄?ℎ
=0︷                         ︸︸                         ︷
( lim
𝑁→∞
𝑓 ( ˆ̄𝜏 | 𝜏ℎ, V̂ar[ ˆ̄𝜏])) 𝑝(𝜏ℎ)𝑑 𝜏ℎ∫
𝜏ℎ∈Θ 𝑓 ( ˆ̄𝜏 | 𝜏ℎ, V̂ar[ ˆ̄𝜏])𝑝(𝜏ℎ)𝑑 𝜏ℎ
= 0,






𝑓 (𝜏ℎ | ˆ̄𝜏, V̂ar[ ˆ̄𝜏])𝑑 𝜏ℎ





𝑓 ( ˆ̄𝜏 | 𝜏ℎ, V̂ar[ ˆ̄𝜏])𝑝(𝜏ℎ)𝑑 𝜏ℎ +
∫
𝜏ℎ∈Θ+?̄?ℎ
𝑓 ( ˆ̄𝜏 | 𝜏ℎ, V̂ar[ ˆ̄𝜏])𝑝(𝜏ℎ)𝑑 𝜏ℎ∫
𝜏ℎ∈Θ?̄?ℎ







𝑓 ( ˆ̄𝜏 | 𝜏ℎ, V̂ar[ ˆ̄𝜏])𝑝(𝜏ℎ)𝑑 𝜏ℎ +
∫
𝜏ℎ∈Θ+?̄?ℎ
𝑓 ( ˆ̄𝜏 | 𝜏ℎ, V̂ar[ ˆ̄𝜏])𝑝(𝜏ℎ)𝑑 𝜏ℎ∫
𝜏ℎ∈Θ?̄?ℎ








− 0 = 1,
which proves the theorem. □
A.0.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. First, define the following subsets
Θ∗𝜏ℎ ≡ {𝜏ℎ : 𝜏 − 𝜑 < 𝜏ℎ < 𝜏 + 𝜑}
Θ−𝜏ℎ ≡ {𝜏ℎ : 𝜏 − 𝜏ℎ ≥ 𝜑}
Θ+𝜏 ≡ {𝜏ℎ : 𝜏 − 𝜏ℎ ≤ −𝜑},
all of which are subsets of Θ𝜏ℎ , the set of hypothetical constant effects in the support of the prior
distribution, 𝑝(𝜏ℎ).




Pr(|𝑡 (𝒁, ?̃?ℎ) − E[𝑡 (𝒁, ?̃?ℎ)] | < 𝜗) = 1,
lim
𝑁→∞
Pr(|𝑡 (𝒁, ?̃?ℎ) − E[𝑡 (𝒁, ?̃?ℎ)] | < 𝜚) = 1,
(A.5)
(A.6)
where 𝜗 and 𝜚 are arbitrarily small constants such that 𝜑, 𝜚 > 0. Since the Difference-in-Means is
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unbiased, note that E[𝑡 (𝒁, ?̃?ℎ)] = 𝜏−𝜏ℎ and E[𝑡 (𝒁, ?̃?ℎ)] = 0, so Equation (A.5) and Equation (A.6)
can be written as 
lim
𝑁→∞
Pr( |𝑡 (𝒁, ?̃?ℎ) − (𝜏 − 𝜏ℎ) | < 𝜗) = 1,
lim
𝑁→∞
Pr( |𝑡 (𝒁, ?̃?ℎ) − 0| < 𝜚) = 1
(A.7)
(A.8)
We can further recast Equation (A.5) as 𝑡 (𝒁, ?̃?ℎ) ∈ (𝜏 − 𝜏ℎ − 𝜗, 𝜏 − 𝜏ℎ + 𝜗) and Equation (A.6) as
𝑡 (𝒁, ?̃?ℎ) ∈ (0 − 𝜚, 0 + 𝜚), and then note that if
𝑡 (𝒁, ?̃?ℎ) ∈ (𝜏 − 𝜏ℎ − 𝜗, 𝜏 − 𝜏ℎ + 𝜗),
then
𝑡 (𝒁, ?̃?ℎ) ∉ (0 − 𝜚, 0 + 𝜚),
whenever 
𝜏ℎ − 𝜏 ≥ 𝜗 + 𝜚 if 𝜏 > 𝜏ℎ,
𝜏ℎ − 𝜏 ≤ −𝜗 − 𝜚 if 𝜏 < 𝜏ℎ.
To complete the proof, simply let 𝜑 = 𝜗 + 𝜚 and then, analogous to the proof of Theorem 1






𝑓 (𝑇 | 𝜏ℎ)𝑝(𝜏ℎ)𝑑 𝜏ℎ +
∫
𝜏ℎ∈Θ+𝜏ℎ
𝑓 (𝑇 | 𝜏ℎ)𝑝(𝜏ℎ)𝑑 𝜏ℎ∫
𝜏ℎ∈Θ𝜏ℎ





=0︷              ︸︸              ︷
( lim
𝑁→∞
𝑓 (𝑇 | 𝜏ℎ)) 𝑝(𝜏ℎ)𝑑 𝜏ℎ +
∫
𝜏ℎ∈Θ+𝜏ℎ
=0︷              ︸︸              ︷
( lim
𝑁→∞
𝑓 (𝑇 | 𝜏ℎ)) 𝑝(𝜏ℎ)𝑑 𝜏ℎ∫
𝜏ℎ∈Θ 𝑓 (𝑇 | 𝜏ℎ)𝑝(𝜏ℎ)𝑑 𝜏ℎ
= 0,






𝑓 (𝜏ℎ | 𝑇)𝑑 𝜏ℎ





𝑓 (𝑇 | 𝜏ℎ)𝑝(𝜏ℎ)𝑑 𝜏ℎ +
∫
𝜏ℎ∈Θ+𝜏ℎ
𝑓 (𝑇 | 𝜏ℎ)𝑝(𝜏ℎ)𝑑 𝜏ℎ∫
𝜏ℎ∈Θ𝜏ℎ







𝑓 (𝑇 | 𝜏ℎ)𝑝(𝜏ℎ)𝑑 𝜏ℎ +
∫
𝜏ℎ∈Θ+𝜏ℎ
𝑓 (𝑇 | 𝜏ℎ)𝑝(𝜏ℎ)𝑑 𝜏ℎ∫
𝜏ℎ∈Θ𝜏ℎ




1) − 0 = 1,
which proves the theorem. □
A.0.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Denoting 𝒀 − 𝒁𝜏ℎ by ?̃?ℎ, note that for 𝑁 = 4, 5, . . .,
Var[𝑡 (𝒁, ?̃?ℎ)] =
𝑁





































































and taking the difference between Equation (A.9) and V̂ar
[ ˆ̄𝜏] yields the desired expression.
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A.0.5 Proof of Proposition 4













𝜏T | 𝜏T , V̂ar[𝜏T ]
)
is the Normal likelihood function in which a value of the TATE, 𝜏T ,
and a conservative plug-in variance estimator, V̂ar[𝜏T ], assign probability density to the realized
Difference-in-Means in the target experiment, 𝜏T . The Normal prior distribution of the TATE, 𝜏T ,
is 𝑝(𝜏T ).
With a Normal likelihood and a Normal prior distribution, it follows that their product is
𝑓
(












































Then note that, after some algebra, it follows that
1
V̂ar[𝜏T]








































































𝜂2 (𝜏T − 𝜁)2
)
. (A.18)











































does not depends on the value of the TATE, 𝜏T , but does depend on V̂ar[𝜏T ] and 𝜏T through 𝜁 . We










𝜂2 (𝜏T − 𝜁)2
)
(A.21)
is a function of 𝜏T , V̂ar[𝜏T ] and 𝜏T , and that it is the Normal density function with mean (location)
parameter equal to 𝜁 and variance (squared scale) parameter equal to 𝜂2.
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Denote the function of 𝜏T and V̂ar[𝜏T ] in Equation (A.20) by 𝑔
(
𝜏T , V̂ar[𝜏T ]
)
and the func-
tion of 𝜏T , V̂ar[𝜏T ] and 𝜏T in Equation (A.21) by 𝑔
(
𝜏T , V̂ar[𝜏T ], 𝜏T
)
, which implies that Equa-
tion (A.19) can be written as 𝑔
(




𝜏T , V̂ar[𝜏T ], 𝜏T
)



















































where lines (A.25) and (A.26) follow from the fact that 𝑔
(
𝜏T , V̂ar[𝜏T ]
)
does not depend on 𝜏T
and that 𝑔
(
𝜏T , V̂ar[𝜏T ], 𝜏T
)








𝜏T , V̂ar[𝜏T ], 𝜏T
)
𝑓 (V̂ar[𝜏T ], 𝜏T ) (A.27)
𝑓
(
𝜏T | 𝜏T , V̂ar[𝜏T ]
)
𝑝(𝜏T ) = 𝑔
(
𝜏T , V̂ar[𝜏T ], 𝜏T
)
𝑓 (V̂ar[𝜏T ], 𝜏T ) (A.28)
𝑓
(
𝜏T | 𝜏T , V̂ar[𝜏T ]
)
𝑝(𝜏T )
𝑓 (V̂ar[𝜏T ], 𝜏T )
= 𝑔
(
































𝜇priorV̂ar[𝜏T ] + 𝜏T𝜎2prior
V̂ar[𝜏T ] + 𝜎2prior
.
Then taking 𝜎2post − 𝜎2prior and 𝜇post − 𝜇prior yields the desired expressions.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. By the definition of ΔP𝑁 in Equation (3.5) and the unbiasedness of the DID estimator




= E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 (1) | 𝑧𝑖 = 1] −
E [𝑌𝑖𝑇−1 | 𝑧𝑖 = 1]−(E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 | 𝑧𝑖 = 0] − E [𝑌𝑖𝑇−1 | 𝑧𝑖 = 0]), where E [·] is taken over the set of possible






= [E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 (1) | 𝑧𝑖 = 1] − E [𝑌𝑖𝑇−1 | 𝑧𝑖 = 1] − (E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 | 𝑧𝑖 = 0] − E [𝑌𝑖𝑇−1 | 𝑧𝑖 = 0])]
− [E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 (0) | 𝑧𝑖 = 1] − E [𝑌𝑖𝑇−1 | 𝑧𝑖 = 1] − (E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 | 𝑧𝑖 = 0] − E [𝑌𝑖𝑇−1 | 𝑧𝑖 = 0])] .
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= (E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 (1) | 𝑧𝑖 = 1] − E [𝑌𝑖𝑇−1 | 𝑧𝑖 = 1] − E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 | 𝑧𝑖 = 0] + E [𝑌𝑖𝑇−1 | 𝑧𝑖 = 0])
− (E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 (0) | 𝑧𝑖 = 1] − E [𝑌𝑖𝑇−1 | 𝑧𝑖 = 1] − E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 | 𝑧𝑖 = 0] + E [𝑌𝑖𝑇−1 | 𝑧𝑖 = 0])
= E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 (1) | 𝑧𝑖 = 1] − E [𝑌𝑖𝑇−1 | 𝑧𝑖 = 1] − E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 | 𝑧𝑖 = 0] + E [𝑌𝑖𝑇−1 | 𝑧𝑖 = 0]
−E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 (0) | 𝑧𝑖 = 1] + E [𝑌𝑖𝑇−1 | 𝑧𝑖 = 1] + E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 | 𝑧𝑖 = 0] − E [𝑌𝑖𝑇−1 | 𝑧𝑖 = 0]
= E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 (1) | 𝑧𝑖 = 1] − E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 (0) | 𝑧𝑖 = 1]
= E [𝑌𝑖𝑇 (1) − 𝑌𝑖𝑇 (0) | 𝑧𝑖 = 1]︸                             ︷︷                             ︸
ATTP
,
which is equal to ATTP𝑁 as defined in Equation (3.1), thereby proving the proposition. One can
analogously prove the same result in a finite sample, S𝑛, albeit with fewer assumptions since
ATTS𝑛 , D̂IDS𝑛 and ΔS𝑛 are all fixed quantities in a finite sample. □
A.0.6 Proof of Corollary 1















?̂?𝑠𝑖𝑇 (0) and (A.31)





































































( ?̂?𝑖𝑇 − 𝑦𝑖𝑇−1) (A.33)
With the expression for Δimp,𝑠 in Equation (A.33), it follows that D̂ID − Δimp,𝑠 is





































( ?̂?𝑖𝑇 − 𝑦𝑖𝑇 )︸                ︷︷                ︸
Average prediction
error in control group





in which ?̂?1 is a vector of regression coefficients from a pre-period regression of the treated group.







?̂?𝑠𝑖𝑇 (0) = 𝒙1,𝑇 ?̂?1
by the law of large numbers. □
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Appendix B: Simulation Results
Case 1 Simulation parameters: 𝑛𝑇/𝑁 = 0.5, ?̄?𝑇 = 0.1, ?̄?𝐶 = −0.02, 𝑆𝑦𝑇 = 0.06, 𝑆𝑦𝐶 = 0.07, 𝑆𝜏 = 0.14
Average MSE (weak hypotheses) 0.0044
Average MSE (sharp hypotheses) 0.0046
Case 2 Simulation parameters: 𝑛𝑇/𝑁 = 0.5, ?̄?𝑇 = 0.31, ?̄?𝐶 = −0.02, 𝑆𝑦𝑇 = 0.06, 𝑆𝑦𝐶 = 0.07, 𝑆𝜏 = 0.14
Average MSE (weak hypotheses) 0.0045
Average MSE (sharp hypotheses) 0.0046
Case 3 Simulation parameters: 𝑛𝑇/𝑁 = 0.7, ?̄?𝑇 = 0.11, ?̄?𝐶 = −0.02, 𝑆𝑦𝑇 = 0.23, 𝑆𝑦𝐶 = 0.07, 𝑆𝜏 = 0.14
Average MSE (weak hypotheses) 0.0096
Average MSE (sharp hypotheses) 0.0136
Case 4 Simulation parameters: 𝑛𝑇/𝑁 = 0.7, ?̄?𝑇 = 0.1, ?̄?𝐶 = −0.05, 𝑆𝑦𝑇 = 0.06, 𝑆𝑦𝐶 = 0.27, 𝑆𝜏 = 0.36
Average MSE (weak hypotheses) 0.0201
Average MSE (sharp hypotheses) 0.0154
Table B.1: Simulation results
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